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Abstract. In the first chapter of the thesis, We discuss a general context and
provide an overview of the dissertation. Furthermore, we outline the contributions.
In the second chapter, based on the Protection for Sale approach of Grossman
and Helpman (1994), we develop a theoretical model in which exogenously organised
groups provide political contributions to influence trade policy. The incumbent
government cares about contributions, yet at the same time, takes into account
the reactions of voters. We formally consider voting decisions of citizens, assuming
they have heterogeneous ignorance thresholds, and explicitly derive the objective
function of the policy-maker. We find that the resulting equilibrium structure of
protection differs from the standard case. Free trade obtains only if no group lobbies
and ignorance levels are the same. On average, more ignorant groups will have lower
(if any) protection from the policy-maker and, also, groups represented by lobbies
will not always be supported by the incumbent government.
In chapter three, we study and compare the stability of trade policy arrange-
ments in two different regulatory scenarios, one with and one without Preferential
Trade Agreements (PTAs), i.e. current vs modified WTO rules. Unlike the exist-
ing literature, our work considers an extensive choice set of trade constellations,
containing both available PTAs, Customs Unions (CUs) and Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs), as well as Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs), while assuming
unlimited farsightedness of the negotiating parties. With symmetric countries and
under both the current and the modified WTO rules, the Global Free Trade (GFT)
regime emerges as the unique stable outcome. In the case of asymmetry, the re-
sults are driven by the relative size of the countries. If the world is in the vicinity
of symmetry and two out of three countries are close to identical while relatively
smaller than the other one, the area where the GFT regime is stable increases when
prohibiting PTAs. However, when two similar countries are relatively larger, the
availability of PTAs is conducive to the stability of the GFT regime. Finally, if the
world is further away from symmetry, full trade liberalisation is not attainable at
all, and an area where the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) regime is stable appears
in the scenario without PTAs. Thus, the direction of the effect of PTAs on trade
liberalisation depends on the degree of asymmetry among countries.
In the last chapter, we deal with normative social decision making under ambi-
guity. Imagine an individual facing a decision problem affecting society as a whole
and suppose that the choice features uncertainty in the form of belief systems for
each member of the group. By combining the concept of an impartial observer with
that of second-order beliefs, this chapter derives a representation of the preferences
of an individual in such a situation using an axiomatic approach. It ultimately ex-
tends (a generalised version of) Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem (1953) to
include uncertainty by building on the work of Grant et al. (2010) and Seo (2009).
In memory of my father.
To my mother and my sister.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Broadly speaking this thesis is a work in applied economic theory. We extensively
exploit the theoretical tools to examine economic problems of high practical signifi-
cance. In chapters 2, we develop a theoretical model in the context of international
trade to understand the endogenous trade policy formation process. The focus is
on the domestic parties involved. Chapter 3 deals with the issue of preferential vs
multilateral liberalisation under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, implying
the change of our focus from a local to a global perspective. In both chapters, the
strategic interactions among the decision-makers play a crucial role in determining
the trade policy. In chapter 4, we abstract from strategic interactions and contribute
to the normative theory of social decision-making under ambiguity.
1.1. Context and overview
The famous economic historian Douglas Irwin1 starts his book on the history of
the U.S. trade policy with the words of Madison from Federalist 10. There Madison
says ”A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilised nations, and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of the government... Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in
what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be
differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by
neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good...It is in vain to say that
enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them
all subservient to the public good.”2
Madison was correct pointing to the importance of clashing interests in deter-
mining the policy outcomes, but do governments, in general, adjust various benefits
and ”render them all subservient to the public good”? Special interest groups, voters,
policy-makers, all of them have their interests. How are these interests aggregated
when a government decides the policy outcome? This is the central question that we
aim at answering in the context of international trade policy in chapter 2.
1see Irwin (2017)
2The Federalist Papers : No. 10. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp
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McLaren (2016), reviewing the literature on commercial policy, writes: ”In a
democracy, politicians campaign to win an election and thereby gain power; once
they have gained power, they bargain with each other while being influenced by
lobbyists, and the result is a realised policy. A full model would involve all three of the
mechanisms, (i) electoral competition, (ii) legislative bargaining, and (iii) lobbying;
but in practice, these three have tended to be studied separately.”
In chapter 2, we build a model where lobbying and electoral competition are in-
tegrated and, additionally, we consider voters’ heterogeneous ignorance thresholds,
as their reactions to trade policy choices differ in practice (See Ponzeto (2011) and
Wegenast (2010)). How the voters respond to policy choices is an important determi-
nant neglected in political economy models of endogenous trade policy. If citizens are
ignorant, in other words, if they cannot map policy decisions to their welfare, then it
is costless for policy-makers to design and implement a policy that is favourable only
for a specific interest group. But if the voters can map the decisions of politicians
on the changes to their welfare, then the policy-makers do not possess such freedom
in policy choices. Voters’ potential reactions constrain them. In the end, when a
policy-maker chooses a trade policy, his/her motivation to win the election forces a
policy-maker to base the decision on a clear trade-off between the interests of special
interest groups and those of voters.
In our model, organised groups provide political contributions to the incumbent
government to influence its decision on trade policy. The incumbent is exogenously
given, and it faces the utilitarian challenger in the upcoming election. Therefore,
the policy-maker cares about donations, but at the same time, takes the possible
reactions of voters into consideration. Contrary to the tradition in the literature,
we formally define the voting decision of citizens, assuming they are heterogeneously
ignorant and explicitly derive the objective function of a policy-maker. Then we
study the structure of the protection that arises in the political equilibrium of the
model.
There are two stages in the model: in the first stage, lobbyists, representing organ-
ised groups, non-cooperatively and simultaneously decide on contribution functions
contingent on trade policy choices of the incumbent government. In the second stage,
the incumbent government observes the contribution functions offered by lobbyists,
takes the possible responses from the voters into consideration, sets a trade policy
and collects from each lobby the contribution associated with its policy. At the end
an election takes place. The citizens cannot abstain from voting.
At large, in the political equilibrium of a trade policy game that we consider, the
free trade regime, even though it is a social welfare maximising policy in a small,
competitive economy, is less likely as it is attainable only in a particular case. So, in
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our model politicians do adjust the clashing interests, but do not necessarily ”render
them subservient to the public good.”
In addition to standard import/export taxes/subsidies, trade agreements are an-
other commonly used instruments in the hands of the governments to conduct trade
policy. In 1860 the first trade agreement, the Anglo-French commercial treaty was
inked. This treaty was significant in many respect, but in connection to the second
chapter of the thesis, one crucial political economy reason stands out. The agreement
allowed the French Emperor ”to circumvent domestic protectionist interests.”3 The
clashing domestic interests obviously might be one of the reasons why countries sign
trade agreements and, in general, understanding the motives for trade agreements
is a captivating undertaking and subject of the vast literature, but in chapter 3 we
explore different aspects of trade agreements.
The Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 unquestionably was the turning
point. A purely bilateral arrangement between Britain and France sparked the in-
terest of other European countries to conclude similar agreements with their trading
partners all over Europe. Within 15 years an additional 56 trade treaties went into
effect and ”by 1875, virtually all of Europe was party to a low-tariff zone by dint of
a web of agreements that included the linchpin MFN (most-favored-nation) clause.”4
Though, World War I ended the bilateral trade regime of the 19th century. Tariff and
non-tariff measures became the conventional instruments of trade policies of all major
countries, and despite a few attempts, nothing significant has changed until the end
of World War II. Only in 1944, the Bretton Woods conference offered new contours of
the postwar economic order. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
of 1947 was one of the mainsprings of this new economic worldview.
Following the GATT, later the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an increasing
number of signatory countries liberalised their trade policies primarily via two chan-
nels: bilateral (discriminatory) and multilateral (non-discriminatory) negotiations.5
To the present day, there have been eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations6
with the current ninth one, the Doha Round, still ongoing. At the same time, parallel
to the arrangements observed on the multilateral level, the world has seen an ever-
increasing number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) mainly in the wake of
bilateral negotiations. Currently, about forty percent of all countries/territories are
a member of more than five PTAs while about a quarter participates in more than
3see Irwin (1993)
4see Grossmann (2016)
5According to Article I of the GATT (MFN principle): Any concession granted to one member needs
to be extended to all other members of the WTO. Contrary to the core MFN principle of GATT
Article XXIV explicitly allows countries to form PTAs, specifically Customs Unions (CUs) and Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs). Under PTAs countries do not need to extend the concessions granted
within the arrangement to other countries.
6Under such negotiations agreements reached among the set of countries are called Multilateral
Trade Agreements (MTAs).
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ten. In chapter 3, it is our intent to examine whether PTAs act as ‘building blocks’
or ‘stumbling blocks’ on the path towards global free trade.
The post World War II experience shows that countries have extensively engaged
in both multilateral and preferential trade liberalisation simultaneously, but in con-
trast with this historical background, the existing theoretical literature on the effects
of PTAs on the global trading system usually considers only a limited selection of pos-
sible trade policy arrangements. Therefore, in a large extent, the literature neglects
the full story of strategic interactions among the policy-makers when they decide
on the mode of liberalisation. Besides, in many cases, the game-theoretic solution
concepts used in the literature assume shortsighted or limited farsighted decision-
makers. In chapter 3 we analyse the impact of PTAs on the global trading system
under the choice set of trade policy arrangements as extensive as in reality and with
the assumption of farsighted policy-makers.
To our mind, the farsightedness of policy-makers is an essential ingredient of the
reality in addition to the extensive set of trade policy constellations. The literature
suggests that on average it takes 3-4 years between the start of negotiations and the
implementation of PTAs (see Mölders (2015) and Freund and McDaniel (2016)). Such
trade negotiations are complicated processes with a significant effect on the countries’
economies, and they are accompanied by elaborate studies about the feasibility and
possible scenario analysis. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the policy-makers
take into consideration the long-run effects of the full strategic interactions among
involved parties.
To account for the farsightedness of policy-makers, we employ the solution con-
cept of the largest consistent sets (LCS) proposed by Chwe (1994). The solution
concept captures the foresight based on the indirect dominance relation, according
to which decision-makers care for the final outcomes that their actions may lead to.
The sequence of moves is determined by the ”effectiveness relations” which shows
what all possible coalitions can do. No pre-determined restrictions are placed on the
effectiveness relations and their nature is determined by the problem to be analysed.
Furthermore, the LCS allows unrestrained negotiations and imposes little structure
on the negotiation processes. The membership of a coalition is not binding as well.
In the end, according to the definition of the LCS, a coalition rejects or deviates from
the outcome only if its deviation leads only to alternatives that benefit its members.
To our mind, the properties of the LCS are well-suited for the analysis of the problem
of interest and it is superior to other solution concepts used in the literature as well.
For example, with respect to ’Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria’ Bernheim, Peleg and
Whinston (1987) note that their notion of self-enforceability is too restrictive in one
crucial aspect as ”[it] rules out the possibility that some member of the deviating
coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included in this
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coalition.” Importantly, this limitation does not affect the concept of LCS. Further-
more, the notion of the ’Stable Sets’ developed by Neumann and Morgestern (1944)
is based on the concept of the direct dominance; thus, it is shortsighted. The same
applies to the solution concept of ’Strong Nash Equilibria’ developed by Aumann
(1959). Another alternative solution concept developed by Ray and Vohra (2015) is
limited as well as their definition of the effectiveness relations is too restrictive for
the context we study.
In chapter 3, we utilise a three-country, general equilibrium trade model with
endowments and perfect competition via exports. The model is taken from Saggi
and Yildiz (2010), which itself is a modification of the model in Bagwell and Staiger
(1997). The underlying trade model is an endogenous device based on which countries
determine their optimal trade policies (tariffs) and rank all possible trade arrange-
ments that might arise. The preference rankings and ”effectiveness relations” then
determine the indirect dominance relations, which in combination with preference
rankings, at the end, establish the stable set of the trade policy arrangements. The
trade policy constellations in our model is of one of four types: MFN,7 CU, FTA, and
MTA. So, we consider all relevant possibilities under the WTO.
The answer to the question whether PTAs are ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling
blocks’ on the path towards global free trade is not as straightforward as one would
like it to be. In the end, the results presented in chapter 3 are mixed and depend
on the size distribution of the countries. Under symmetry, GFT is the unique stable
trade constellation in both regulatory scenarios, with and without PTAs. But as soon
as one moves away from symmetry, GFT might not be reached at all. In between,
the effect of switching off the availability of PTAs depends on the exact asymmetry.
In case two countries are relatively smaller, prohibiting PTAs increases the area of
stability of the GFT regimes. When two countries are relatively larger, it reduces the
area. Once the world is further away from symmetry, abolishing the exception for
PTAs might result in the worst possible state from the perspective of overall world
welfare, the non-cooperative MFN regime. Therefore, under such circumstances,
PTAs act as a mechanism that prevents the MFN regime.
With chapter 3 we finish analysing the elements of international trade policy. In
the final section of the thesis, we build a model to deal with a rational theory of
societal judgements under ambiguity.
In the mid of the previous century, Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977) developed a
constructive approach to put the ethical theory in the modern Bayesian theory of
rational behaviour. He used to divide the general theory of rational behaviour into
individual decision theory, ethics and game theory. As by that time there were
7MFN trade arrangement corresponds to the situation, when countries choose individually rational,
non-cooperative Nash policies under the most-favoured-nation principle.
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strong axiomatic foundations for individual decision making and game theory, his
desire to put ethics in the same set-up seemed a relevant aspiration. By combining
Adam Smith’s hypothetical construct of the impartial spectator with Kant’s principle
of universality and utilitarian tradition, indeed Harsanyi successfully managed to
achieve his goal. In a nutshell, Harsanyi argued that if in a society individuals are
facing risky prospects over social outcomes and a hypothetical lottery over identities
and if each imagines himself/herself as an impartial observer, then they should be
(weighted) utilitarians.
Individuals, as members of society, continually face choices among moral rules,
institutional arrangements, government policies or patterns of wealth distribution;
therefore, they are repeatedly involved in value judgements about which social alter-
native to choose. The areas of application for Harsanyi’s theory is vast. However,
Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem only considers scenarios where each of the
involved individuals faces objective risk. It is a theory analysing societal judge-
ments when each member of society knows objective probabilities over a set of social
outcomes. But what if the members of a society do not have an objective prob-
ability distribution over the possible social outcomes. In chapter 4 our goal is to
extend Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem including Knightian Uncertainty in
the model by introducing individual belief systems about the likelihood of the social
outcomes (which the impartial observer necessarily takes into consideration).
Our framework is based on the generalised version of Harsanyi (1953) by Grant et
al. (2010), which accommodates common criticism of Harsanyi’s approach, specifi-
cally the issue of fairness and attitude towards mixing. The introduction of individual
belief systems to our framework follows Seo (2009).
During working on the chapter, we had to decide which axiomatic approach to
use for modelling preferences. Existing models in this stream of literature essen-
tially differ in the choice of the domain of preference. Seo (2009) takes the domain of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and a similar axiomatic foundation. In Seo (2009) the
preferences are defined over the set of act lotteries (an act is a measurable function
from the state space into the set of outcomes). Another famous alternative approach
of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) by contrast requires two domains with
preferences. There an individual has a preference over the acts on a state space S and
preference over another state space ∆S, the set of all probability measures over the
state space. The elements of ∆S are called second-order acts. Similarly to Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006) and Ergin and Gul (2009) also assume
state space bigger than Seo. To our mind, the domain selection of Seo allows us to
introduce uncertainty to the (generalised) framework without any additional modi-
fications. Moreover, the informational requirement for the hypothetical construct of
the impartial spectator is minimal under the approach of Seo.
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In the end, Our main result shows that the impartial observer’s preferences admit
a representation in the form of a weighted average of the individual (transformed)
second-order subjective expected utilities.
Apart from the axiomatic derivation of the impartial observer’s utility represen-
tation under ambiguity, in chapter 4 we provide two illustrative examples of our
approach. In the first example, we consider the famous case in moral philosophy
known as the moral dilemma of the ’Afghan Goatherds’. While in the second ex-
ample, we examine a simple exchange economy with two goods and two individuals,
with each of them receiving endowments and compare two alternative re-distributions
rules, namely the Walrasian auctioneer and the Egalitarian rule when ambiguity is
presented. The second example is primarily from the realm of constitutional design.
Both examples demonstrate the importance of individual belief systems and thus
justifies the introduction of uncertainty to the framework.
1.2. contributions
Chapter 2 of the thesis is joint work with George Papava. He was a PhD student
at Chicago University when we actively worked on the project. Chapter 3 and chapter
4 of the thesis are joint works with Stefan Berens, who is a PhD student at Bielefeld
University.
All projects in this thesis are results of many hours and days of discussions and
debates, which were the most interesting and exciting part of my time while being
a PhD student here. We have many times changed the focus of the projects and,
in the end, jointly developed them. In chapter 3 and 4, Stefan Berens’ expertise in
programming and his mathematical background were of great benefit.
All work was carried out jointly, and all authors contributed equally to the relevant
chapters of the thesis. Besides, We have greatly benefited from participating in
different conferences, workshops and research meetings. Comments from Professors
at Bielefeld University largely contributed to the improvement of the chapters in this
thesis as well.
Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my and my co-authors’ original
work.
CHAPTER 2
Endogenous Trade Policy in the presence of Lobbying and
Heterogeneously Ignorant Voters
2.1. Introduction
The idea that under democracies trade policy outcomes are the consequence
of the interactions between organised groups and policy-makers is not new among
economists. Many policy outcomes have been studied and explained by analysing
the interest groups’ activities behind the processes. According to Anderson and Tol-
lison (1985), the repeal of the import duties on corn by the House of Commons in
1846 was largely due to Anti-corn Law League’s activities backed by a cohesive and
well-defined organised group, the British cotton textile industry.
More recently, after eliminating the restrictions on the purchase of sugar from
Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement in 2008 the USA govern-
ment, from the year 2014, has experienced well-organised influence from the U.S.
sugar producers against the decision, accusing the Mexican producers of price dump-
ing. As a result, within less than a year, the United States and Mexico reached an
agreement to avoid anti-dumping and countervailing duties on U.S. sugar imports
from Mexico and the deal reintroduced the limitations on trade. More precisely, the
U.S. government brought into the minimum prices for raw and refined sugar imports
as well as volume and timing restrictions. It should be noted that sugar and sugar-
cane farms account only for 1.3 per cent of the value of total farm and livestock
production in the U.S.A, while they provide 33 per cent of crop industries’ total
campaign donations and 40 per cent of crop industries’ total lobbying expenditures.1
The special interest groups’ activities are one side of the story. The policy-makers
care about the political contributions, yet at the same time, they acknowledge that
the voters’ potential reactions to the policy choices are important enough to be taken
into consideration. Indeed, Wegenast’s (2010) empirical study does find that informed
electorate reduces the total amount of campaign contributions, possibly as a result of
the reduced freedom of policy-makers to design policies favourable to some interest
groups. Furthermore, Ponzeto (2011) shows that more news coverage of trade policy
in a given industry increases the demand for trade liberalisation. He demonstrates
that non-tariff barriers are used less in the industries which have more media cover-
age. Bhagwati (1985) coined the term "Dracula Effect" in his book "Protectionism"
1see Bryan (2014).
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to describe the role of information in a trade liberalisation process: "the mere act of
recognising [protectionism] will help trigger a more corrective response. In the mat-
ters, we can count on assistance from...the Dracula Effect: exposing evil to sunlight
helps destroy it."
The organised groups offer political contributions to influence policy outcomes.
The policy-makers are interested in such contributions as they have to finance their
election campaigns. If citizens are ignorant, in other words, if they cannot map
policy decisions to their welfare, then it is costless for a policy-maker to design and
implement a policy that is favourable only for a specific organised group and influence
citizens’ voting decisions through campaign expenditures. But if the voters can map
the decisions of the politicians to the changes in their welfare, then the policy-makers
do not have such freedom in policy choices. Voters’ potential reactions constrain
them.
The lobbying activities have occupied the stage of research for many years. There
are vast empirical and theoretical literature analysing the role of special interest
groups in policy determination process in general,2 but little or improper attention
has been dedicated to the importance of voters’ ignorance in the political economy
models of trade policy formation.3
In this chapter, we build a theoretical model in which organised groups provide
political contributions to influence the incumbent government’s decisions on trade
policy. The incumbent government is exogenously given, and it faces the utilitar-
ian challenger in the upcoming election. Therefore, the policy-maker cares about
donations, but at the same time, takes into consideration the possible reactions of
voters. In the model we formally define the voting decisions of citizens, assuming they
are heterogeneously ignorant and explicitly derive the objective function of a policy-
maker. Then we study the structure of the protection that arises in the political
equilibrium of the model.
We get that free trade prevails only if lobbyists represent none of the groups
owning specific factors and, at the same time, all groups share the same ignorance
density. Moreover, if all groups are unorganised, our model predicts that groups
with average ignorance level lower than overall average ignorance will receive positive
government protection and vice versa. Contrary to the standard result of Grossman
and Helpman (1994), organised groups are not always supported in the political
equilibrium of our model and, depending on the parameters’ values, the policy-maker
2For example, see Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Mitra et al.
(2002), Tovar (2009), Bombardini and Trebi (2012) and Imai et al. (2013).
3To our knowledge, Downs (1957) was one of the first who acknowledged the importance of voters’
ignorance in the political process. In his seminal book, Economic Theory of Democracy, he writes:
”Many citizens who vote and consider voting important are nevertheless not well-informed on the
issues involved in the election.” (p.298)
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might support unorganised groups as well. On average, more ignorant groups will
have lower (if any) protection from the government.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, we briefly discuss the relevant literature
and outline the major approaches modelling the political process in determining a
trade policy. Then we present the general set-up for the model and elaborate on
the technical details. Next, we explicitly model the decisions of the agents involved,
define equilibrium and analyse the results. In the end, we present a summary and
concluding remarks.
2.2. Related Literature
Over last 50 years several approaches have been developed to explain the en-
dogenous formation of trade policy.4 Here we briefly discuss the seminal papers that
mostly influenced the directions of theorising in the literature.
Based on the works of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), Hillman (1982) devel-
oped a model where the choice of tariffs could have been viewed as the solution to
the government’s trade-off between the political support from industry and the dis-
satisfaction of consumers. In the model, rising domestic prices through trade taxes
benefit the industry profits and provide a basis for more political support from that
industry, but at the same time, the higher prices, caused by the free trade distortions,
deteriorate consumers’ welfare. According to Hillman (1982), this trade-off between
opposing interests determines the tariff structure, as government maximises aggregate
support. The problem with the approach is the fact that a reduced-form function
represents the aggregate support and the model lacks the micro foundations.
For explaining trade policy outcomes, Mayer (1984) developed a majority voting
model. According to his approach, the ownership structure of the economy and a
median voter determine tariff rates. The higher the median voter’s share of ownership
of the sector-specific input and the larger the sector is in terms of output, the higher
the tariff rate will be. But as Helpman (1995) notes the main shortcoming of the
model is the fact that if we consider a highly concentrated distribution of ownership
of the specific factors, which is not unrealistic, then we should not observe tariffs in
such sectors.
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) developed an electoral competition model for
understanding the endogenous formation of trade policy. They construct the model
where two candidates and two lobbies interact. One candidate is assumed to be pro-
trade, while the other one is pro-protection. Lobbies give contributions to increase
the probability of winning for their candidate. A two-stage game is considered. In
the first stage, candidates commit to their trade policies, and in the second stage,
4For detailed review of the literature see Helpman (1995), Rodrik (1995), Winden (2004) and
McLaren (2016)
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lobbies decide on contributions. The Nash equilibrium of the game identifies the rates
of protection. Magee, Brock and Young’s model is not explicit about the political
process, who the voters are and how they vote. Besides, the restriction on candidates’
platforms is artificial. For these reasons their approach was vigorously criticised (for
example, see Austen-Smith (1991) and Mayer and Li (1994)).
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) were the first who explicitly consider the role of
political contributions, albeit with strong restriction, as in their model contributions
influenced only the election outcomes and not the choice of trade policy. Grossman
and Helpman (1994) have developed a theory where the influence motive of campaign
contributions plays the central role. According to this approach, interest groups offer
politicians campaign contributions contingent on policy choices. Subsequently, the
politicians choose the policy to implement knowing how the policy choice affects the
decisions of organised groups. However, contributions are not the only factor that
politicians take into consideration; they also care for the well-being of the general
public. The political objective function is a weighted sum of total political contribu-
tions and aggregate welfare, where the weights are exogenously given. Based on the
work of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the authors analyse a two-stage game and
determine the equilibrium outcome. Like Magee, Brock and Young (1989), Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) do not provide an explicit picture of the political process.
Moreover, in the most of the models discussed above, full information assumption is
made.5
Somewhat related to our work is the paper of Ponzeto (2011). He models tariff
formation as the outcome of an electoral competition, where each agent endogenously
acquires information about his sector of employment. In equilibrium trade policy for
an industry is less protective when there is more public information about it. Like
Ponzeto (2011), we also consider the informational aspect of trade policy in voting
decisions of citizens, though we treat it as exogenously given. Moreover, lobbying
activities play the significant role in our work contrary to Ponzeto (2011), where it is
absent.
In our work, we retain the basic structure of Grossman and Helpman’s (1994)
model and their notion of equilibrium, but we explicitly model the political process,
assuming that voters are heterogeneously ignorant about the effects of policy choices.
Based on the voting decision of citizens we derive the governmental objective function
when voting is probabilistic. Adding these new features allows us to formulate an
explicit micro-founded model of endogenous trade policy determination.
5Several papers consider the role of information in the policy determination process, but the ap-
proaches are dichotomous in the sense that the authors only consider informed and uninformed
voters (for example, see Baron (1994), Grossmann and Helpman (1996) and Bombardini and Trebi
(2011)).
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2.3. Model
2.3.1. General Framework. We consider a small open economy. The economy
is populated by individuals who are assumed to have identical preferences, and each
faces the following utility maximisation problem:
U(x) = x0 +
M∑
m=1
um(xm) s.t. x0 +
M∑
m=1
pmxm = E(2.1)
where x0 is the consumption of a numeraire good produced by labour alone. Produc-
tion technology for a numeraire good is constant returns to scale, and input-output
coefficient equals to one. Furthermore, both the world and the domestic price of a
good 0 is assumed to be equal to one. The aggregate supply of labour is large enough
to ensure a positive supply of good 0. Note that given assumptions imply the equi-
librium wage rate to be one as well. M non-numeraire goods are produced and pm is
the domestic price of good m, where m ∈M . Since a small open economy is consid-
ered, for each good m there exists an exogenously given world price, which we denote
by pwm. The production technology for all non-numeraire goods is constant returns
to scale and, contrary to numeraire good, manufacturing of each good m requires
labour, Lm and a sector-specific input, Km. The size of the total population is N ,
and every individual i = (1, 2, ..., N) owns at most one specific factor of production;
hence, each belongs to only one group of people owning exactly one type of specific
factor. The number of people in the groups can be various, which is denoted by Nm
and N =
∑M
m=1 Nm. E is the total income of an individual. The sub-utility function
in equation (2.1) is differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
The first order conditions of an individual’s utility maximisation problem imply
that:
xm = dm(pm) = u
′−1
m (pm) and x0 = E −
M∑
m=1
dm(pm)pm
Then indirect utility for any individual can be written as:
v(p, E) = E +
M∑
m=1
um(dm(pm))−
M∑
m=1
dm(pm)pm(2.2)
where
∑M
m=1 um(dm(pm)) −
∑M
m=1 dm(pm)pm represents a consumer surplus. We de-
note it by the following notation σ(p).
While equilibrium wage rate is one, the domestic price solely determines the
reward to the specific factor employed in the production of good m. Let’s denote this
reward by pim(pm), then it is defined as follows: pim(pm) = maxLm(pmf(Km, Lm) −
Lm). By Hotelling’s lemma, domestic output, or supply, of good m will be the first
derivative of the reward function: ym(pm) = pi
′
m(pm).
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In the economy, the incumbent government determines the trade policy. Trade
taxes and subsidies are the only policy instruments that politicians can deploy. A
domestic price in excess of the world price means an import tariff for imported goods
and an export subsidy for exported goods, while local prices below the world prices are
equivalent to import subsidies and export taxes. Furthermore, all income generated
by trade policy is evenly allocated among citizens. Therefore, per capita tariff revenue
from the government denoted as r(p) will be:
r(p) =
M∑
m=1
(pm − pwm)(dm(pm)−
1
N
ym(pm))(2.3)
In general, individuals can get income from three sources: labour income, income
from owning a share of a specific factor and tariff revenues from the government.
Then the indirect utility of individual i holding some specific factor m, assuming that
individuals’ share in specific factor ownership is evenly distributed within groups6, is:
vmi (p, Em) = li +
1
Nm
pim(pm) + σ(p) + r(p)(2.4)
The indirect utility functions will play a crucial role in the decision-making process
while voting. A policy-maker cares about the votes, but at the same time, he/she
needs to collect contributions from the business groups to run the election campaign.
We assume that some business groups, more precisely, some of the owners of specific
factors are exogenously organised and represented by a lobbyist, who decides how
much to contribute for maximising the reward to the group they represent. There
is an incumbent running the government, which is exogenously given and it faces a
trade-off between contributions and votes. In the end, precisely this trade-off will
determine the political equilibrium of the game.
The political process of trade policy determination runs through two stages:
In the first stage, lobbyists, representing organised groups, non-cooperatively and
simultaneously decide on contribution functions contingent on trade policy choices of
incumbent government.
In the second stage, the incumbent government observes the contribution func-
tions offered by lobbyists, takes into consideration the possible responses from the
voters, sets a trade policy and collects from each lobby the contribution associated
with its policy. At the end the election takes place. The citizens cannot abstain from
voting.
2.3.2. Political Process and Decisions of Agents. We have already defined
the indirect utility function of individual i owning some specific factor m. In order to
determine how citizens vote, let’s consider the indirect utility evaluated at the world
6The ownership structure in our model is slightly different from Grossman and Helpman (1994).
There individuals might not own any specific factor.
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prices:
vmi (p
w, Ewm) = li +
1
Nm
pim(p
w
m) + σ(p
w)(2.5)
vmi (p
w, Ewm) shows an indirect utility of an individual i owning some specific factor
m in the case there is not any distortion to free trade. This variable indicates what
would have been the welfare of agent i under the world prices.7
In our model the voters differ from one another in the ability/desirability to de-
termine the relationship between the trade policies and the difference in their indirect
utilities, vmi (p, Em)−vmi (pw, Emw ). One might think that citizens have a different level
of ignorance for policies that deviate from socially optimal strategy (see footnote 7).
In practice, there could be several potential reasons why citizens are ignorant with
respect to policies. In some cases, it might be that the different levels of ignorance are
just outcomes of rational choices of agents or citizens might have different thresholds
of cognitive limitations,8 or individuals are miscellaneously limited by the information
they have.9 The other reason could be the trade preferences of individuals, including
the biases of the agents.
For our theoretical model, it does not matter what the source of ignorance is. We
assume that distribution of the ignorance among the citizens is a factor (industry)
specific and it is exogenously given.10 We introduce parameter β to capture the igno-
rance of the voters. In other words, βmi measures the ability of a voter i owning some
specific factorm to map the trade policy choice of the incumbent on the improvement
or deterioration of his/her welfare.
7Note that for a small, competitive economy free trade is in general social welfare maximising policy.
So far the same is true for our model as well. Based on the individual indirect utilities (equation
(2.5)), aggregate welfare is
∑M
m=1
∑Nm
i=1 v
m
i (p,Em) =
∑M
m=1
∑Nm
i=1 li +
1
Nm
pim(pm) + σ(p) + r(p) =
N +
∑M
m=1 pim(pm) + N(σ(p) + r(p)) (N stands for total labor income in the economy as the
equilibrium wage is one). Now the maximisation of the aggregate welfare results in the following
first order condition: (pk − pwk )(Nd
′
k (pm)− y
′
k (pk)) = 0 for all k ∈M , which is satisfied only under
free trade. As the challenger is utilitarian, citizens will evaluate any distortionary trade policy
relative to free trade policy.
8For example, Conconi et al. (2014) indirectly show that voters might have some depreciation
rate for information about trade policy. There is no any difference how the members of the House
(who serve 2-year terms) and the members of the Senate (who serve 6-year terms) vote for trade
liberalisation when a Senator is in the last two years of his/her term. While early in their election
period the members of a Senate, who serve 6-year terms more often vote for open trade. The voting
pattern can be considered as an indication of the imperfect memory of voters, and they might differ
in this respect from one another.
9Ponzeto (2011) shows that in an unbalanced panel of 162 countries from 1975 to 2003, tariffs are
significantly lower the higher the rate of television ownership. The finding is both economically and
statistically significant even after controlling the important economic variables.
10There is empirical evidence that industry of employment and education matters, for example,
in the formation of trade policy preferences among voters (see Irwin (1996), Beaulieu (2002) and
Blonigen (2011)). Education is a more robust determinant of trade policy preferences. If we suppose
that education matters in the determination of the ignorance of the voters as well, then a factor
(industry) specific distribution of ignorance seems a reasonable assumption as various industries
have a different composition of the labor force by education.
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For expositional clarity, we assume that βmi is distributed uniformly
11 and pa-
rameters of distribution may differ over the specific factor holders. For all sectors
m ∈M , we have that:
βmi ∼ U [0,Φm](2.6)
The upper limit of the distribution (Φm) determines how ignorant is the group m
of specific factor holders. The higher is Φm, the lower is the density (1/Φm), therefore
implying, on average, higher ignorance for the group m. If Φm is low (the density
(1/Φm) is high) for a group m, then the voters in the group m are concentrated near
0 and, on average, the group has lower ignorance.
Another variable that we introduce is the general popularity of the incumbent gov-
ernment, denoted by δ. The incumbent cannot directly control the general popularity,
but the policy-maker exploits contributions from organised groups to campaign and
the campaign spending affects the general popularity. Following the literature (see
Persson and Tabellini (2002)) the general popularity of a policy-maker is determined
as follows:
δ = δ̂ + η
∑
j∈L
Cj(p) with η > 0(2.7)
where Cj(p) is a contribution from the organised group j, L is the set of organised
groups (L ≤ M) and η measures the effectiveness of campaign spending.12 The
incumbent government knows the distributions of ignorance in different groups, but it
does not know its average popularity, as δ̂ is a random uniform shock (δ̂ ∼ U [−Ψ,Ψ]).
Before the election, a positive or a negative shock may occur that together with
campaign spendings determines the general popularity.
In the end, the following three elements will determine citizens’ voting decisions.
The first one is the difference between indirect utilities, with and without trade
policy distortions. This element is group specific as individuals do not differ regarding
utilities within the groups. The second element is the ignorance level of an individual,
which is agent specific and the third one is the general popularity of the incumbent,
common to all voters in the country. Now we formally define the voting behaviour
of an individual i owning the specific factor m:
Definition 2.1. An individual i owning the specific factor m will vote for the
incumbent if
vmi (p, Em)− vmi (pw, Ewm) + βmi + δ ≥ 0
11Persson and Tabellini (2002), p.57 conclude that in a similar set-up the usage of any unimodal
distribution instead of a uniform distribution does not change the results qualitatively.
12In the model, organised groups give political contributions to the incumbent government only.
This abstraction is not very restrictive as the financial advantage enjoyed by incumbents in general
is a well-documented fact. See Fouirnais and Hall (2014) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).
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If we do not consider the ignorance level of individuals and the general popularity
of the incumbent government, then the agent will vote for the incumbent only if
the change in his/her welfare from the distortionary trade policy is positive. The
ignorance becomes an essential ingredient when the net change in indirect utility
from the distortionary trade policy is negative. Such a situation may occur if, for
example, some groups of specific factor holders other than group m are supported
by the government. Then individuals in the group m are harmed as consumers. In
general, in the presence of ignorance, the voters with lower ignorance threshold will
be more responsive to policy changes.
The next question to address is what motivates the incumbent government’s trade
policy choice. Grossman and Helpman (1994) assume that government maximises
the weighted sum of total political contributions and aggregate welfare. We deviate
from this assumption and follow the predominant view in the literature that the
policy-maker conceives policy as a means to winning the election. As Downs (1957)
notes ”Party members have as their chief motivation the desire to obtain the intrinsic
rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate policies as means to holding office
rather than seeking office in order to carry out preconceived policies.”
In our model, the incumbent is concerned with winning the election, so his/her
expected utility depends on the probability of winning, Π and on the return from
being elected, which is considered to be some positive constant. In the case of losing
the election, the return is zero. To derive the expression for the policy maker’s
objective function, we have to determine the probability of winning.
The incumbent knows that after implementing the trade policy, in each group m
of the specific factor holders there will be a voter who is indifferent between voting
and not voting for the incumbent. Let’s call such voter a swing voter of that group.
Under the uniform distribution assumption for ignorance, every group will have the
swing voter, which is determined by the condition in definition 2.1. Then every voter
in the group m that has a higher ignorance level than the ignorance of a swing voter
(denoted as βms ) will vote for the incumbent. As βmi is distributed uniformly, the
share of voters in group m who will vote for the incumbent will be:
Ωm = (Φm − βms )
1
Φm
= 1− 1
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p, Em)− δ)(2.8)
If we consider all groups we can derive the total share of citizens who vote for the
incumbent:
Ω =
M∑
m=1
αmΩ
m =
M∑
m=1
αm(1− 1
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p, Em)− δ))
= 1−
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p, Em)) + δ
1
Φ
(2.9)
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where αm = NmN and
1
Φ
=
∑M
m=1
αm
Φm
is the average density of ignorance in a country.
The incumbent wins the election if Ω >
1
2
. The condition is satisfied whenever
δ > Φ
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p, Em))−
1
2
Φ(2.10)
Equation (2.7) and the requirement Ω >
1
2
are equivalent to the following condi-
tion
δ̂ > Φ
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p, Em))− η
∑
j∈L
Cj(p)− 1
2
Φ(2.11)
Let’s denote the right-hand side expression of equation (2.11) by δ and recall
that δ̂ is a random variable which is distributed uniformly. Then the probability of
winning the election will be defined as follows:
Π[ δ̂ > δ ] = (Ψ− δ) 1
2Ψ
(2.12)
After some manipulations (see Appendix A.1.1) similar to the derivation of the
equations (2.8) and (2.9), we get
Π[ δ̂ > δ ] =
Φ
2Ψ
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
2Ψ
∑
j∈L
Cj(p) +
Φ
4Ψ
+
1
2
(2.13)
The incumbent will maximise the probability of winning given in the equation
(2.13). Note that, in the end, the rational behaviour of the policy-maker boils down
to the maximisation of the following expression:
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈L
Cj(p)(2.14)
The policy-maker considers the effects of trade policy on the swing voters in each
group of the specific factor holders weighted by the combination of group density
of ignorance and the group’s share in the total population. Besides, the incumbent
government cares for political contributions. The effectiveness of campaign spending
and the average density of ignorance determine the weight that the policy-maker
assigns to political donations. At large, if the incumbent government is interested
only in winning the election and the ignorance densities are different in the various
groups of specific factor owners, then the policy-maker does not need to take into
account the overall welfare of the society. It suffices to concentrate only on the swing
voters in each group in addition to the political contributions.
In Grossman and Helpman (1994) when the government doesn’t care about the
campaign contributions, free trade is the optimal strategy as the social welfare is
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maximised under such a policy. Now let’s assume that η equals zero or L is an
empty set in our model. In the first case, policy-maker does not have any incentive
to collect political donations, while in the second case, no one wants to contribute to
the incumbent. In any of the two cases, contrary to Grossman and Helpman (1994),
the free trade still might not be the optimal strategy.13
The last agent whose decision we have to present is the lobbyist who behaves on
behalf of the organised group. The lobbyists, like the incumbent government, have
information about the distributions of ignorance in the various groups of specific
factor holders and they also possess knowledge about the distribution of the political
shock that might unfold before the election. Therefore, all lobbies can correctly
anticipate the policy-maker’s best responses to the contribution schedules. Moreover,
we assume that the lobbyists cannot influence the distribution of the ignorance among
the specific factor holders. Recall that there are M groups of factor holders, but
only some of them are organised. The lobbyist objective is to solve the following
maximisation problem:
pij(pj)− Cj(p)(2.15)
where pij(pj) is the reward to specific factor owned by the group j ∈ L, which depends
only on its price.
2.3.3. Equilibrium and Structure of Trade Policy. To solve a two-stage
game between the lobbies and the incumbent government, let’s assume that the
policy-maker chooses its policy from a bounded set of domestic price vectors denoted
by P . We retain the equilibrium notion of Grossmann and Helpman (1994) taken
from Bernheim and Whinston (1986), as it directly applies to our set-up.14 Then the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a two-stage trade policy game can be defined
as follows:
Definition 2.2. The collection ({Coj (po})j∈L, po ∈ P) is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium of a two-stage game if and only if the policy vector po is in the policy
maker’s best-response set to Coj (p) and given {Col (po})l∈L\j, no lobby j has any other
feasible strategy Cj(p) that would yield a higher payoff.
Definition 2.2 can be further operationalised in Proposition 2.1, where we char-
acterise the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a trade policy game:
13Assume one of the conditions, η = 0 or L is empty, holds. Then the first order conditions from
government’s maximisation problem are: yk(pk)[Φ/Φi−1]+(pk−pwk )m
′
k(pk) = 0 for all k ∈M . Now
it is clear that pk = pwk is not a sufficient requirement for the first order conditions to be satisfied.
Moreover, in equilibrium we get that those groups of the specific factor owners who have higher
density of ignorance (voters in the group are less ignorant) than country average will be supported
in equilibrium even though there is no political contributions. The following equation demonstrates
the result: pk − pwk = [ 1/Φi1/Φ − 1] yk(pk)(−m′k(pk)) for all k ∈M .
14For a general discussion of the common agency problem see Dixit et al. (1997).
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Proposition 2.1. The collection ({Coj (po})j∈L, po ∈ P) is a sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Coj (po) is feasible for every j ∈ L;
2. po ∈ P maximises∑M
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈LC
o
j (p);
3. po ∈ P maximises
pij(pj)− Coj (p)+
∑M
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈LC
o
j (p);
4. For every j ∈ L there exists a pj ∈ P that maximises∑M
m
αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈LC
o
j (p)
such that Coj (pj) = 0.
In general there might be many contribution schedules that satisfy equilibrium
conditions, but we restrict our attention to the truthful contribution schedule defined
in Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The truthful contribution function takes the
following form:
CTj (p,Bj) = max(0, pij(pj)−Bj)(2.16)
where Bj is some number determined in the equilibrium.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) have shown that there is no cost for players to
choose truthful strategies, because the set of best response functions always includes
such strategies. Moreover, all equilibria supported by truthful strategies are stable
as only these equilibria are Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria.15
With contribution functions that are differentiable, the fact that po is the optimal
price vector implies that the following first-order conditions should be satisfied in
equilibrium:
M∑
m=1
5αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈L
5Coj (p) = 0(2.17)
5pij(pj)−5Coj (p) +
M∑
m=1
5αm
Φm
(vms (p, Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈L
5Coj (p) = 0
(2.18)
Combining equation (2.17) with equation (2.18) results in
5pij(pj) = 5Coj (p)(2.19)
15For thorough discussion of Truthful Contribution Schedules with detailed proofs see Grossman
and Helpmann (2001), chapter 8, Dixit et al. (1997), and Rausser et al. (2011), pp 155-164.
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Equation (2.19) shows that for any small change in a policy each lobby adapts
its contribution schedule in the way that the difference in the contribution exactly
matches the effect of policy change on the lobby’s welfare.
To derive the structure of protection in equilibrium of the model, it suffices to
consider the effect of a marginal policy change on swing voters’ welfare and industry
returns. Let’s assume that the price pk changes (we provide the detailed derivations
of the equilibrium conditions in Appendix A.1.2). First, consider the effect on swing
voter in group m.
∂vms (p, E
m)
∂pk
= (
εmk
Nm
− 1
N
)yk(pk) +
1
N
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk)(2.20)
where m′k(pk) is a derivative of import with respect to pk and equals (Nd
′
k (pk) −
y
′
k (pk)). εmk is an indicator function, that equals 1 when m = k and 0, otherwise.
The effect of a marginal policy change on industry j’s return will be:
∂pij(pj)
∂pk
= θjkyk(pK)(2.21)
where θjk is an indicator function as well and it equals 1 when j = k and 0, otherwise.
To exploit the equilibrium first-order conditions (2.17) and (2.19), which helps us
to derive the overall effect of a marginal change in the price pk, we have to sum up
the effect of price change over all swing voters and sum up the effect of a marginal
policy change over all organised industry returns. Note that vms (pw, Ewm) does not
depend on pk. Then we get
1
N
(pk − pwk )(−m
′
k(pk)) = ηIkyk(pk) +
1
N
yk(pk)(
Φ
Φk
− 1)(2.22)
where Ik =
∑
j∈L θjk and it represents an indicator function, which equals 1, when
the industry k is organised and represented by a lobbyist and 0, if industry k is not
organised.
Arranging terms in equation (2.22) results in the following expression, which
should be satisfied in the equilibrium:
pok − pwk = (ηIkN +
1/Φk
1/Φ
− 1) yk(p
o
k)
(−m′k(pok)
(2.23)
We can reformulate the equation (2.23) using the trade taxes and subsidies and
state the result as a proposition. Note that tk =
pk−pwk
pwk
.
Proposition 2.2. Let’s assume that the contribution schedules are differentiable
around the equilibrium and the equilibrium lies in the interior of P, then the govern-
ment chooses the trade policy that satisfies the following condition:
tok
1 + tok
= (ηIkN +
1/Φk
1/Φ
− 1)zk(p
o
k)
ek(pok)
for all k ∈M
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where zk(pok) = yk(pok)/mk(pok) is the equilibrium ratio of domestic output to imports
and ek(pok) = (−m′k(pok))pok/mk(pok) is the elasticity of import demand or export supply.
Ceteris paribus industries that have lower import or export supply elasticities (in
absolute value) will have higher support from the government. Also, the local prices
relative to the world prices will be higher for industries whose domestic output is more
extensive. Apart from the economic variables, the density of ignorance within the
group of specific factor holders relative to the overall average density of ignorance and
the effectiveness of political spending matters for trade policy choices. The higher
is the latter variable, the more protection the organised group can buy. For each
contributed dollar, the special interest group gets higher protection. Each organised
group is interested in getting more protection, but if the overall average density of
ignorance in society is higher (this means that in general, the citizens are less ignorant
and more responsive to trade policy) protection of any organised group will be lower.
More thorough analysis of the equilibrium trade policy structure is presented in the
next section.
2.4. Analysis
In this section, we shall further explore the implications of the proposition (2.2).
The first question is when free trade is the equilibrium outcome of a trade policy game.
Note that in our set-up the absence of the political contributions is not enough for a
free trade regime to prevail (see footnote 13). As the incumbent government is not a
social welfare maximiser even after ignoring the political donations, one should not
expect the free trade to be the equilibrium outcome in such a case.
In the corollary 2.1 we present the first major implication of the proposition (2.2).
Corollary 2.1. According to the equilibrium condition, free trade prevails only
if lobbyists represent none of the groups owning the specific factors and all groups
share the same ignorance density.
Proof. In order for a free trade regime to prevail it is necessary that the following
condition holds:
ηIkN +
1/Φk
1/Φ
− 1 = 0 for all k ∈M(2.24)
We have to consider three cases: when lobbyists represent none of the groups of
the specific factor owners, when lobbyists represent all of the groups, and when they
represent only some of the groups.
First, let’s consider the case when none of the groups of owners of the specific
factors is organised. Under such condition Ik = 0 for all k ∈M . Then from equation
(2.24) we get that for a free trade regime to be an equilibrium of a trade policy
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game, it should happen that 1/Φk = 1/Φ for any k ∈M . This condition can only be
satisfied if all groups share the same density of ignorance.
Next, let’s assume that lobbyists represent all groups. Then a free trade regime
to be an equilibrium, we should have that
1
Φk
=
1
Φ
(1− ηN) for every k ∈M(2.25)
Equation (2.25) implies that densities of ignorance in all groups should be the same.
Recall that 1
Φ
=
∑M
m=1
αm
Φm
and η > 0, then we get contradiction.
Finally, let’s assume that there are some organised and some unorganised groups.
Under free trade, for any unorganised group k /∈ L the following condition should
be satisfied 1/Φk = 1/Φ and for any organised group j ∈ L, the following one
1/Φj = 1/Φ(1 − ηN). Recall that L is the set of the organised groups and L < M ,
then by the definition of the average density of ignorance we should have:
1
Φ
=
L∑
j=1
αj
Φj
+
M∑
k=L+1
αk
Φk
=
1
Φ
[(1− ηN)
L∑
j=1
αj +
M∑
k=L+1
αk](2.26)
We get contradiction.
So, only if none of the groups of the specific factor holders is organised and they
share the same density of ignorance, we get that free trade is an equilibrium of a
trade policy game. 
The intuition behind the result given in corollary 2.1 is straightforward. Since
lobbyists represent no group and every group has similar densities of ignorance, the
incumbent does not have incentives to support any group. The policy-maker cannot
exploit the ignorance of any group; therefore, free trade prevails. Moreover, note
that contrary to Grossman and Helpman (1994) we do not get a free trade as an
equilibrium when all groups are organised, even in the case when they share the
same density of ignorance. In such case, the incumbent government designs the trade
policy based on the economic fundamentals of the model (domestic output to import
or export and the elasticity of import demand or export supply) in addition to the
effectiveness of the campaign spendings. In general, when all groups are organised,
and they share the similar density of ignorance, all else equal, industries that have
high import demand or export supply elasticities (in absolute value) will have smaller
support from the government, while the sectors that have higher domestic output to
import or export ratio will get higher protection.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that all sectors that are represented by
lobbies are protected by import tariffs or export subsidies in the equilibrium, while
import subsidies and export taxes are applied to all sectors that have no organised
representation. Which groups will the policy-maker support in the equilibrium in
our set-up? Is it always the case that the incumbent government will support the
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organised groups? Or can unorganised groups get some support from the government
as well? The next result of the proposition 2.2 stated as a corollary answers these
questions.
Corollary 2.2. Organised groups are not always supported in equilibrium. More-
over, there are cases when the incumbent government will support unorganised groups.
Before we present the proof of corollary 2.2, notice that the policy maker’s decision
to protect an industry depends on whether the industry is organised or not; what is
the effectiveness of the campaign spendings16 and how the relative ignorance density
of the industry relates to the average ignorance of the whole society.
Proof. In general, the government will protect the group k ∈M in equilibrium
if
ηIkN +
1/Φk
1/Φ
− 1 > 0
First, notice that if 1
Φk
> 1
Φ
, it does not matter what is the value of Ik and whether
ηN < 1 or ηN > 1, the proposition (2.2) implies that in equilibrium government will
support all such groups.
Now we have to consider the cases when 1
Φk
< 1
Φ
. Several situations should be
assessed.
1. If ηN < 1 and Ik = 0, the industry k will not be supported.
2. If ηN < 1 and Ik = 1, all organised sectors whose ignorance density falls
in the interval ( 1
Φ
(1 − ηN), 1
Φ
) will be protected. But all organised groups
with ignorance density satisfying the following condition 1
Φk
< 1
Φ
(1 − ηN)
will not be protected in the equilibrium.
3. If ηN > 1 and Ik = 0, industry k will not be supported in equilibrium.
4. If ηN > 1 and Ik = 1, all such industries will be supported in the
equilibrium.

Why might the government decide to protect the unorganised groups? Recall that
trade policy affects each group of the specific factor holders through two channels.
First, protection of the industry generates higher factor income, but the same industry
representatives are consumers as well, therefore, supporting other sectors decreases
their consumer surplus. When a group is unorganised, but it has higher ignorance
density in relation to overall average ignorance density, the government might want
to protect the group to compensate losses of its consumer surplus due to trade policy.
In general, defending the specific factor holders, who are more responsive to policy
16One can interpret ηN as the effectiveness of each unit of the campaign spending in terms of the
number of votes.
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choices, gives the policy-maker more freedom to design the trade policy. One should
remember that all these calculations happen on the margin under the clear trade-off
between the political contributions and votes.
The incentives of the incumbent government to protect an industry decreases
when the density of ignorance in that industry decreases. The logic applies to the
organised groups as well if the effectiveness of the campaign spendings is not high
enough (see the proof of corollary 2.2). The collection of the political donations from
ignorant organised groups does not pay off in terms of votes for the policy-maker. But
if the effectiveness of the political spendings reaches some threshold, the incumbent
government will support all organised sectors.
Figure 1 summarises the results from the proof of corollary 2.2. It shows when
the government will and will not support organised and unorganised sectors in the
equilibrium of a trade policy game. The decision largely depends on the relative
ignorance density of a sector in relation to overall ignorance density. Note that if η
is approaching zero, implying that the political spendings cannot affect the general
popularity of the incumbent government, two lines in the graph will get closer to each
other.
Figure 2.1. Relative ignorance density and policy-maker’s decision
To sum up, the incumbent government will protect those groups who are relatively
more responsive to the trade policy choices. Lobby representation of a sector is not
a sufficient determinant for selling the protection.
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2.5. Conclusions
Despite the consensus among economists that free trade permits the achievement
of maximal social welfare in a society when a small, competitive economy is consid-
ered, in reality, we extensively observe deviations from the free trade regime through
government policies. There is vast literature that aims to explain the political process
behind protection. The goal of chapter 2 is to contribute to this literature.
In our work, the incumbent government faces a trade-off between the campaign
contributions and votes. The policy-maker cares about winning the upcoming elec-
tion. In some extent, we retain the basic structure of Grossman and Helpman’s (1994)
model and their notion of equilibrium, but we explicitly model the political process,
assuming that voters are heterogeneously ignorant about the effects of policy choices.
Based on the voting decision of citizens we derive the governmental objective function
when voting is probabilistic. Adding these new features to the Grossman and Help-
man model allows us to formulate an explicit micro-founded model of endogenous
trade policy determination.
Examination of the structure of a political equilibrium of the model shows that
groups represented by lobbies are not always supported in equilibrium. Besides, there
are cases when the incumbent might support groups without any lobby representation
although they do not provide any campaign contributions. On average, more ignorant
groups will always experience lower (if any) protection from the policy-maker.
Our work substantiates several possible extensions of the model which are worthy
of carrying out. First, in the model, we assume that the lobbyists cannot influence
the ignorance density of the group they represent. In practice, the special interest
groups through different information channels can affect the ignorance of voters and
in this way force the policy-maker to implement some desirable policy. Intuitively
the effectiveness of such informational channels will influence the incumbent’s capa-
bility of collecting the campaign contributions and the structure of the equilibrium
trade policy. Second, we assume that the challenger is utilitarian and the lobbyists
contribute political donations to the incumbent only. Under such assumptions, we
abstract in a large extent from the potentially interesting strategic interaction be-
tween the incumbent and the challenger. It is interesting to analyse the structure of
the equilibrium trade policy when lobbyists can contribute to both the incumbent
and the challenger, while the latter is not utilitarian as well. Lastly, the work gener-
ates interesting theoretical predictions, which in the case of finding a good proxy for
voters’ ignorance can be tested empirically.
CHAPTER 3
The Farsighted Stability of Global Trade Policy Arrangements
3.1. Introduction
Following the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, an in-
creasing number of signatory countries liberalised their trade policies primarily via
two channels: bilateral and multilateral negotiations. To the present day, there have
been eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations with the current ninth one, the
Doha Round, still ongoing. At the same time, parallel to the arrangements observed
on the multilateral level, the world has seen an ever-increasing number of Preferential
Trade Agreements (PTAs) mainly in the wake of bilateral negotiations. Currently,
about forty percent of all countries/territories are a member of more than five PTAs
while about a quarter participates in more than ten.1
The World Trade Organization (WTO), successor of the GATT in 1995, provides
the rule set for the trade liberalisation process of a significant number of countries.2
Its Article I acts as the foundation for any multilateral trade liberalisation by formu-
lating the so-called Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle: Any concession granted
to one member needs to be extended to all other members of the WTO.3 In this
chapter, trade policy arrangements that are consistent with the MFN principle are
referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs).4 Contrary to the core MFN
principle, Article XXIV Paragraph 5 explicitly allows countries to form PTAs, specifi-
cally Customs Unions (CUs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), that do not need to
extend the concessions granted within the arrangement to other countries.5 However,
Article XXIV Paragraph 5 Subparagraph (a), (b), and (c) each require that these are
without (negative) influence on other trade relations.
The (direction of the) influence of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 on the development
of trade policy arrangements is a controversial topic and the focus of many papers.6
1Source: http://www.wto.org
2All members of the WTO account for 96.4 percent of world trade, 96.7 percent of world GDP, and
90.1 percent of world population as of 2007 (Source: http://www.wto.org).
3Article I states that ‘any [...] favour [...] granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for [...] all other contracting parties’ (GATT, 1947).
4Furthermore, we interchangeably use the terms trade policy arrangements, trade agreements, trade
constellations, and trade relations.
5Article XXIV Paragraph 5 states that ‘[...] this agreement shall not prevent [...] the formation of
a customs union or of a free-trade area [...]’ (GATT, 1947).
6The next part of this chapter contains further information on the related literature.
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Likewise, the primary purpose of this chapter is the analysis of the stability of different
trade policy arrangements in two scenarios, that is with PTAs (current WTO rules)
and without PTAs (modified WTO rules). In particular, it is our intent to examine
whether PTAs act as ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’ on the path towards
global free trade (Bhagwati (1993)).
The existing literature usually considers a limited selection of trade agreements
or assumes limited farsightedness of the negotiating countries. It certainly allows for
a cleaner description of the model and interpretation of its results, but ultimately
raises the question about whether or not these restrictions significantly influence the
analysis and to what degree these frameworks capture reality. In our opinion, cer-
tain empirical observations favour an extensive choice set and full farsightedness.
During the past rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, many countries were si-
multaneously involved in other trade liberalisation processes.7 Moreover, such trade
negotiations are usually complicated processes with significant effect on the coun-
tries’ economies and accompanied by elaborate studies about feasibility and future
developments.8 Taking these assessments into account, the contribution of our work
is an answer to the question concerning the influence on the analysis.
First of all, we consider an extensive set of trade agreements, containing PTAs,
i.e., CUs and FTAs, as well as MTAs. Next, endogenizing the formation of trade
agreements, each country ranks them based on a three-country two-good general
equilibrium model of international trade.9 The stability of all trade agreements is
then examined using these rankings together with the concept of ‘consistent sets’ as
stable sets - a notion proposed by Chwe (1994). As a result, our work expands the
set of trade agreements under consideration and also extends the farsightedness of
the negotiating parties in comparison to the literature. In fact, to the best of our
knowledge, no other paper considers a choice set as extensive as ours.
In the end, our analysis shows that the effect of PTAs on trade liberalisation
depends on the size distribution of the countries. As long as the countries are close
to symmetric, Global Free Trade (GFT) emerges as the unique stable outcome under
both the existing and the hypothetical institutional arrangement. However, when two
countries are considerably smaller, a modified WTO without PTAs would facilitate
the formation of GFT. By contrast, if two countries are relatively larger, this modified
WTO would actually obstruct the development towards GFT. Once the world is
7Maggi (2014) showcases the importance of an extensive set of trade constellations.
8Aumann and Myerson (1988) provides a (brief) description of the criticism against the use of
limited farsightedness in general: ‘When a player considers forming a link with another one, he does
not simply ask himself whether he may expect to be better off with this link than without it, given
the previously existing structure. Rather, he looks ahead and asks himself, "Suppose we form this
new link, will other players be motivated to form further new links that were not worthwhile for
them before? Where will it all lead? Is the end result good or bad for me?"’
9A model similar to that of Saggi and Yildiz (2010), which itself is a modification of the one in
Bagwell and Staiger (1997). The modified one is also used in Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013).
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further away from symmetry, full trade liberalisation is not attainable at all and
abolishing the exception for PTAs might result in the worst possible state from the
perspective of overall world welfare, the non-cooperative MFN regime.
The findings of our work notably deviate from those of the existing literature.
Compared to the paper of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013), the composition of the
stable set of trade policy arrangements differs on a substantial part of the parameter
space under consideration (while coinciding on the remainder). Beyond that, the
comparison with the work of Lake (2017) yields not only a difference in terms of
stability but also with respect to the driving force(s).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 focuses on the
related literature, Section 3.3 specifies the model, Section 3.4 analyses the findings
while further details are discussed in Section 3.5, and Section 3.6 concludes our work.
3.2. Related Literature
An ever increasing body of literature studies the different aspects of international
trade agreements. It is not our goal to completely review this stream of literature.10
The emphasis of this part of our work is on the methodology of the related papers.
Further details, in particular a comparison of the model predictions, can be found
in Section 3.5. In the following, the focus is on the so-called ‘rules-to-make-rules’
literature (Maggi (2014)) that tries to determine the role of PTAs in the global trade
liberalisation process.
A number of relevant papers are the work of Saggi, Yildiz and various co-authors.
Saggi and Yildiz (2010) considers a three-country trade model where the degree and
nature of trade liberalisation, bilateral and multilateral, are endogenously determined.
Using Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, the authors study the stability of FTAs and
MTAs while varying the extent of asymmetry among the countries with respect to
their size. In a subsequent paper Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013) study the com-
plementary case by focusing on the combination of CUs and MTAs while leaving
everything else fixed (in terms of their framework). By contrast, the paper of Mis-
sions, Saggi and Yildiz (2016) analyses the effect of both forms of PTAs, i.e. CUs and
FTAs, on attaining global free trade, but excludes MTAs. In a sense, this completes
their ‘2 out of 3’ pattern of trade agreements under consideration.
Another related paper (in terms of farsightedness) is the work of Lake (2017),
who uses a dynamic approach to understand whether FTAs facilitate or impede the
formation of GFT. The approach uses a three-country dynamic model where a fixed
protocol specifies for each period the exact nature (and order) of negotiations. Then,
10The reader may want to consult the papers of Maggi (2014), Grossmann (2016), and Bagwell and
Staiger (2016) for a detailed review of the related literature.
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on the basis of Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies, the author analyses the
effect of country asymmetries on global trade liberalisation.
Furthermore, a variety of research focuses purely on analysing the effect of FTAs.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) consider several countries with a homogeneous good in their
model and study different degrees of asymmetry across countries. They employ the
notion of Pairwise Stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) as the solution method.
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) use similar methods but introduce heterogeneity with
respect to goods. In a separate section, they also briefly discuss a setting with CUs,
but overall focus on FTAs. Another related paper to Goyal and Joshi (2006) is
that of Zhang et al. (2013) in which the concept of Pairwise Stability is replaced
with Pairwise Farsighted Stability by Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009),
thereby comparing myopia with farsightedness in an otherwise fixed framework. Also
connected to this is the paper of Zhang et al. (2014), which uses the work of Goyal
and Joshi (2006) as a benchmark and analyses the evolutionary effect of the number of
countries in a dynamic framework featuring random perturbations. Now, while all of
the aforementioned papers employ (different) network-theoretic concepts, there is also
Aghion et al. (2007), which features standard cooperative game theory. In the three-
country model presented there, a single country takes on the role of negotiation leader
and decides to either engage in sequential bilateral or single multilateral bargaining
with the other countries.
The stability concept of our approach is that of Chwe (1994). It is (in parts)
a response to the criticism of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (solution).11
The approach aims to achieve two goals, namely to include unlimited consideration of
the future by the participants while simultaneously avoiding emptiness of the stable
set that plagues other (more) restrictive solution concepts.12 It is also closely related
to the stability concept found in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) and
its extension (HMV (2014)). In fact, as is noted by the authors, their criterion
constitutes a stricter version, but in specific cases (like our model) they coincide.
3.3. Model
3.3.1. Setting. Let N = {a, b, c} denote the set of all (three) countries in the
world. Furthermore, let X denote the set of all trade agreements between these
countries, see Section 3.3.3 for an explicit list. Then, the welfare function of each
country induces a collection of preferences onX denoted by {≺i}i∈N , see Section 3.3.2
for a description of the employed trade model that determine the welfare functions.
11Consult von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for a description of this (solution) concept and
Harsanyi (1974) for its criticism.
12It is also resistant to the criticism of Ray and Vohra (2015) about the sovereignty of coalitions
as their main issues concerned with feasibility and distribution do not apply to our framework.
Furthermore, their specific criticism about the explanatory power of Chwe’s approach only applies
to transferable utility games.
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Moreover, the non-empty subsets S of N specify the coalitions of countries, i.e. the
grand coalition, coalitions of two, and single coalitions. Naturally, the preferences
of the individual countries induce those of the coalitions, namely for x1, x2 ∈ X and
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅: x1 ≺S x2 if and only if x1 ≺i x2 for all i ∈ S. Further, the actual
ability of coalitions to change the status quo of trade agreements is captured via
the collection {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅ of effectiveness relations defined on X, see Section 3.3.5
for the resulting overall network structure. In combination, the preferences together
with the effectiveness relations will allow us to analyse the (potential) stability of
different trade agreements, see Section 3.3.4 for a formal definition of the employed
concept of stability. Finally, to determine the stable and unstable trade agreements
an algorithm numerically evaluates a grid of the parameter space, see Section 3.3.6
for details.
3.3.2. Underlying Trade Model. In order to study the stability of different
constellations of trade agreements, our framework utilises a three-country trade model
with competition via exports. It will determine the welfare of each country and
thereby induce preferences and rankings over all regimes. The model itself follows
the one used by Saggi and Yildiz (2010).
Recall that N = {a, b, c} denotes the set of countries. Further, let G = {A,B,C}
denote three (corresponding) non-numeraire goods. Now, each country i is endowed
with zero units of good I (corresponding capital letter) and ei units of the others.
Ultimately, it will end up importing I and exporting J and K with J,K 6= I. To
guarantee the ‘competing exporters’-structure, a general condition needs to be applied
to the degree of asymmetry with respect to the endowments of the countries. For i
and j in N with i 6= j, in order for the exports from i to j to be non-negative the
condition 3ej ≤ 5ei needs to be satisfied. Thus, the general condition reads:
3
5
max{ej, ek} ≤ ei ≤ 5
3
min{ej, ek} ∀ i, j, k ∈ N
The preferences of individuals in each country are furthermore assumed to be
identical. The demand for any non-numeraire good L ∈ G in country i ∈ N is given
by the function d(pLi ) = α − pLi with pLi the price of good L in country i and the
(universal) reservation price α.13 Each country also (possibly) imposes tariffs on the
goods imported by them. Let tij denote the tariff imposed by country i on the import
from country j. All prices and tariffs of a specific good I ∈ G are connected via the
following no-arbitrage condition
pIi = p
I
j + tij = p
I
k + tik(3.1)
13The demand function is derived from a utility function that is additively separable and also
quadratic in each non-numeraire good.
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where i, j, k ∈ N are pairwise distinct. In this model, the resulting prices together
with the corresponding endowments are the only factors influencing imports and
exports. In particular, the level of imports mIi of good I to country i is completely
determined by the demand function (depending on the price), mIi = d(pIi ) = α− pIi .
The exports xIj of good I from country j are the combination of the demand function
(or prices) and the corresponding endowment, xIj = ej − d(pIj ) = ej + pIj − α. Now, a
market-clearing condition for any good I requires that country i’s import is equal to
the total export of the countries j and k (again i, j, k ∈ N pairwise distinct):
mIi = x
I
j + x
I
k(3.2)
Ultimately, the objective function of country i is its welfare14, denoted Wi, which
includes Consumer Surplus (CS), Producer Surplus (PS), and Tariff Revenue (TR):
Wi =
∑
L∈G
CSLi +
∑
L∈G\{I}
PSLi + TRi
Now, CS is composed of three parts itself, namely one for each good. The con-
sumer surplus CSIi with respect to the foreign good I is CSIi =
1
2
(α − pIi )mIi and
CSLi =
1
2
(α− pJi )(ei − xJi ) for a domestic good L. Also, PS splits into two. The pro-
ducer surplus PSLi for a domestic good L is given by PSLi = xLi (pLl − tli)+(α−pLi )pLi .
Finally, the tariff revenue TRi is given by TRi = xIj tij + xIktik.
3.3.2.1. Equilibrium. Let us start by using no-arbitrage (3.1) and market-clearing
(3.2) to compute the equilibrium prices:
pIi =
1
3
(
3α−
∑
j 6=i
ej +
∑
j 6=i
tij
)
Using these equilibrium values, it is possible to calculate imports, exports, and also
the welfare of each country up to the value of the tariffs (Appendix B.2.1). Note, that
the maximisation of welfare with respect to tariffs is going to be restricted depending
on the trade agreement under consideration, see Section 3.3.3. For example in the
case of MFN, country i maximises Wi under the restriction that tij = tik. Therefore,
country i aims to maximise its welfare Wi over (tij, tik) ∈ Ti given (tji, tjk) ∈ Tj and
(tki, tkj) ∈ Tj, where Tl is the set of possible tariff pairs for country l in a fixed trade
agreement.
The full equilibrium of this model is computed as follows. Fix a trade agreement
and thereby the restrictions on the tariffs. Compute the best-response functions for
each country (with respect to the tarifs) and determine the optimal choices. While
Section 3.3.3 contains all information on the trade agreements that is necessary to
14In certain cases (depending on the trade agreement) the objective function of a country includes
the welfare of other countries as well. See Section 3.3.3 for the details.
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compute the equilibria, the actual results are presented in Appendix B.2.2. Finally,
an overview of the (resulting) overall welfare can be found in Appendix B.2.3.
3.3.3. Trade Policy Arrangements. All trade relations in our model are one
of four types: MFN, CU, FTA, and MTA. Each type, except for MFN, naturally
induces different combinations of insiders and outsiders. Namely, three combinations
of two members and one of three (each for CU, FTA, and MTA).15 Additionally,
the case of FTA contains the possibility of a special hub structure with two FTAs
at the same time - adding another three combinations. In total, our model allows
for 16 different trade constellations.16 For each of these trade agreements the tariffs
are bounded from below and above by zero and the MFN-tariff respectively, which
is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.2.2. The corresponding set of tariffs for
country i, i.e. [0, tMFNi ], is denoted by Ti. Any additional restrictions on tariffs,
specific to trade agreements, are listed here:
In the baseline case, i.e. MFN, countries do not liberalise their trade relations
at all, but the non-discrimination principle still applies. Each country unilaterally
chooses its (optimal) tariffs accordingly. Therefore, the optimisation problem of coun-
try i is max(tij ,tik)∈TMFNi Wi with T
MFN
i = {(tij, tik) ∈ R2≥0 | tij = tik}. Note, that in
this reference scenario each tariff is chosen from R≥0 instead of Ti.
In case country i and j form CU(i,j), each of them removes any trade restriction
on the other country and then jointly imposes an optimal tariff on country k. Thus,
the optimisation problem of country i and j is max(tij ,tik)∈TCUi ,(tji,tjk)∈TCUj Wi + Wj
with TCUi = {(tij, tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = 0} and TCUj analogous. Finally, country k simply
follows and applies the principle of MFN (as before). However, as soon as all three
countries enter a single CU together, the (common) optimisation problem is trivial,
because the only possible tariff of each country towards any other country is zero,
and the scenario is denoted by CUGFT.
In case country i and j form FTA(i,j), each of them removes any trade restriction
on the other country and then unilaterally imposes an optimal tariff on country k.
Thus, the (representative) optimisation problem of country i is max(tij ,tik)∈TFTAi Wi
with T FTAi = {(tij, tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = 0}(= TCUi ). The optimisation problem of country
k is identical to that of the third country in case of a CU. Further, in case country i
15Note that in our model Global Free Trade is essentially listed in three different variations, via
CUs, FTAs, and MTAs. The actual welfare is necessarily equal across all three variations, but
not their position in the network (Section 3.3.5). In particular, for our concept of stability it is
important which group of countries can create or destroy specific trade agreements (Appendix B.3.1).
Occasionally, all three variants together are going to be referred to as ‘GFT’ (when applicable).
16The framework does not contain combinations of different classes of trade agreement due to the
possibly conflicting restrictions on tariffs that the different classes entail. In order to circumvent
potential conflicts one would need to fix an (arbitrary) ordering in terms of priority (or importance)
of trade agreements, which would reduce the explanatory power more than the inclusion of other
combinations of trade agreements would increase it (in our opinion).
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forms an FTA both with j and k, that is FTAHub(i), then both tariffs of country i are
set to zero by nature of its trade relation with both other countries. Each of the other
two countries operates as before: Country j (k analogous) faces max(tji,tjk)∈TFTAj Wj
where T FTAj = {(tji, tjk) ∈ T 2i | tji = 0}. Thus, in terms of decision problem, it does
not matter for a country whether its partner also forms another trade agreement with
the other country. Finally, if all three countries in pairs of two countries form FTAs,
then the optimisation problem is identical to the case of CUGFT, denoted FTAGFT,
but the actual trade agreement is different in terms of structure and network position,
see Section 3.3.5.
In case country i and j form MTA(i,j), then both jointly change their tariffs with
respect to each other and also for the third country (at the same time). Thus, the
optimisation problem of country i and j is max(tij ,tik)∈TMTAi ,(tji,tjk)∈TMTAj Wi+Wj with
TMTAi = {(tij, tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = tik} and Tj analogous. As seen before, the optimisation
problem of country k is identical to that of the third country in case of a CU. Again,
as soon as all three countries enter a single MTA together, the optimisation problem
is identical to the case of CUGFT, denoted MTAGFT, but also different in terms of
network position, see Section 3.3.5.
3.3.4. Stability Concept. As concept of stability our framework makes use of
the approach of Chwe (1994).17
Consider the tuple Γ = (N,X, {≺i}i∈N , {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅) that correspondingly de-
scribes the evolution of the status quo of trade agreements driven by the combination
of preferences and effectiveness relations:
Let x ∈ X be the status quo of trade agreements at the start. Next, each coalition
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅ (including individuals) is able to make y ∈ X the new status quo as
long as x→S y. Continue with such y as the new status quo. If a status quo z ∈ X
is reached without any coalition moving away, then the state is actually realised and
each country receives their corresponding welfare.18 In consequence, any coalition
only favours following through on their ability to move, x→S y, when preferring the
final welfare over the current one, x ≺S z. Formally, this comparison of states by
(chains of) coalitions is captured in the definition of direct and indirect dominance:
Definition 3.1 (Dominance). Let x1, x2 ∈ X. Then,
i) x1 is directly dominated by x2, write x1 < x2, if there exists S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
such that x1 →S x2 and x1 ≺S x2.
17Consult the paper of Chwe (1994) for the proofs of the propositions that are presented here.
18Technically, the model is without any true sense of time. Any start (or end) as well as any
sequence of actions should be interpreted as a thought-experiment. Furthermore, a path created in
this fashion is generally not unique.
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ii) x1 is indirectly dominated by x2, write x1  x2, if there exist sequences
y0, y1, . . . , ym ∈ X (with y0 = x1 and ym = x2) and S0, S1, . . . , Sm−1 ⊆ N ,
such that Si 6= ∅, yi →Si yi+1, and yi ≺Si ym for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Note, that if x1 < x2 for some x1, x2 ∈ X, then automatically x1  x2.
Using this definition, the concept of ‘consistent set’ describes a (sub-)set that
exhibits internal stability in the form of a lack of incentive to deviate:
Definition 3.2 (Consistent Set). A set Y ⊆ X is consistent if y ∈ Y if and only
if for all x ∈ X and all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, with y →S x there exists z ∈ Y where x = z
or x z such that y 6≺S z.
In general, a consistent set is not necessarily unique, but the following proposition
allows us to talk about the unique ‘largest consistent set’, i.e. the (consistent) set
that contains all consistent sets:
Proposition 3.1. There uniquely exists a Y ⊆ X such that Y is consistent and
Y ′ ⊆ X consistent implies Y ′ ⊆ Y . The set Y is called the largest consistent set or
simply LCS.
Or put differently, it is the unique fixed point of the correspondence f : 2X → 2X
defined by
Y 7→ f(Y ) = {y ∈ X | ∀x ∈ X, ∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅, with y →S x :
∃z ∈ Y s.t. (x = z or x z) ∧ y 6≺s z}.
Now, similar to the internal stability captured in the definition of consistent sets,
a form of external stability is captured via an incentive to gravitate towards the
consistent set:
Definition 3.3 (External Stability). Let Y ⊆ be the largest consistent set. Then,
it satisfies the external stability condition if for all x ∈ X \Y there exists y ∈ Y such
that x y.
The following result characterises one setting in which this condition is satisfied:
Proposition 3.2. Let X be finite and the underlying preferences irreflexive.
Then, the LCS is non-empty and satisfies the external stability property.
Finally, let us state a couple of comments on the application and interpretation
of this stability concept with respect to our model:
3.3.4.1. Application. First of all, applying Proposition 3.1 to our model is trivial,
because it is stated without any (additional) requirements on the involved objects.
Furthermore, the application of Proposition 3.2 is straight forward as well: First,
the set of outcomes X is clearly finite in our setting as we are only considering a
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finite number of different trade agreements. Second, any strict preference is auto-
matically irreflexive and our preferences are induced by strict welfare comparisons.
Thus, while the definition of the (largest) consistent set in general only guarantees
internal stability, our setting actually implies external stability as well:
Corollary 3.1. In our setting, the (unique) LCS is non-empty and satisfies the
external stability property (in addition to the internal stability).
Now, the LCS is going to be the focus point of our analysis. Any trade agreement
is considered to be ‘(potentially) stable’ if it is in the LCS, ‘unstable’ otherwise. The
nomenclature is a tribute to the fact that the LCS as a stability concept is ‘weak: not
so good at picking out, but ruling out with confidence’, because ultimately it ‘does
not try to say what will happen but what can possibly happen’ (Chwe (1994)).
3.3.5. Network Structure. The complete network structure consists of a col-
lection of transition matrices {AS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ induced by {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅. Let S ⊆ N,S 6=
∅ be any coalition, then the entry (AS)xi,xj is 1 if xi →S xj and 0 otherwise. Thus,
the matrix for {a, b, c}, the full coalition, is simply given by (A{a,b,c})xi,xj = 1 for all
xi, xj ∈ X. Further, each of the transition matrices induces a directed graph with
the trade agreements as vertices and the effectiveness relations as edges. Therefore,
the corresponding directed graph of the full coalition is a complete directed graph
with loops.
It is noteworthy to point out that the relation (or transition) x→S x holds for all
trade agreements x and all coalitions S, but is ultimately irrelevant for the analysis
with respect to the stability. The reason for this is the fact that our model contains no
sense of time - essentially stalling negotiations serves no purpose.19 Therefore, these
transitions are ignored from now on or, put differently, the framework only considers
a form of equivalence classes, namely modulo loops. Furthermore, whenever coalition
S is able to destroy one trade agreement, say x1, and subsequently create another
one, say x2, then it is able to move directly, i.e. x1 →S x2. Finally, for the remaining
coalitions (of two and one country) only the transition graphs are presented here.
The corresponding transition tables can be found in Appendix B.2.4.
Let us now consider the transition graph for a single country coalition i ∈ N
with j, k ∈ N \ {i}, j 6= k, denoting the other two countries. In this case, MFN is
connected to a number of other different elements, but not to the three variants of
Global Free Trade, CUGFT, FTAGFT and MTAGFT. Now, each of those forms a
separate group of connected trade agreements. Thus, the overall transition graph,
see Figure 3.1 (modulo loops), consists of four sub-graphs.
19While staying in one trade constellation, the overall strategic situation remains the same. Specif-
ically, for each country and each coalition the welfare of each trade agreements only depends on
the parameters of the underlying trade model. Similarly, the network structure stays constant.
Additionally, the number of (potential) movements in a chain of trade agreements is unlimited.
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MFN
CU(i,j)
CU(k,i)
CU(j,k)
CUGFT
MTA(i,j)
MTA(k,i)
MTA(j,k)
MTAGFT
FTA(i,j) FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(i)
FTA(j,k)
FTAHub(j) FTAHub(k)
FTAGFT
Figure 3.1. The transition graph for coalition {i}, i ∈ N .
Finally, consider the transition graph for a coalition of two countries i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j with k ∈ N \ {i, j} denoting the other country. In this case, MFN, CU(i,j),
FTA(i,j), and MTA(i,j) are all interconnected. Also, any element connected to one
of these is automatically connected to all of them. Thus, in the transition graph,
see Figure 3.2 (again, modulo loops), this group of four corresponds to a complete
directed sub-graph pictured as one ‘(super) node’ (dotted box).
CU(i,j)
MTA(i,j)
MFN
FTA(i,j)
CU(j,k)
CU(k,i)
CUGFT
MTA(j,k)
MTA(k,i)
MTAGFT
FTA(j,k) FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(k)
FTAHub(j) FTAHub(i)
FTAGFT
Figure 3.2. The transition graph for coalition {i, j}, i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
3.3.6. Algorithm and Parameters. The (additional) explanatory power from
the introduction of an extensive set of trade agreements and unlimited farsightedness
comes at the cost of a complex computational problem. This problem is solved
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numerically with the help of an algorithm - the pseudocode of which can be found in
Appendix B.1.20 The parameter space therefore needs to be specified and discretised:
First, recall that the endowments satisfy 3
5
max{ej, ek} ≤ ei ≤ 53 min{ej, ek} for
all i, j, k ∈ N in order to guarantee the ‘competing exporters’-structure, see Section
3.3.2. Now, without loss of generality, normalise one endowment to one, namely
eb = 1. Consequentially, for i, j ∈ N \ {b}: emin := 35 ≤ 35 max{1, ej} ≤ ei and
ei ≤ 53 min{1, ej} ≤ 53 =: emax. Furthermore, the resulting parameter space, Figure
3.3, can be split into six right-angled triangles, which are mirror images of one another
(in terms of relative endowments). Thus, again without loss of generality, focus on
one of them, namely the marked triangle, and then cover it with a grid for the actual
computation.21
ec
ea35 1
5
3
3
5
1
5
3
Figure 3.3. The parameter space of the endowments with eb = 1
Additionally, to produce plausible results, e.g positive prices, the factor α needs
to be chosen above a minimal value for each tuple of endowments, αmin(ea, eb, ec).
Above this minimal value, the results remain unchanged.22 Thus, by taking the max-
imum over all these minimal values, αmax min = maxea,eb,ec{αmin(ea, eb, ec)}, adding an
epsilon, α = αmax min + , and using it for all endowments makes sure that all results
are plausible and comparable at the same time.23
3.4. Analysis
Let us now present the resulting structure of stability among trade agreements
according to our framework. Figure 3.4 depicts the parameter space of endowments
under consideration for this - it is the (marked) triangle from before. The analysis
starts with the three extreme points, then turns to the connecting intervals, and
20The authors are grateful to Michael Chwe for the provision of an exemplary algorithm.
21The distance is set to 0.0013360053440215 - due to 500 points per dimension of the grid.
22The factor α always enters the welfare of country i as 2αei (see Appendix B.2.1). Therefore, any
changes above the minimal value leave the welfare levels and therefore the rankings unaffected.
23In our computation  is simply fixed to 0.01, which yields α = 1.3988888888888888.
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finishes with the entire interior. In each of these cases, two scenarios are examined.
The first scenario corresponds to the current WTO institutional arrangement while
the second one assumes modified WTO rules without Article XXIV Paragraph 5,
which would prevent the formation of PTAs (specifically CUs and FTAs).
P Q
R
PQ
Q
RPR
A
ec
ea1 53
1
5
3
Figure 3.4. Overview of the different points, intervals and areas of
interest depending on the (partially normalized) endowment tuple
The remainder of this analysis is structured as follows. First, Section 3.4.1 con-
siders the symmetric case, see point P in Figure 3.4, where all countries are identical.
Second, Section 3.4.2 features the two extreme asymmetric cases, points Q and R,
with countries that are small, small, and large (Q) or small, large, and large (R). Next,
Section 3.4.3 discusses the three related intervals, sides PQ, QR, and PR, where the
countries are small, small, and varying (PQ), small, large, and varying (QR), or small
with two varying equally (PR). Finally, Section 3.4.4 describes the inner area, area
A, with three distinct countries.
3.4.1. Symmetric Case. First, let us consider the symmetric case, where sym-
metry refers to identical endowments for all countries, i.e. ea = eb = ec = 1 = emin,
and corresponds to point P in the triangle of Figure 3.4. As the countries do not
differ from one another, the only thing that matters for welfare is whether a country
is an insider or an outsider in a specific trade agreement. In the following, we present
the ranking of preferences from the perspective of country a, which represents that
of all other countries as well, for fixed i, j ∈ N \ {a} with i 6= j:
CU(i, j) ≺a MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a FTAHub(i) ≺a FTA(i, j) ≺a FTA(a, i)
≺a CU(a, i) ≺a MTA(i, j) ≺a GFT ≺a FTAHub(a)
The case where two countries form a CU is the least favourable trade constellation
for the third country. Under such circumstances, the outsider faces the second-highest
tariffs (with MFN-tariffs the highest), while the insiders cancel the tariffs among
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themselves. The exports of country a to the other countries, i and j, are the lowest
under CU(i,j) compared to all alternative trade agreements. The same applies to the
total imports. In other words, the ‘trade diversion’ effect is the strongest for country
a in case of CU(i,j). In general, the MFN regime favours country a when compared
to CU(i,j). The tariff revenue remains the same, while the consumer surplus is lower
and the producer surplus is higher - the increase offsets the decrease. The MFN
regime slackens the ‘trade diversion’ effect present in the case of CU(i,j) by virtue of
increased export values of country a.
Among the group of bilateral trade agreements where the country is an insider,
the MTAs result in the lowest welfare (for this country). MTA(a,i) itself generates
a higher welfare for country a in comparison with the MFN regime on the grounds
of increased consumer and producer surplus. The FTAHub(i) constellation results in
even further gains in welfare for country a through higher export values and producer
surplus accordingly (the tariff revenue and also the consumer surplus are lower under
FTAHub(i) compared to MTA(a,i) though). However, country a does not have an
incentive to remain in this constellation. The unilateral deviation from FTAHub(i) to
FTA(i,j) comes with a decrease of consumer and producer surplus but enough increase
in tariff revenue to ultimately ensure higher welfare under the latter constellation.
Nonetheless, among FTAs being an outsider is less desirable than being an insider
for any country. The drop in tariff revenue is offset by an expansion of the consumer
and producer surplus, resulting in higher welfare for country a in case of FTA(a,i)
compared to FTA(i,j). As an insider, country a prefers CU(a,i) over FTA(a,i) though.
More precisely, in spite of the decline in the consumer surplus, the actual welfare goes
up through an expansion of tariff revenue and producer surplus.
The formation of MTA(i,j) guarantees the highest welfare for country a compared
to any other bilateral trade agreement. The driving factor is the MFN-principle,
which implies that in case of MTA(i,j) the insiders need to apply the same tariff to
both each other and the outsider - a form of free-rider problem. At the same time,
country a attains the highest possible tariff revenue.
Each country obtains the second-highest welfare level when the world reaches
global free trade. Under full trade liberalisation, the producer surplus is also the
second-highest among all trade agreements (effectively driving the ranking). It is only
surpassed by that of FTAHub(a). The latter constellation brings about the highest
possible welfare for country a. But note that such a trade agreement disproportionally
favours the hub country over the other countries.
Countries’ strong preference rankings are the crucial ingredient for computing the
LCS. In fact, for each country all three variants of global free trade are ranked as
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second-best option while each first-best option, a hub structure, is ranked consider-
ably lower for the other countries. Intuitively, global free trade seems like a stable
compromise. The following proposition and its proof reinforce this:
Proposition 3.3. Under symmetry and with the current institutional arrange-
ment of the WTO, the LCS contains three elements: CUGFT, FTAGFT, and MTAGFT.
In other words, (the trinity of) global free trade is the unique stable outcome.
Proof. Based on the definition of indirect dominance and the transition graphs,
see Section 3.3.4 and 3.3.5, the preference rankings from earlier allow us to derive
the indirect dominance matrix. If the entry in the matrix is equal to one (resp.
zero), then the trade arrangement corresponding to the row of the entry is (resp.
isn’t) indirectly dominated by the one corresponding to the column of the entry. For
example, FTAHub(a) is indirectly dominated by CUGFT as there exists a (finite)
sequence of outcomes and coalitions such that all coalitions in the sequence prefer
the final outcome over the current one:
FTAHub(a)→{b,c} CU(b, c)→{a,b,c} CUGFT
Checking for all possible sequences yields the following indirect dominance matrix:24

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2CU(a, b) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
3CU(b, c) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
4CU(c, a) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
5CUGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
7FTA(b, c) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
8FTA(c, a) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
9FTAHub(a) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
10FTAHub(b) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
11FTAHub(c) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
12FTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13MTA(a, b) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
14MTA(b, c) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
15MTA(c, a) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
16MTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

Note that intuitively any outcome is stable if all deviations from it are deterred.
Also, a deviation from the outcome is hindered if there is a stable outcome which
might be reached and some member of the deviating coalition does not prefer it over
the initial outcome. In the following procedure, start with the full set and then keep
removing elements that are unstable until the remaining ones are stable
24Appendix B.1 contains the pseudocode for this procedure.
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Take x ∈ {MFN,FTA(i, j), CU(i, j),MTA(i, j)}, where i, j ∈ N with i 6= j,
and then consider the joint deviation x →{a,b,c} FTAGFT . The FTAGFT regime
is not indirectly dominated by any other outcome (see the matrix above) and also
x ≺{a,b,c} FTAGFT for each of those x. Thus the deviation x →{a,b,c} FTAGFT
cannot be deterred and therefore no such x can be part of the stable set.
Consider FTAHub(i), i ∈ N , and the deviation FTAHub(i) →{j,k} FTAGFT ,
j, k ∈ N \ {i} with j 6= k. Using FTAHub(i) ≺{j,k} FTAGFT together with the
logic from before eliminates FTAHub(i) for each i ∈ N .
Focus on the set of remaining elements Y = {CUGFT, FTAGFT,MTAGFT}.
Start with any element y in Y . If there is a deviation to any element x ∈ X \ Y ,
then there always exists an indirect dominance path (see indirect dominance matrix)
x  y′ coming back to an element y′ ∈ Y . In addition, for any y1, y2 ∈ Y , y1 6= y2,
there does not exist a coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, for which y1 ≺S y2. Thus, the set Y
satisfies the (internal) stability condition while being maximal, i.e. Y = LCS. 
In the symmetric case, under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO,
the global free trade variations appear as the only stable constellation according to
our framework. But what would happen without Article XXIV Paragraph 5? In this
case, countries would not have the option to liberalise trade through the formation of
CUs or FTAs - leaving MTAs as the only possibility. The representative preference
ranking of country a would look as follows:
MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a MTA(i, j) ≺a MTAGFT
Each country achieves the peak welfare under MTAGFT. Thus, it is reasonable
to conjecture stability of MTAGFT. The following proposition proves this intuition:
Proposition 3.4. Under symmetry and with the modified institutional arrange-
ment of the WTO (no PTAs), the LCS contains one element: MTAGFT. In other
words, global free trade is the unique stable outcome.
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is derived as before:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 1 1 1 1
2MTA(a, b) 0 0 1 1 1
3MTA(b, c) 0 1 0 1 1
4MTA(c, a) 0 1 1 0 1
5MTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0

Let us start with the full set of trade agreements again (limited to the setting).
If the grand coalition moves from MFN to MTAGFT , then the only possibility
is to stay there, as MTAGFT is not indirectly dominated by any other outcome.
Moreover, MFN ≺a,b,c MTAGFT . Thus, MFN cannot be stable. Furthermore, if
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the grand coalition moves from any bilateralMTA regime to GFTMTA, by the same
argument, it is clear that no bilateralMTA can be stable. Finally, any deviation from
MTAGFT will come back to itself due to the indirect dominance. Consequentially,
the set Y = {MTAGFT} is consistent and also the largest one. 
If symmetry among all countries holds, then Article XXIV Paragraph 5 does not
change anything in terms of stability and corresponding welfare, both individual and
overall. The only stable trade constellation is (the trinity of) global free trade.
3.4.2. Asymmetric Case - Vertices of the Triangle. It is natural to start
the analysis of the asymmetric case by considering its two extreme scenarios, which
correspond to the points Q and R in the triangle of Figure 3.4. In the following,
Section 3.4.2.1 discusses the case of countries that are small, small, and large (Q)
while Section 3.4.2.2 focuses on countries that are small, large, and large (R).
3.4.2.1. The case of two small and one large country. In this scenario, fix
ea = emax and eb = ec = emin (point Q). Let us start with the ranking of preferences
for country a and another country i ∈ N \ {a} - representing also j ∈ N \ {a, i}:
CU(i, j), FTA(i, j) ≺a FTAHub(i) ≺a MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺a FTA(a, i)
≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a CU(a, i) ≺a GFT, FTAHub(a)
MTA(a, i) ≺i GFT, FTAHub(a) ≺i CU(a, i) ≺i FTA(a, i) ≺i CU(a, j)
≺i MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺i FTAHub(i) ≺i FTA(a, j) ≺i MTA(a, j)
≺i FTAHub(j) ≺i CU(i, j), FTA(i, j)
One immediately notices that small and large countries have different rankings.
A large country profoundly dislikes the scenarios where it is an outsider; while the
small countries, by contrast, dislike any trade arrangements with the large country.
Note that in certain cases countries actually do not differentiate between different
trade constellations.25 For example, CU(i,j) and FTA(i,j) result in same welfare for
all countries. In this case, under the given pattern of endowments, the optimal tariffs
of the small countries for CU and FTA are above the MFN-tariff. However, the
Sub-paragraphs of Article XXIV Article 5 rule this out and therefore the tariffs are
capped at the MFN-level. A similar argument applies to the case of FTAHub(a).
Here, the optimal tariffs of the small countries would be negative. By restricting
tariffs from below by zero implies that FTAHub(a) corresponds to GFT, or rather a
Pseudo-GFT. Finally, the MTA between the small countries actually coincides with
the MFN regime because of identical optimal tariffs for both cases.
Next, let us analyse the preferences of the large country a. As mentioned above,
being the outsider produces the least favourable constellations for a large country.
25Additional details on this can be found in Appendix B.2.2 and Appendix B.2.5.1.
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The worst scenarios are those where the small countries form a PTA. In such cases,
the export, and hence the producer surplus, is the lowest in the large country. Now,
compared to these PTAs among the small countries, both the tariff revenue and the
consumer surplus are lower under FTAHub(i), but the comparably strong growth of
the producer surplus produces an increase in welfare. Further increases in producer
surplus are possible via the MFN regime or MTA(a,i). As soon as the large country
forms an FTA, its welfare increases due to trade relations that benefit its exports
within the constellation. MTA(a,i) leads to an even higher welfare, but there the
driving factor are the tariff revenues. Among all bilateral trade agreements, where
the large country is an insider, the optimal outcome is CU(a,i). The highest welfare
for the large country occurs when trade is fully liberalised though. In that scenario,
it is able to completely reap the trade benefits - the producer surplus peaks when
compared to the other trade agreements.
Now, let us consider the preferences of a small country i, the countries i and j
are indistinguishable from each other in this respect. Contrary to the preferences
of a large country, it is in its best interest for a small country to avoid forming any
trade arrangement with the large country. The smallest welfare of a small coun-
try occurs in the case of MTA(a,i), as the constellation generates one of the least
desirable combinations of tariff revenue and producer surplus. Under FTAHub(a)
or GFT, the small country achieves higher welfare through an increase in producer
surplus and despite a decrease in tariff revenue and consumer surplus. CU(a,i) and
FTA(a,i) each lead to further welfare improvements for the small country. In both
cases, the driving factor is a higher consumer surplus. Next, regardless of the lower
consumer and producer surplus under CU(a,j) (compared to FTA(a,i)), its higher
tariff revenue actually results in a higher welfare. The tariff revenue stays at its peak
under MTA(i,j) or the MFN regimes as well, but with higher welfare. Specifically, an
increase in consumer surplus offsets the decrease in producer surplus. By compari-
son, FTAHub(i) actually increases the producer surplus and thereby also the total
welfare. FTA(a,j) then generates its peak tariff revenue from before and through
this a higher welfare for the small country as an outsider. Under MTA(a,j) the tariff
revenue stays the same and the lower producer surplus gets (more than) compensated
by the higher consumer surplus. Compared to this, FTAHub(j) decreases the tariff
revenue but increases both the consumer and the producer surplus enough to increase
the welfare. Finally, a small country attains the best result by forming a PTA with
the other small country, either through FTA(i,j) or CU(i,j). While keeping relatively
high tariff revenues, the small countries manage to have a high producer surplus as
well.
Using the preference rankings to derive the LCS yields the following proposition:
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Proposition 3.5. With the endowments given by ea = emax and eb = ec = emin,
and under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellations
are the PTAs between the two small countries, that is CU(b,c) and FTA(b,c).
Proof. Let us start by giving the indirect dominance matrix:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2CU(a, b) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
3CU(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4CU(c, a) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5CUGFT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7FTA(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8FTA(c, a) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9FTAHub(a) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
10FTAHub(b) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11FTAHub(c) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12FTAGFT 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
13MTA(a, b) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14MTA(b, c) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15MTA(c, a) 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16MTAGFT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0

Recall that X denotes the full set and let Y = {CU(b, c), FTA(b, c)} be the
candidate for the LCS. Take any element x from the set X \ Y and consider the
deviation x →{b,c} CU(b, c). Note that CU(b, c) is not indirectly dominated by any
other element from X and furthermore x ≺{b,c} CU(b, c) for all x ∈ X \Y . Thus, the
deviation x→{b,c} CU(b, c) can not be deterred for all x ∈ X \Y . Therefore, no such
x can be part of the stable set.26
As each outcome in X \ Y is indirectly dominated by y ∈ Y (see the matrix), for
any coalition and any deviation away from y ∈ Y there always exists a path of indirect
dominance back to Y . Moreover, no coalition is actually better off when coming back
to Y , as x 6≺S y for all x, y ∈ Y , x 6= y, and S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. Therefore, the set Y
satisfies the (internal) stability condition while being maximal, i.e. Y = LCS. 
Even though global free trade is the most desirable regime for the large country,
the two small countries do not have any incentive to form such a constellation and the
large country can not enforce it. As a consequence, country a ends up with the worst
trade agreement (from its perspective). Thus, in this scenario the size advantage
26It might appear that this proof deviates from the general approach of eliminating element by
element from the full set until the remainder forms the stable set. However, in this proof it is purely
a coincidence that in one step all elements but the stable ones can be eliminated with one argument
(or rather deviation).
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of the large country does not translate into a favourable stable regime. Moreover,
this specific case showcases the relevance of the restrictions on PTAs (remember that
insiders are not allowed to raise tariffs on outsiders). The constraint makes the small
countries be indifferent between the two forms of PTAs.
Now we turn to the hypothetical scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5.
Here, the ranking of preferences for the countries, with country a the large one and
country b and c small (represented by i and j), are as follows:
MTA(i, j),MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a GFT
MTA(a, i) ≺i MTAGFT ≺i MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺i MTA(a, j)
As a result, the best outcome for a small country i is the MTA(i, j) regime, as
the PTAs are not available anymore. The next proposition presents the new LCS as
a consequence of these changes:
Proposition 3.6. With the endowments given by ea = emax and eb = ec = emin,
and under a modified institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellations
are MFN and MTA(b,c).
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is given as follows:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 0 0 0 0
2MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 0 0
3MTA(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0
4MTA(c, a) 1 0 0 0 0
5MTAGFT 1 1 1 1 0

Start with the full set again. If we consider the deviations MTA(c, a)→c MFN
and MTA(a, b) →b MFN , then no further deviations are expected as MFN is
not indirectly dominated by any other outcome. In addition, MTA(c, a) ≺c MFN
and MTA(a, b) ≺b MFN , so MTA(c, a) and MTA(a, b) cannot be part of the sta-
ble set. The same argument works in the case of MTAGFT and the deviation
MTAGFT →b,c MFN , as MTAGFT ≺b,c MFN . So, the global free trade regime
cannot be stable as well.
Let Y = {MFN,MTA(b, c)}. Following any deviation from the elements in Y ,
there is always an indirect dominance path coming back to Y (MFN in this case).
In addition, for any x, y ∈ Y with x 6= y there does not exist coalition S for which
x ≺S y. Thus, the set Y is consistent and the largest one as well. 
In summary, when there are two small and one large country, the GFT regime
is unstable under the current and hypothetical institutional set-up of the WTO. At
best, world trade can be partially liberalised. Additionally, the small countries profit
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when they can form a PTA instead of an MTA, as the limiting MFN principle can
be avoided that way.
3.4.2.2. The case of one small and two large countries. In this scenario, fix
eb = emin and ea = ec = emax (point R). Let us start with the ranking of preferences
for country b and another country i ∈ N \ {b} - representing also j ∈ N \ {b, i}:
GFT ≺b CU(i, b) ≺b FTAHub(i) ≺b FTA(i, b) ≺b FTAHub(b) ≺b MTA(i, b)
≺b MFN ≺b CU(i, j) ≺b MTA(i, j) ≺b FTA(i, j)
CU(j, b) ≺i FTA(j, b) ≺i MFN ≺i MTA(i, b),MTA(j, b) ≺i FTA(i, j)
≺i MTA(i, j) ≺i CU(i, j) ≺i FTAHub(b) ≺i FTAHub(j) ≺i GFT
≺i FTAHub(i) ≺i FTA(i, b) ≺i CU(i, b)
Under the given pattern of endowments, the preference rankings of the countries
are considerably different from the previous cases. For the small country, the MFN
regime generates higher welfare than any other trade agreement where it is part of.
As for a large country, being an outsider is on the lower end of the ranking, while
being an insider in a PTA with a small country is on the other end.
Let us take a closer look at the preference ranking of the small country. First,
GFT actually generates the lowest total welfare - driven by no tariff revenue and not
enough compensation via consumer and producer surplus. As mentioned before, any
trade arrangement involving the small country results in lower welfare compared with
other constellations (but higher welfare than GFT). The lowest among those are the
CU with any of the large countries, which through increased tariff revenue (and de-
spite a decrease in consumer surplus) yield higher welfare in comparison with the GFT
regime. Even though FTAHub(i) reduces those gains in tariff revenue again, by virtue
of a growing consumer surplus it still raises the total welfare. Further improvement
in the welfare of the small country is possible if the world moves from FTAHub(i)
to FTA(i,b); the sole reason is a higher consumer surplus. Under FTAHub(b), the
export volumes to the large countries are at its peak and it generates substantially
higher producer surplus. As a consequence, it results in the small country preferring
to form a hub structure (as the hub node) over an FTA with one of the large coun-
tries. Replacing the FTA with an MTA with similar structure is the most desirable
configuration for the small country among the constellations where it participates.
Under MTA(i,b) the producer surplus is actually the smallest compared to all other
alternatives, but high tariff revenue and consumer surplus determine its position in
the ranking. The MFN regime surpasses all configurations mentioned above. When
there are two large countries, the tariff revenue becomes an important factor in the
welfare of the small country. Any further improvements with respect to the welfare
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of the small country depend on the large countries liberalising trade among them-
selves - the small country essentially free-rides in these cases (exhausting its tariff
revenue to the fullest). The driving factor among these three is the export volume.
Consequentially, CU(i,j) is the worst option, followed by MTA(i,j), and FTA(i,j) is
the (overall) best outcome.
The following discusses the preferences of the two large countries. The least
favourable scenario occurs when the other large country forms a CU together with
the small country. Its position in the ranking is driven by the lowest export vol-
umes and producer surplus. Now, FTA(j,b) produces higher welfare compared to the
previous constellation due to growth in producer surplus (based on rising exports
to the small country) which makes up for the drop in consumer surplus. A similar
development makes the MFN regime an even better constellation (here the exports
to the large country increase). All tariffs (and thus prices) are identical under both
MTA(i,b) and MTA(j,b), as a consequence they generate the same welfare. On the
grounds of increased exports, the welfare tops that of the MFN regime. Among the
class of bilateral trade agreements between the large countries, the ranking goes as
follows: FTA(i,j) followed by MTA(i,j) only surpassed by CU(i,j). In comparison with
MTA(i,b) and MTA(j,b), the greater consumer and producer surplus of FTA(i,j) guar-
antees an increase of total welfare. An MTA between the two large countries produces
more tariff revenues and actually results in a more desirable outcome. Moving from
MTA(i,j) to CU(i,j) decreases tariff revenue and also consumer surplus but the gain
in producer surplus through increased exports to the other large country makes more
than up for this. FTAHub(b) and even more so FTAHUb(j) further improve the wel-
fare via growth of the tariff revenue and consumer surplus (the case of FTAHub(b)),
and increased exports to the other large country (for FTAHUb(j)). Now, the GFT
regime allows the large country to raise the exports to the small country while retain-
ing the same level of exports to the other large country. As a consequence, the welfare
of GFT surpasses that of the previous mentioned constellations. However, when the
large country is part of a hub structure as the hub node itself, then its exports to the
small country increase such that the welfare exceeds that of full trade liberalisation.
Furthermore, the FTA with the small country constitutes the second-best outcome
for the large country on the grounds of high tariff revenue accompanied by similar
consumer surplus. Finally, CU(i,b) is the most desirable constellation driven by the
high exports to the small country.
Let us compute the LCS under these preference rankings in the next proposition:
Proposition 3.7. With the endowments given by eb = emin and ea = ec = emax,
and under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellation
is the CU between the two large countries, that is CU(c,a).
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is given as follows:
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
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2CU(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
3CU(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
4CU(c, a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5CUGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
7FTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
8FTA(c, a) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
9FTAHub(a) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
10FTAHub(b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
11FTAHub(c) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
12FTAGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
13MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
14MTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
15MTA(c, a) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16MTAGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

First, take x ∈ {CU(i, b), FTA(i, b),MTA(i, b), FTAHub(i), FTAHub(b)}, with
i ∈ {a, c}. Country b can destroy such trade agreements and, depending on the initial
constellation, either FTA(c, a) or theMFN regime remains. Then, further deviations
are possible, namely MTA(c, a) and CU(c, a). However, each of the aforementioned
trade agreements is indirectly dominated by CU(c, a) and simultaneously country b
is better off compared to the initial situation. Consequently, such deviations can not
be avoided and no such x can be part of the stable set.
Now, consider x ∈ {MFN,FTA(c, a),MTA(c, a)} for which x →{a,c} CU(a, c)
presents a deviation that can not be deterred. As in the previous paragraph, CU(c, a)
is not indirectly dominated any element and also x ≺{a,c} CU(a, c). Thus, no such x
can be the part of the stable set as well.
At last, let x ∈ {CUGFT, FTAGFT,MTAGFT} and consider the deviations
where country b leaves the agreements. CU(c, a), FTA(c, a), or MTA(c, a) can be
the result. We have shown that the last two outcomes can not be stable. As for
CU(a, c), we have that for all x considered x ≺{b} CU(a, c). As a result, we conclude
that no such x can be in the consistent set.
CU(a, c) indirectly dominates each outcome, all deviations from it are deterred.
So, the set containing CU(a, c) is consistent and the largest one as well. 
The small country manages to block many desirable outcomes for large countries.
Country b can unilaterally deviate from any trade agreement with higher welfare than
CU(i,j) for the large countries. Thus, the majority of countries cannot impose their
will on the other country. What the large countries can achieve is the best trade
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agreement that they can reach without the participation of the small country, in this
case one among themselves.
A similar story unfolds in the scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5. There,
the countries’ preference rankings are as follows, with country b the small one and
country a and c large (represented by i and j):
MTAGFT ≺b MTA(i, b) ≺b MFN ≺b MTA(i, j)
MFN ≺i MTA(i, b),MTA(j, b) ≺i MTA(i, j) ≺i MTAGFT
As the logic of the corresponding preference rankings of the countries is similar
to before, let us directly present the proposition:
Proposition 3.8. With the endowments given by eb = emin and ea = ec = emax,
and under a modified institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellation
is the MTA between the two large countries, that is MTA(c,a).
Proof. In this case, the indirect dominance matrix has the following form:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 0 0 1 0
2MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0
3MTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0
4MTA(c, a) 0 0 0 0 0
5MTAGFT 0 0 0 1 0

Assume, x ∈ {MTA(a, b),MTA(b, c),MTAGFT} and consider the deviations,
where country b dismantles any above mentioned constellation. Two possibilities:
Either MFN or MTA(c, a) remain. From MFN either no coalition moves away or,
as it is indirectly dominated by MTA(c, a) (see the indirect dominance matrix), the
latter might be approached. In either case, b is better off. Thus, no such x can be
part of the stable set.
Now, analyse the case of theMFN regime. Take the following deviation: MFN →{a,c}
MTA(c, a). As MTA(c, a) is not indirectly dominated by any other trade agreement
and MFN ≺{a,c} MTA(c, a), the MFN regime can not be stable as well.
As MTA(c, a) indirectly dominates each trade agreement, all deviations from it
are deterred. So, the set consisting of MTA(c, a) is consistent and the largest one as
well. 
Thus, similar to the other asymmetric case, one small and two large countries
allow for partial but not full liberalisation of world trade irrespective of the actual
scenario (current vs. modified WTO rules). In terms of overall welfare, the world
is better off in the hypothetical scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5 though.
Individually, the small country is in a better position in case of MTA(i,j) compared
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to CU(i,j), as it exploits the MFN obligation of the large countries. By contrast,
the large countries are better off in the other case. Therefore, while none of the two
institutional arrangement facilitate global free trade, they influence the welfare for
the stable set (both overall and individual).
3.4.3. Asymmetric Case - Edges of the Triangle. Let us now turn to the
cases where the endowments of countries vary along one dimension - corresponding to
the sides PQ, QR, and PR in the triangle of Figure 3.4. Specifically, Section 3.4.3.1
presents the scenario where the countries are small, small, and varying (PQ), Section
3.4.3.2 discusses the setting where the countries are small, large, and varying (QR),
and Section 3.4.3.3 describes the case of a small country with two varying equally
(PR).
While in the previous cases it was still possible to solve the problems analytically,
the following require the use of a numerical approach. The analysis presented here
consists of graphics picturing the composition of the stable sets and accompanying
descriptions that explore the underlying mechanics. The exact numerical values for
these (sub-)intervals can be found in Section B.3.2.
3.4.3.1. The case of one small, one large, and one varying country. First,
let us consider the case eb = emin, ea = emax, and ec ∈ (emin, emax) (side QR). Under
the given pattern of the endowments, a number of trade agreements can be completely
ruled out (with respect to the LCS). The MFN and GFT regimes for example are
never part of the stable set. Additionally, none of the PTAs between the small and
the large country appear as a stable outcome. The same holds for the hub structures
where either the small or the large country is the hub node. As for the actual
composition of the LCS, see Figure 3.5 for a graphical representation.
CU(b,c)
CU(c,a)
FTA(b,c)
FTA(c,a)
FTAHub(c)
MTA(c,a)
1
= eb
5
3
= ea
ec
Figure 3.5. Characterisation of the case of small, varying, and large
country
The general observation is that when the varying country is close in size to the
small country, then the PTAs between these smaller countries appear as elements in
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the stable set. When the country becomes larger the trade constellation between the
larger countries replaces these. Additionally, there are two small, separated, regions
in the middle of the interval where FTAHub(c) is stable.
In order to get an intuitive understanding of the results, let us identify specific
trade agreements that go from stable to unstable (or the other way around) for certain
endowment tuples. Then, explore the underlying mechanics to understand why the
changes happen.
Start with the PTAs between country b and c, the small and the varying one.
Interestingly, the only factor driving their stability are the preferences of country b
(with fixed minimal endowments). Once the MFN regime becomes more desirable
than CU(b,c) for country b, the constellation CU(b,c) drops from the stable set. Now,
an identical story holds for the case of FTA(b,c). Thus, for both constellations it only
requires a single change in the preference ranking of country b to influence the stable
set.
The PTAs and MTAs between country a and c start to appear in the LCS when
country c is becoming relatively large and closer to country a in size. At first both
countries actually prefer to form a CU with country b, that is when country c is
relatively small (and CU(b,c) actually is an element in the stable set). However, once
it is preferable for country b to be the outsider instead of the insider in a CU, CU(c,a)
emerges as a stable outcome (even though CU(b,c) still remains stable). Moreover,
as soon as country c prefers FTA(c,a) respectively MTA(c,a) over the MFN regime,
each of them becomes part of the LCS as well. For the interval where all PTAs
and MTAs between country a and c are stable, both countries have fixed preference
relations over these outcomes:
FTA(c, a) ≺a CU(c, a) ≺a MTA(c, a)
MTA(c, a) ≺c FTA(c, a) ≺c CU(c, a)
However, as soon as country c also prefers MTA(c,a) over FTA(c,a), the joint FTA
drops out of the LCS. Similarly, as soon as country a prefers CU(c,a) over MTA(c,a),
this also applies to the joint MTA - leaving CU(c,a) as the only stable outcome.
FTAHub(c) is stable in the two small, separated, regions in (or near) the middle
of the interval. In the first region, the stability is driven by the fact that country b
starts to value FTAHub(c) more than FTA(b,c) and gets in unison with country a
in this respect. Once the preferences of country b over these outcomes get reversed,
FTAHub(c) drops out of LCS again. In the second region, the stability of the same
hub structure is largely determined by the change in the preferences of country c.
Now, as soon as it starts to value FTA(c,a) over the MFN regime, which also puts
FTA(c,a) in the LCS, both FTAs with c as a partner are stable and consequentially the
corresponding hub structure is stable as well. As soon as the free-riding incentives
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of country b increase (valuing the MFN regime more than FTAHub(c)), this hub
structure is not part of the stable set anymore.
The hypothetical institutional arrangement without Article XXIV Paragraph 5
does not promote the appearance of GFT as part of the stable set. GFTMTA, but
also MTA(a,b) and MTA(b,c) never emerge as stable outcomes. Varying the size
of country c generates either the MFN regime or MTA(c,a) as the stable element.
Figure 3.6 presents these findings.27
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Figure 3.6. Characterisation of the case of small, varying, and large
country
Over the whole interval, country b does not have any incentive to form an MTA
with any of the other countries. This is one reason why the MFN regime is stable over
the specific range of the interval. The other reason is that country c prefers to not
have a trade agreement with country a as long as its own size is not too large. Once
country c gets sufficiently large though, MTA(c,a) presents a better option than the
MFN regime. As a consequence, MTA(c,a) replaces the MFN regime as the stable
set.
As a side note, while in the first scenario (with PTAs), the LCS near and at each
respective extreme point corresponded to each other (continuity), the situation is
different in the second scenario (without PTAs). When country c and b are equal in
size, MTA(b,c) appears in the LCS even though it is not there before. Here, both
the MFN regime and MTA(b,c) generate the same welfares for all countries (see also
the discussion on point Q in Section 3.4.2.1).
Finally, under this given pattern of endowments, the GFT regime does not ap-
pear as part of the stable set independent of the scenario (with and without PTAs).
However, the choice of rules does determine whether partial trade liberalisation takes
place or not. The possibility of forming PTAs reduces the incentive of the small(est)
country to free ride. Otherwise, the MFN regime is the unique stable outcome when
there is one small, one large, and one comparably small country.
27In addition to the aforementioned elements, it also pictures MTA(b,c) as a single point, see the
dot, but this appears only for completion sake because that point corresponds to one of the extreme
cases (point Q) discussed earlier.
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3.4.3.2. The case of two small, and one varying country. Second, let us
showcase the scenario with eb = ec = emin and ea ∈ (emin, emax) (side PQ). In contrast
to the previous case, it is not possible to rule out many of the trade agreements. Only
MFN, FTAHub(a), and MTA(b,c) never appear in the LCS. The stable set is then
presented in Figure 3.7.28
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Figure 3.7. Characterisation of the case of small, small, and varying
country
In the immediate vicinity around symmetry, the GFT regime is the only element
of the LCS (or rather the group of the three variants forms the stable set), but both
FTAHub(b) and FTAHub(c) emerge as stable outcomes when moving away from the
extreme point. On the whole interval a number of different PTAs and MTAs, mostly
between a small and the larger country, appear. Near the other point, only PTAs
among the small countries are still stable.
First, the spike in the number of stable constellations close to symmetry actually
follows a change in the preferences of the varying country with respect to CU(b,c) and
the GFT regimes - it starts preferring the first over the latter. Furthermore, FTA(a,b)
and FTA(c,a) become unstable because the small countries start to like the MFN
regime more than the GFT variants (or rather these are only stable for that instance
where it is not the case). When country a gets sufficiently large, country b prefers
FTAHub(c) over CU(a,b) and c prefers FTAHub(b) over CU(c,a). As a consequence,
both of these CUs drop out from the LCS. Similarly, when country b and c start
preferring FTAHub(c) and FTAHub(b) over GFT, the latter stops being stable. A
similar argument also applies to the MTAs. When the size of country a increases even
more, both country b and c favour CU(b,c) over their respective hub structure, which
results in FTA(b,c), FTAHub(b), and FTAHub(c) becoming unstable. When the
endowment of country a gets close to maximum, the small countries are constrained
28The dot marks a single point again.
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by the MFN-tariffs and do not differentiate between CU(b,c) and FTA(b,c) anymore,
which makes FTA(b,c) stable again.
In the scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5, the interval of GFT increases
significantly. Moreover, over two-thirds of this interval the GFT regime is the unique
element in the LCS. Additionally, all possible combinations of MTA appear at some
point (mostly close to symmetry). Figure 3.8 demonstrates the results.29
MFN
MTA(a,i) i=b,c
MTA(b,c)
MTAGFT
1
= eb = ec
5
3
ea
Figure 3.8. Characterisation of the case of small, small, and varying
country
Around symmetry, GFTMTA is the only element in the stable set. As soon as
the small countries start to prefer MTAs with country a over GFTMTA, all three
MTAs appear in the LCS. When the size of country a increases, the MTAs drop out
from the LCS, because the small countries rank the one with the large country as the
worst trade agreements (switching last place with the MFN regime), which actually
also influences the stability of the MTA among themselves. Furthermore, the GFT
regime becomes unstable when the small countries start to prefer their joint MTA
over GFTMTA.
Similar to the previous case, the LCS changes at one extreme point. Namely,
when the endowment of country a reaches the maximum, the MFN regime appears
in the LCS, as MFN and MTA(b,c) generate identical welfare for all countries (again,
see also the discussion on point Q in Section 3.4.2.1).
Under this pattern of endowments, the first scenario does not allow for a sharp
prediction via the LCS (unlike the previous case). Especially around symmetry, where
almost all trade agreements are part of the stable set. In the second scenario, the
effect of the PTAs on the stability of the GFT regime is significant though - essentially
the abolishment of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 would facilitate the formation of GFT
as long as there are two small countries and the third country is not substantially
larger.
3.4.3.3. The case of one small, and two varying countries. Finally, let
us turn to the case where eb = emin and ea = ec ∈ (emin, emax) (side PR). In this
29As before, in addition to the mentioned trade agreements, the graphic also contains MFN as a
single point, see the dot, at an extreme point (again point Q).
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scenario, depending on the size of the larger countries, any trade agreement can be
part of the stable set. The exact composition of the LCS is the basis for Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.9. Characterisation of the case of small, varying, and vary-
ing country
In the interval around symmetry, the GFT variants are stable and stay the unique
elements of the stable set for longer (compared to the previous case). Also, a collection
of different trade agreements is stable relatively close to symmetry. However, near
the other extreme point, the CUs between the varying countries is the unique stable
outcome. Also, MFN is stable in two small, separated, regions.
Again, the peak in stability near symmetry comes from a shift in the preferences
of the varying countries with respect to CUs. At that point, both of these start to
prefer a CU with the small country over the different forms of GFT. The occurrence
of the MFN regime actually follows a preference of the small country of MFN over
GFT (the first region) and then FTAHub(a) and FTAHub(c) (the second region).
As countries a and c are getting bigger, first MTA(a,b) and MTA(b,c) drop out from
the LCS when they rank the lowest according to the preferences of country b. The
three variants of GFT become unstable once the small country prefers CU(c,a). Next,
CU(a,b) and CU(b,c) follow as the small country starts to prefer to be in the MFN
regime over a CU with any of the larger countries. As soon as CU(c,a) becomes the
more desirable trade agreement for country b when comparing it to any FTA where
b participates or any hub structure with a large country as hub, all aforementioned
constellations drop out from the LCS.
Contrary to the previous case, switching off Article XXIV Paragraph 5, actually
decreases the interval where the GFT regime is part of the stable set. However, this
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effect is considerably smaller. A similar observation holds for the range where the
GFT regime is the unique stable outcome. The exact composition can be seen in
Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10. Characterisation of the case of small, varying, and vary-
ing country
The main driving force behind the stability are alterations in the preferences of
the small country over the interval. More precisely, it is important where exactly the
small country places the MFN regime in its ranking of preferences compared to the
other trade agreements. As soon as country b prefers MFN over another constellation,
the latter drops out from the LCS. After a certain point, the MTA between the large
countries remains the only stable outcome.
Similar to the previous pattern of endowments, this case makes a clear analysis
in the first scenario difficult, especially around symmetry where, as before, almost all
constellations are stable. The effect of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 actually works in
the other direction on the stability of the GFT regime when compared to the previous
case though.
3.4.4. Asymmetric Case - Interior of the Triangle. In the following (and
final) part of the analysis, the focus lies on the interior of the triangle of Figure 3.4.
Here, unlike in the previous discussions, both CU and FTA appear together under
the label of PTA. However, a variation of the graphics of this analysis that actually
distinguishes between the two can be found in Appendix B.3.1. For the purpose of
a general overview, this level of abstraction suffices though - in fact, the members of
a specific trade agreement are suppressed for clarity as well, i.e. who is insider and
outsider.
First, we consider the existing institutional set-up, where PTAs are available to
the countries. Figure 3.11 shows the (simplified) stable sets. In a small region close
to symmetry, region one, the trinity of GFT regimes is the unique stable element. In
both a neighbouring and another distant area, region two, PTAs become stable as
well. The connecting area, region three, adds MTAs as another stable element. In a
tiny area near the diagonal, region four, no form of trade agreement can actually be
excluded from the stable set. Further along the diagonal and in the asymmetric cor-
ners, region five, PTAs are the only stable trade constellation. In between, region six,
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MTAs are also stable. In another tiny area, also close to the diagonal, region seven,
MFN enters the stable set as well. In general, with a certain degree of asymmetry
among countries at most partial trade liberalisation can be expected.
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Figure 3.11. Simplified Overall Stability with PTAs
Next, we consider a modified institutional set-up, where PTAs are not available.
Figure 3.12 depicts the corresponding stable sets. In an area near symmetry as well
as in a sizeable area away from it, region one, GFT is again the unique stable element.
Connected to these are two areas, region two, where MTAs become stable as well.
Moving towards the asymmetric corners, region three, yields MTAs as the only stable
element. In between, region four, only MFN remains in the stable set.
The comparison of the graphics allows us to deduce two compelling statements.
The first noteworthy result is the extent of MFN in each scenario. In the modified
institutional arrangement without PTAs the area where MFN is (uniquely) stable
increases substantially (note that this effect is present away from symmetry). Under
(significant) asymmetry, it seems that PTAs allow countries to move towards their
international efficiency frontier (cf. Bagwell et al. (2016)).
The second interesting result is the difference in the extent of stability of GFT
in the two regulatory scenarios. First, recall that once the degree of asymmetry
surpasses a certain threshold, none of the GFT regimes remains in the stable set,
independent of the institutional set-up. Around symmetry the opposite holds in that
the GFT regimes are always stable there (in both scenarios). In between, the effect
of PTAs on the stability of GFT depends on the structure of asymmetry. See Figure
3.13 for the different areas of stability depending on the regulatory scenario. Note
that region one corresponds to the aforementioned stability around symmetry. In
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Figure 3.12. Simplified Overall Stability without PTAs
the case of two relatively larger countries (but not too large), the abolishment of
PTAs results in a reduction of the area where GFT is stable, see region two. In this
instance, PTAs act as ‘building blocks’ on the road to GFT. But when two countries
are relatively smaller (but not too small), the same regulatory action yields the exact
opposite effect, see region three. Here, PTAs are ‘stumbling blocks’. Thus, whether
PTAs are ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’ in the vicinity of symmetry depends
on the relative size of the majority of the countries.
I II
1 x x
2 x
3 x
Figure 3.13. The different areas of stability of the GFT regime in
the scenario with (I) and without (II) PTAs
3.5. DISCUSSION 59
In a nutshell: If the world is in the vicinity of symmetry and two out of three
countries are close to identical while relatively smaller than the other one, the area
where the GFT regime is stable increases when prohibiting PTAs. However, when
two similar countries are relatively larger, the availability of PTAs is conducive to
the stability of the GFT regime. Finally, if the world is further away from symmetry,
full trade liberalisation is not attainable at all and an area where the MFN regime is
stable appears in the scenario without PTAs.
3.5. Discussion
In this section, let us first compare the findings of our work with those of several
similar studies and underline the differences in the modelling strategies, especially
with respect to the explanatory power of each approach. Second, this section links
our predictions to different empirical observations, thereby validating our approach.
Let us start with the paper of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013).30 First note
that the underlying trade model in our approach is similar to theirs, which allows a
direct comparison of the findings in certain scenarios (found in the next paragraph).
The first distinction is the set of trade agreements under consideration. While in
our model countries can be involved in multilateral trade liberalisation via MTAs or
they may choose to carry out their favoured form of preferential trade liberalisation
through CUs or FTAs, Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013) focuses on two out of
these three possibilities, namely CUs and MTAs. In our opinion, the expanded set
of trade arrangements in our model allows us to fully capture the trade-offs among
the alternatives and make the model realistic. The second significant difference is the
concept of stability. While our framework uses the notion of LCS, the paper of Saggi,
Woodland and Yildiz (2013) utilises Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria. As Bernheim,
Peleg and Whinston (1987) note, their notion of self-enforceability, which is critical
for Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, is too restrictive in one crucial aspect, mainly:
‘When a deviation occurs, only members of the deviating coalition may contemplate
deviations from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that some member of the
deviating coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included
in this coalition.’ Importantly, this limitation does not affect the concept of LCS.
It is not a pure academic difference. The historic development of the two (disjoint)
trade constellations in Europe in the 1960s, the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), can not be captured by
a model using Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, because it excludes those strategies
30As mentioned in Section 3.2, this paper analyses the case of CUs and MTA while their other papers
(Saggi and Yildiz (2010) resp. Missions, Saggi and Yildiz (2016)) focus on different combinations
of trade agreements (FTAs and MTAs resp. CUs and FTAs) but use a similar framework. As a
consequence, the comparison of methodology applies to these papers as well.
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that the UK actually followed during that time.31 While being a member of EFTA
the UK applied for EEC membership in 1961 and thereby undermined the stability
of the EFTA. Furthermore, ‘the more ambitious Kennedy Round between 1964 and
1967 coincided with negotiations to expand the EEC to include Britain, Ireland,
Denmark, Greece, and Norway - and was motivated in part by US concerns about
being excluded from an ever-broader and more unified European market.‘ (World
Trade Report 2011). Thus, unlike the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, the LCS
allows interactions among members and non-members of coalitions simultaneously,
thereby accommodating these historic developments. Additionally, the (conjectured)
motivation of the US reinforces the importance of the interaction among different
modes and forms of trade liberalisation.
In specific cases it is actually possible to directly compare the composition of the
stable sets of chapter 3 with those of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013). In fact,
their ‘multilateralism game’ fits our scenario of a modified institutional arrangement
without PTAs. Compare Figures 2 and 5 of Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013) with
Figures 3.10 and 3.8 in our work correspondingly. In the case with one small country
and the other two varying, both approaches predict the same stable sets near the
endpoints of the interval. In our work GFT stays part of the stable set even when
MTAs, either between the large countries or a small and a large country, become
stable as well - which is in contrast to Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013). A similar
observation follows for the case of two small and one varying country, i.e. near the
endpoints of the interval results coincide while the appearance of MTAs does not
prevent GFT from staying in the stable set. Furthermore, in our model there exists
an interval where GFT becomes the unique stable element once more. It seems that
one effect of the unlimited farsightedness is the proliferation of GFT.
Another relevant paper is that of Lake (2017). Apart from the stability concept,
the approach of Lake also differs with respect to the choice set. There, the focus lies
on FTAs. In this respect, a direct comparison of the findings is difficult. Moreover,
compared to the previous paper, the ‘multilateralism game’ is further simplified in
Lake (2017), as the only possible regime there is the three country constellation that
results in GFT. Furthermore, as the underlying trade model, the paper employs the
political economy oligopolistic model. However, according to the paper, the findings
are robust with respect to various underlying trade models, including the competition
via exports model. Additionally, Lake himself compares his results to those of Saggi
and Yildiz (2010). Due to the similarity of the ‘multilateralism game’ in Saggi and
Yildiz (2010) and Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013), it is only logical to compare
our results with those of Lake (2017) as with the previous paper.
31See Baldwin and Gylfason (1995).
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According to Lake (2017), specifically Figure 3, the exact role of FTAs under
asymmetry depends on the nature of asymmetry (similar to our findings). However,
the direction of the effect of PTAs on trade liberalisation is the opposite. There, in
case of two larger and one small country, FTAs act as ‘(strong) stumbling blocs’, and
with two smaller and one larger country, as ‘(strong) building blocs’. Furthermore,
there it seems that the determining factor are the preferences of the larger countries,
while in our case the findings are driven by the preferences of the smaller countries.
Thus, the aforementioned differences in the choice set and stability concept appear
to shift the power to influence the negotiations among the countries, which then
produces a different outcome. Specifically, in the case of the ‘multilateralism game’,
which corresponds to our scenario without PTA, there are essentially two areas, that
is one where GFT emerges as unique equilibrium and one with MFN instead. In the
parameter space triangle the first makes up the upper left part of the triangle, while
the second makes up the opposing lower right.32 Therefore, for two larger countries
the GFT regime remains the unique equilibrium for the whole interval, whereas in
our model it only stays stable in the vicinity of symmetry (only partially unique)
and then the MTA between the larger countries is the unique stable outcome, as seen
in Figure 3.10. Furthermore, for two smaller countries first GFT then MFN is the
unique equilibrium, while in the beginning GFT is also stable in our case (although
only partially unique) the MTA between the small countries takes it place as the
unique stable element near the end, depicted in Figure 3.8. Finally, in the case
of three different countries, it starts with MFN and ends with GFT as the unique
equilibrium, which corresponds to our findings for the first part but then in the second
part the MTA between the medium and large country is the unique stable element,
visible in Figure 3.6.
Another aspect of Lake (2017) necessitates a remark, namely the assumption
that a once created trade agreement remains binding from then on. Lake argues that
‘the binding nature of trade agreements is pervasive in the literature and realistic’.
However, the latest developments in the world cast doubt on this plausibility. The
USA, for example, pulled out of the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
at the final stage and currently negotiates with South Korea to amend the so-called
KORUS FTA. The developments around ‘Brexit’ are another argument for modelling
non-binding trade agreements. Using the LCS as stability concept allowed us to
accommodate such deviations.
A final remark on the relation of our research with empirical observations. As
the analysis has shown, a growing degree of asymmetry among countries produced a
significant area of stability for the MFN regime when PTAs are prohibited, see region
32The first corresponds to the regions denoted WBB and SSB in Figure 3 of Lake (2017), while the
second matches the regions SBB and WSB.
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four in Figure 3.12. If one would interpret the expansion of the WTO rule set to an
increasing number of countries as an amplification of asymmetry among its member
states, then the potential of PTAs to prevent the MFN regime might be one of the
driving factors of the prevalence of PTAs in recent history. However, the World Trade
Report (2011) casts doubt on this motive. According to the report: ‘Approximately
66 per cent of tariff lines with MFN rates above 15 percentage points have not been
reduced in PTAs.’ Note that a reduction of the tariff peaks for 34 percent of the tariff
lines is still a significant effect considering the fact that the majority of tariff peaks
occurs in agricultural and labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, which are politically
sensitive and countries usually try to exclude them from the trade liberalisation
via PTAs. Furthermore, according to the same report, over time more and more
PTAs have included provisions regarding technical barriers to trade - a category of
the Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The paper of Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2009)
estimates that restrictiveness measures that include NTBs are on average about 87
percent higher than the measures based on tariffs alone. Thus, in order to evaluate
the aforementioned motive properly, the effects of NTBs should be included in the
analysis as well. Moreover, contrary to the conclusion of the report that ‘preference
margins are small and market access is unlikely in many cases to be an important
reason for creating new PTAs’, Keck and Lendle (2012) show that the preferential
utilisation rates are often high even in the case of small preference margins and they
increase both with the preference margin and the export volume. All in all, it is our
opinion that there is (partial) evidence for the motive of avoidance of MFN via PTAs
which coincides with the predictions of our model about the trade-off between trade
liberalisation and the MFN regime in the asymmetric part of the parameter space.
As this overview showed, a number of core attributes of the LCS, specifically the
farsightedness, the non-binding nature of agreements, and the possibility of inter-
actions between members and non-members of coalitions, capture important mecha-
nisms present in the world and influence the composition of the stable set significantly
(when compared to other stability concepts).
3.6. Conclusion
Under the rules of the WTO (previously GATT), a group of countries can engage
in both multilateral and preferential trade liberalisation. The formation of global
trade agreements is a complex game and the rules of the game influence the na-
ture of the exact outcomes. WTO’s Article I aims at creating the global free trade
system, while Article XXIV Paragraph 5 allows countries to seemingly circumvent
the liberalisation process. In chapter 3, our focus lies on the stability of trade pol-
icy arrangements under two different regulatory scenarios (with and without PTAs)
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assuming unlimited farsightedness of the participants in the trade negotiations and
considering an extensive set of trade agreements - moving our model closer to reality.
Unfortunately, the answer to the question whether PTAs are ‘building blocks’ or
‘stumbling blocks’ on the path towards global free trade is not as straightforward
as one would like it to be. In the end, the results presented here are mixed and
depend on the size distribution of the countries. Under symmetry, GFT is the unique
stable trade constellation in both regulatory scenarios. But as soon as one moves
away from symmetry, GFT might not be reached at all. In between, the effect of
switching off Article XXIV Paragraph 5 depends on the exact asymmetry. In case
two countries are relatively smaller, prohibiting PTAs increases the area of stability
of the GFT regimes. When two countries are relatively larger, it reduces the area.
Once the world is further away from symmetry, abolishing the exception for PTAs
might result in the worst possible state from the perspective of overall world welfare,
the non-cooperative MFN regime. Therefore, under such circumstances, PTAs act as
a mechanism that prevents the MFN regime.
Our research also raises a couple of questions in need of further investigation.
First, it would be interesting to study the robustness of the findings with respect to
the underlying trade model. While the model of competition via exports remains
popular in the related literature, economists also extensively use both oligopoly and
competition via imports model. Fortunately, the framework presented here does allow
for a different underlying trade model such as the ones mentioned above. Another
potential area of inquiry might be an extension of the framework to increase the
number of countries. Nowadays, in addition to bilateral negotiations, so-called pluri-
lateral negotiations play an important role in the development of preferential trade
liberalisation. Recent examples are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) and the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Including more than three
countries in a model would allow us to investigate the strategic interactions among
countries whilst taking these negotiations into account. The introduction of political
economy considerations to the underlying trade model is another area of interest33,
as it might allow us to understand the nature of tariff peaks occurring after PTAs
come into effect. It is our opinion that modifications or extensions of our framework
(as mentioned here) are directions worthy of further research.
As a final remark, it is perhaps important, going forward, to move the debate
of ‘building blocks’ vs. ‘stumbling blocks’ to a level of detail that goes beyond this
binary choice.
33See for example Facchini et al. (2013).
CHAPTER 4
The Impartial Observer under Uncertainty
4.1. Introduction
Individuals, as members of society, continually face choices among moral rules,
institutional arrangements, government policies or patterns of wealth distribution;
therefore, they are repeatedly involved in value judgements about which social al-
ternative to choose. The history of economists (and philosophers) arguing that indi-
viduals should make such decisions under sympathetic interest in the welfare of each
member of society without any bias towards particular participants dates back as far
as Adam Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ (1759).
Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977) developed a rational theory of societal judgements.
According to this theory, such choices should be made based on individual’s ‘social’
or ‘moral’ preferences which are derived from the concept of an ‘impartial observer’.
As such, you imagine a situation where you do not know your actual place in society
when comparing different social arrangements. Instead, you judge the desirability
of the alternatives under the personal preferences of all members of society.1 Thus,
the original premise remains that this type of theory, unlike the theory of individual
rational behaviour or game theory, should be independent of selfish considerations.
The main result of this theory, now known as Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer The-
orem, combines Adam Smith’s ideas of a sympathetic and impartial spectator with
Kant’s universality criterion and the utilitarian tradition of social utility maximisa-
tion using von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. In the end, Harsanyi
argued that an individual facing risky prospects over social outcomes and a hypo-
thetical lottery over identities in society should rank these according to the weighted
aggregate of individuals’ expected utilities.
However, Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem with its implicit utilitarianism
only considers scenarios where each of the involved individuals faces objective risk.
It is a theory analysing societal judgements when objective probabilities over a set
of social outcomes are known by each member of society. Our goal in chapter 4 is
to extend Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem to include Knightian Uncertainty
in the model. By introducing individual belief systems about the likelihood of the
social outcomes (which the impartial observer necessarily takes into consideration),
1The imaginary construct of impartiality is similar to John Rawls’ idea of a ‘veil of ignorance’ in ‘A
Theory of Justice’ (1971), as these two metaphors are attempts at capturing the same stance.
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our approach allows the application of the original framework to a new area of social
value judgements. In particular, it allows the analysis of scenarios where individuals
agree on the ranking but not on the likelihood of social outcomes. The impartial
observer in our model does not aggregate these belief systems separately though.
When the impartial observer imagines herself being a particular individual, she adopts
not only that individual’s preferences but the belief system as well.2
The main result of our work is a generalised utilitarian representation of the
preferences of the impartial observer under uncertainty. It is a weighted sum of
Second-Order Subjective Expected Utility (SOSEU) functions, each representing the
preferences of an individual. Our framework is based on the generalised version of
Harsanyi (1953) by Grant et al. (2010), which accommodates common criticism of
Harsanyi’s approach, specifically the issue of fairness and attitude towards mixing.
The introduction of individual belief systems to our framework follows Seo (2009)
and as a result the SOSEU functions supersede the Expected Utility (EU) functions
of both Harsanyi’s and Grant et al.’s approach.
In addition to the framework, chapter 4 includes two illustrative examples. First,
the moral dilemma of the ‘Afghan Goatherds’ (see Sandel (2010)) showcases a scenario
of agreement on the ranking but disagreement on the likelihood of social outcomes.
Second, an example of a simple exchange economy with endowments and different
alternatives of wealth (re-)distribution demonstrates the frameworks suitability for
traditional economic problems - it serves as a proof of concept in that regard.
In order to motivate the introduction of uncertainty to moral value judgements,
let us preview the story of the Afghan Goatherds. In 2005 a team of four soldiers,
all U.S. Navy SEALs, set out to find a Taliban leader in the Afghan mountains near
the Pakistan border. Just as the team set up their base overlooking the area to
fulfil their reconnaissance mission, two Afghan goatherds stumbled upon them - a
young boy with them. Due to the nature of their mission and other circumstances,
the team considered killing or releasing the civilians the only two viable options.
Eventually, the team cast a vote, where one soldier abstained, two voted two ways
and the commander of the unit made the decisive call to release them. The civilians
later informed the Taliban in a nearby village about the presence of the soldiers. In
the subsequent ambush three of the four soldiers died, leaving the commander as the
lone survivor.
In retrospect it is easy to make the correct call for this specific scenario. However,
imagine you wanted to create a guideline for commanders about how to make such
moral value judgements when in the field. In that case, you would naturally assume
2In our opinion, this is a natural extension of Harsanyi’s concept of impartiality. It differs therefore
from the type of group decisions that are presented in Raiffa (1970), which features and discusses
aggregation of belief systems.
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the role of an impartial observer and evaluate the situation based on individual pref-
erences. In order to truly assume a person’s view however, it is necessary to also take
on that persons belief system - which is not possible (or included) in the traditional
setting. Our approach therefore serves as an extension of the framework to include
such cases where belief systems play an important role. This work also contains a
formal presentation of this specific moral dilemma and thereby connects the model
with reality.
Section 2 discusses the related literature and focuses on the two relevant streams of
literature, that is social choice theory and decision theory under uncertainty. Section
3 presents a minimal version of a framework based on Grant et al. (2010) and
then introduces uncertainty following Seo (2009). Section 4 provides an analysis of
the model, including a comparison with Grant et al. (2010). Section 5 contains the
aforementioned illustrative examples as it revisits the Afghan Goatherds and presents
the economic example. Section 6 summaries and concludes chapter 4. The appendix
consists of one particularly extensive proof and additional details for the example of
the Afghan Goatherds.
4.2. Related Literature
The important philosophical tradition of impartiality for moral value judgements
about collective life has a long history. Vickrey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953) both
independently introduced the idea to the economic literature and as Mongin (2001)
formulates it: ‘All in all, Harsanyi, if perhaps not Vickrey, should count as a major
representative of the ethics of impartiality among 20th century writers.’
The (related) literature on Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem is substantial.
It is not our aim to review this vast literature as a whole, but instead to concentrate
on the building blocks of our work and other closely related research.
As mentioned in the introduction, Grant et al. (2010) and Seo (2009) are the
inspiration for the building blocks of our framework. In the first one, the authors
revisit Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem; they consider two major criticisms,
concerning fairness and different risk attitudes, and derive a generalised version of
the theorem that accommodates these criticisms. Furthermore, in the special case of
an impartial observer that is indifferent between identity and outcome lotteries (‘ac-
cidents of birth’ and ‘life chances’) the generalised version of the theorem boils down
to the standard Harsanyi doctrine. In consequence, the setting of the paper actually
yields a new axiomatisation of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism. The resulting generalised
utilitarianism serves as inspiration for the foundation of our approach. It gives us
the possibility to extend the original framework of Harsanyi from risk to uncertainty
while also accommodating common criticism of it.
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In the second paper mentioned above, Seo formulates a model for decision making
under uncertainty using second-order beliefs, i.e. beliefs over probability measures.
Existing models in this stream of literature essentially differ in the choice of the do-
main of preference. Seo takes the domain of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and
a similar axiomatic foundation. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) by con-
trast require an additonal (sub-)domain with preferences. The domain selection of
Seo allows us to introduce uncertainty to the (generalised) framework without any
additional modifications. The Second-Order Subjective Expected Utility (SOSEU)
representation of the preferences by Seo therefore translates to a corresponding ver-
sion in the context of an impartial observer.
A variety of papers already deals with Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem
under uncertainty. Gajdos and Kandil (2008) provide an extension of the framework
where the impartial observer considers sets of identity lotteries. In their model, unlike
ours, uncertainty is introduced on a societal (not individual) level. The impartial
observer’s preference (under additional assumptions) is then characterised by a convex
combination of Harsanyi’s utilitarian and Rawls’ egalitarian criteria.
A work closer to ours is the one by Nascimento (2012) which presents a model
of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. A fundamental
difference is the setting of each paper. Namely, the one of Nascimento is that of a
group of individuals that necessarily agrees on the ranking of certain risky objects.
In contrast, our setting is one where a group of individuals does not agree on the
ranking of any objects (risky or ambiguous). The assumption of Nascimento fits a
group of experts or specialists in a field where there is a certain consent. However,
in our opinion this assumption is too restrictive for other cases, like the economic
example in this chapter (see Section 4.5 for a formal discussion). Nevertheless, the
results are actually closely related, compare specifically Theorem 1 by Nascimento
and Theorem 4.1 in this work. In a sense, our work arrives at a similar representation
but with a different axiomatic foundation and also with applications in mind that
are explicitly excluded otherwise. Furthermore, as the analysis of the example of the
Afghan Goatherds shows, our framework is actually also able to include scenarios
with consent (see Section 4.5 and Appendix C.2).
It is worth mentioning (and repeating) that the impartial observer in our model
always takes on the individual beliefs as part of the preferences thereby avoiding any
aggregation of belief systems. In consequence, our model stays true to Harsanyi’s
thought experiment and also avoids the impossibility result of Mongin (1995).3
3A number of papers deals with decision making of societies using a mechanism of aggregating
different individual beliefs, for example Cres, Gilboa and Vielle (2011), Alon and Gayer (2016),
Danan, Gajdos, Hill and Talon (2016), and Qu (2017).
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4.3. Model
Let (X, τ) be a topological space. Then, denote by BX its Borel σ-algebra and by
∆(X) the set of all probability measures on (X,BX). By x for x ∈ X refer both to the
actual element in X and to the induced one in ∆(X) - depending on context. Endow
∆(X) with the weak convergence topology. Also, endow any product of topological
spaces with the product topology.
4.3.1. General Setting. Let I = {i1, . . . , iI}, I ≥ 2, be a finite set of individu-
als facing a societal decision problem in the presence of individual uncertainty. Each
social choice is modelled as a three-layered object (of different types of risk).4 First,
the (final) outcome space is given by X - a compact metrisable space with |X | ≥ 2.
The outcome lotteries p ∈ ∆(X ), also called one-stage lotteries, are the first layer
(featuring objective risk). Further, let S = {s1, . . . , sS}, be the finite set of states of
the world, which introduces uncertainty via individual beliefs about its probability
distribution. The functions h : S → ∆(X ), also called acts, are the second layer
(featuring subjective risk or simply ambiguity). Denote by H the set of all acts. The
act lotteries P ∈ ∆(H), also called two-stage lotteries, are the third layer (featuring
objective risk again).
The individuals in this situation imagine themselves as an impartial observer, i.e.
treating their (social) identity as an unknown component in the decision problem.
As such, they face both identity lotteries z ∈ ∆(I) and act lotteries P ∈ ∆(H).
Thus, the individual preferences i, i ∈ I, are each defined on ∆(H) while that of
the impartial observer  is defined on ∆(I) × ∆(H).5 For all of these preferences,
we assume a couple of ‘standard’ properties:
Assumption 4.1 (Individual). For each i in I the preference i on ∆(H) is
complete, transitive and continuous. Its asymmetric part i is non-empty.
Assumption 4.2 (Impartial Observer). The preference  on ∆(I) × ∆(H) is
complete, transitive and continuous. Its asymmetric part  is non-empty
Note, that by continuous we mean that the weak upper and lower contour sets
are closed with respect to the corresponding topologies. In the case of the individual
this means with respect to the weak convergence topology and in the case of the
impartial observer the product topology of the weak convergence topologies.
4The introduction of uncertainty via these three-layered objects follows Seo (2009) and by extension
Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
5The impartiality that is presented here is based on the framework of Grant et al. (2010) which
generalised the concept of Harsanyi (1953). In Grant et al. (2010) the impartial observer’s pref-
erences are defined on ∆(I)×∆(X ), which naturally extends to ∆(I)×∆(H) - incorporating the
framework of Seo (2009). By contrast, the corresponding set in Harsanyi (1953) is ∆(I × X ). See
Grant et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion on this difference.
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Axiom 4.1 (Acceptance Principle). For all i in I and all P,Q in ∆(H):
P i Q⇔ (i, P )  (i, Q)
The acceptance principle establishes the intuitive link between the preferences of
the individuals and that of the impartial observer. The intuition is that when the
impartial observer imagines herself to be a particular individual that she in fact takes
on the preferences of that individual (including the belief system).
Axiom 4.2 (Independence over Identity Lotteries). Suppose elements (z, P ), (z′, Q)
in ∆(I)×∆(H) are such that (z, P ) ∼ (z′, Q). Then, for all z˜, z˜′ in ∆(I) and all α
in (0, 1]:
(z˜, P )  (z˜′, Q)⇔ (αz˜ + (1− α)z, P )  (αz˜′ + (1− α)z′, Q)
The independence over identity lotteries as well as the acceptance principle are
each concerned with the nature of the impartial observer’s preferences with respect
to identities. As our approach considers uncertainty on the level of outcomes and not
identities, these two axioms naturally carry over from the traditional setting.
Assumption 4.3 (Absence of Unanimity). For all P,Q in ∆(H):
∃i ∈ I : P i Q⇒ ∃j ∈ I : Q j P
The absence of unanimity can be interpreted as a required heterogeneity on the
social alternatives and (preferences of) individuals. It is also not a new addition,
but controversial enough to require an additional comment. First of all, normative
decision-making is clearly trivial when all individuals agree on all rankings. Thus,
it is possible to exclude this extreme case without losing any explanatory power.
However, in our opinion it is too restrictive to completely leave out the opposite
where everyone disagrees about everything - like it is done in Nascimento (2012)
with the requirement of agreement on risky prospects. In general, our aim is to focus
on scenarios that exhibit substantial heterogeneity in terms of (dis-)agreement.6
Next, let us state a lemma (which is going to be useful later on) about the repre-
sentation of the preferences of the impartial observer and the individuals. Now, the
structure of the results and the proof itself (see Appendix C.1) follow the ideas of
Grant et al. (2010):
Lemma 4.1. Suppose absence of unanimity applies. Then, the impartial observer
satisfies the acceptance principle and independence over identity lotteries if and only
if there exists a continuous function V : ∆(I)×∆(H)→ R that represents  and for
6It might seem that absence of unanimity is too restrictive as well (just in the other direction). Yet,
adding a dummy individual that provides the (technically) required heterogeneity allows us to relax
the restriction while still staying in our framework. See Section 4.5 and Appendix C.2 for the formal
presentation of the story of the Afghan Goatherds with a demonstration of a dummy.
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each individual i in I a function Vi : ∆(H) → R that represents i such that for all
(z, P ) in ∆(I)×∆(H):
V (z, P ) =
∑
i∈I
ziVi(P )
Moreover, the functions V and Vi, i ∈ I, are unique up to common positive affine
transformation.
Note that the main arguments of the proof actually work for a general compact set
H as well, i.e. the proof requires no specific structure of H. Thus, a modified Lemma
4.1 could potentially serve as a foundation for conceptually similar approaches to ours
that only differ in terms of additional structure, specifically with respect to individual
utilities.
Now, up to this point all assumptions and axioms follow Grant et al. (2010).
Specifically, their axiom of independence over outcome lotteries (for individuals) is
the only missing axiom. However, in the next part the axioms follow Seo (2009)
instead and introduce uncertainty to the framework.
4.3.2. Introducing Uncertainty. In order to formulate the remaining axioms
and introduce uncertainty to the model, it is necessary to define additional objects.
Namely, let us define what we mean when talking about mixing two acts or lotteries
(of acts). In the end, the two different kind of mixtures depend on the timing of the
resolution of uncertainty (or of the mixing - depending on how you look at it).
First, consider the case where, when combining two (pure) acts, the uncertainty
is resolved first and then the mixing takes place:
Definition 4.1. For f, g in H and α in [0, 1] and for s ∈ S, B ∈ BX we set
(αf ⊕ (1− α)g)(s)(B) = αf(s)(B) + (1− α)g(s)(B).
This operation is called a second-stage mixture.
Now, with this in mind, we introduce a ‘standard’ independence axiom with
respect to second-stage mixtures:
Axiom 4.3 (Second-Stage Independence). For all i in I, all α in (0, 1] and lot-
teries p, q, r in ∆(X ):
αp⊕ (1− α)r i αq ⊕ (1− α)r ⇔ p i q
Second, consider the case where, when combining two lotteries of acts, the mixing
takes place first and then the uncertainty is resolved:
Definition 4.2. For P,Q in ∆(H) and α in [0, 1] and for B ∈ BH we set
(αP + (1− α)Q)(B) = αP (B) + (1− α)Q(B).
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This operation is called a first-stage mixture.
Again, with this in mind, we introduce a ‘standard’ independence axiom with
respect to first-stage mixtures:
Axiom 4.4 (First-Stage Independence). For all i in I, all α in (0, 1] and lotteries
P,Q,R in ∆(H):
αP + (1− α)R i αQ+ (1− α)R⇔ P i Q
Finally, it is necessary to introduce an additional technical object that essentially
serves as a tool for scenario analysis (for the individuals):
Definition 4.3. Each f ∈ H and µ ∈ ∆(S) induce a one-stage lottery
Ψ(f, µ) :=
⊕
s∈S
µ(s)f(s),
each P ∈ ∆(H) and µ ∈ ∆(S) induce a two-stage lottery
Ψ(P, µ)(B) := P ({f ∈ H : Ψ(f, µ) ∈ B})
for B ∈ BH.
In other words, the element Ψ(P, µ) is the (induced) lottery that corresponds to
the lottery P in the scenario where µ is the probability distribution over the states.
Axiom 4.5 (Dominance). For all i in I, all P,Q in ∆(H):
Ψ(P, µ) i Ψ(Q, µ) ∀µ ∈ ∆(S)⇒ P i Q
Imagine an individual only knows there exists a ‘true’ probability distribution but
does not know which one it is. Then, the axiom of dominance captures the intuition
that if the individual prefers one induced lottery over another one - substituting all
possible probability distributions as the true one, then this individual should prefer
that one lottery over the other (and vice-versa).
Finally, using the additional axioms with Lemma 4.1 it is possible to formulate
the main result of our work:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose absence of unanimity applies. Then, the impartial ob-
server satisfies the acceptance principle as well as independence over identity lot-
teries, and each individual satisfies first-stage and second-stage independence, and
dominance if and only if the impartial observer’s preference admits a representation
〈{Ui, φi}i∈I〉 of the form
V (z, P ) =
∑
i∈I
ziφi(Ui(P ))
where each
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• φi : R→ R is an increasing continuous function
• Ui : ∆(H)→ R is a SOSEU representation of i
i.e. the impartial observer is a generalised (weighted) utilitarian under uncertainty.
In addition, the Ui are unique up to uniqueness of the SOSEU representation.
Further, the functions V and φi ◦ Ui are unique up to a common positive affine
transformation.
Proof. Let absence of unanimity apply.
Part 1 (‘⇐’):
First, the representation of the impartial observer is affine in identity lotteries and
therefore satisfies the acceptance principle and independence over identity lotteries.
Note that alternatively this specific step also follows by application of Lemma 4.1.
Second, the representation of each individual is of SOSEU form and thus satisfies
its axioms, that is first-stage and second-stage independence, and dominance, using
Theorem 4.2 of Seo (2009).
Part 2 (‘⇒’):
In this part, the result of Lemma 4.1 is required. Namely, as the impartial observer
satisfies the acceptance principle and independence over identity lotteries, it gives us
a continuous function V : ∆(I) × ∆(H) → R representing  and for each i ∈ I
functions Vi : ∆(H)→ R representing i such that for all (z, P ) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(H):
V (z, P ) =
∑
i∈I
ziVi(P )
The preferences of each individual satisfy first-stage and second-stage independence,
and dominance, and so by Theorem 4.2 of Seo (2009) each Vi is a SOSEU function.
However, this only holds up to transformation via an increasing continuous function.
Thus, for each i ∈ I it follows that Vi = φi ◦ Ui where Ui is a SOSEU function and
φi is a transformation.
The uniqueness of the Ui follows directly from Lemma C.1 in Seo (2009), while
the uniqueness of the V and φi ◦ Ui follows from Lemma 4.1. 
In the theorem and its proof the actual SOSEU representation remained hidden.
The following remark (re-)states the formal definition of a SOSEU representation and
its uniqueness properties (see Seo (2009)). It will be helpful in the analysis and for
the applications later on.
Remark 4.1. A SOSEU representation is generally characterised by a triple
(u, v,m) and of the form
U(P ) =
∫
H
∫
∆(S)
v
(∫
S
u(f)dµ
)
dm(µ)dP (f)
for P ∈ ∆(H), where
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• u is a bounded continuous mixture linear function, u : ∆(X )→ R,
• v is a bounded continuous strictly increasing function, v : u(∆(X ))→ R,
• m is a probability measure, m ∈ ∆(∆(S)).
The uniqueness of the SOSEU representation implies that for any another triple
(u′, v′,m′)
i) u and u′ as well as v ◦ u and v′ ◦ u′ are each identical up to positive affine
transformation,
ii)
∫
∆(S) ϕdm =
∫
∆(S) ϕdm
′ for all continuous functions ϕ on ∆(S) for which
there exists a Borel signed measure λ on T := [u(∆(X ))]S with bounded
variation such that for all µ ∈ ∆(S) it holds that ϕ(µ) = ∫
T
v(µ · t)dλ(t).
4.4. Analysis
Naturally, the starting point of our analysis is the connection between our result
and that of Grant et al. (2010). As expected, completely eliminating uncertainty by
reducing it to risk produces their result as a special case of ours (see 4.4.1).
Furthermore, one (significant) indeterminacy in Theorem 4.1 is the specific form
of the φi, i ∈ I. In the current setting, the only restriction is that each of them
is an increasing continuous function. Let us therefore analyse the specific form of
these functions in relation with different (additional) properties of the preferences.
In particular, let us compare this to the findings presented in Grant et al. (2010).
Fortunately, their results and proofs actually do not rely on the underlying structure
of the outcome space and therefore all of their findings translate into our setting
without any modifications.
4.4.1. The Special Case of Risk. In the special case of (only) risk, i.e. S =
{s}, all belief systems are trivial. In consequence, the three-layer objects containing
uncertainty in the middle reduce to two-layer objects with only risk present. Further,
in order to identify this with the setting of Grant et al. (2010) assume that each vi,
i ∈ I, is actually a linear function (corresponding to indifference to uncertainty) or
equivalently assume reversal of order or reduction of compound lotteries.7 Thus, the
two-layer objects with risk collapse to single-layer objects with risk.
In this (special case of a) setting, first/second-stage independence simply reduces
to independence over outcome lotteries, dominance is now an empty statement, and
7Take i ∈ I. Then, reversal of order and reduction of compound lotteries each describe a property
of the preferences of individual i with respect to first-stage and second-stage mixtures.
Namely, reversal of order is satisfied if for all f, g ∈ H and α ∈ [0, 1]
αf ⊕ (1− α)g ∼i αf + (1− α)g.
Similarly, reduction of compound lotteries is satisfied if for all p, q ∈ ∆(X ) and α ∈ [0, 1]
αp⊕ (1− α)q ∼i αp+ (1− α)q.
The axiom of dominance implies the equivalence of these two properties (see Seo (2009)).
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the representation of the impartial observer takes on the form of the generalised
(weighted) utilitarian of Grant et al. (2010).
4.4.2. Fairness. One common criticism of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism is concerned
with fairness (see for example Diamond (1967)). It is one of the two issues that Grant
et al. (2010) solved by generalising the theory. The notion of fairness in this context
refers to a preference of the impartial observer for mixing act lotteries over mixing
identity lotteries.8
Consider from now on those tuples of identity and act lotteries between which
the impartial observer is indifferent, that is (z, P ′) and (z′, P ) with (z, P ′) ∼ (z′, P ).
Following the arguments in favour of fairness, the impartial observer always prefers
mixing these pairs on the level of acts over mixing on the level of identities, i.e.
(z, αP + (1− α)P ′)  (αz + (1− α)z′, P ) for all α ∈ (0, 1), which is also referred to
as a preference for life chances (compared to accidents of birth). In the case of risk,
Grant et al. (2010) show that this holds if and only if each φi, i ∈ I, is concave,
which actually translates one-to-one into our setting.
Conversely, consider a scenario where the impartial observer is indifferent between
life chances and accidents of birth, that is (z, αP + (1− α)P ′) ∼ (αz + (1− α)z′, P )
for all α ∈ (0, 1). In the case of risk, Grant et al. (2010) show that this holds if and
only if each φi, i ∈ I, is affine, which again translates one-to-one into our setting.9
4.4.3. Mixtures. In the previous part, the focus was on the relation between
mixing either identity or act lotteries. Another criticism of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism
is concerned with different attitudes among the individuals towards mixing.10
Fix two individuals, say i and j, and consider from now on those act lotteries
which the impartial observer ranks equally from each perspective, that is P, P˜ , Q, Q˜
with (i, P ) ∼ (j,Q) and (i, P˜ ) ∼ (j, Q˜). Imagine that the impartial observer prefers
facing the (first-stage) mixtures of each of those two pairings of act lotteries as i
rather than as j, i.e. (i, αP + (1−α)P˜ )  (j, αQ+ (1−α)Q˜) for all α ∈ (0, 1). Now,
Grant et al. (2010) show that this holds if and only if the composite function φ−1i ◦φj
is convex on the domain Uji := {u ∈ R | ∃P,Q ∈ ∆(H) : (i, P ) ∼ (j,Q) ∧ Uj(Q) = u}
for the case of risk but it actually also applies to our setting under uncertainty.
Alternatively, imagine that the impartial observer is indifferent when comparing
to face these mixtures as different individuals: (i, αP˜+(1−α)P ) ∼ (j, αQ˜+(1−α)Q)
for all α ∈ (0, 1) and all i, j ∈ I. Following Grant et al. (2010) this holds if and
only if φi = φ, i ∈ I, both for risk and under uncertainty. Further, let i1 and i2 be
8The paper of Grant et al. (2010) also provides an example justifying this notion of fairness.
9Note that in this case the resulting representation is actually equivalent to a framework with a single
probability distribution over states for every individual and simultaneously a modified probability
distribution over individuals that includes belief systems.
10In Grant et al. (2010) this issue is actually referred to as ‘different attitude towards risk’.
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a pair of individuals such that there exists a sequence of individuals j1, . . . , jN with
j1 = i1 and jN = i2 where each Ujn,jn−1 has non-empty interior. Then, the functions
Ui, i ∈ I, are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
4.5. Applications
In the following, two applications (or examples) for our approach are presented.
The first example picks up the story of the Afghan Goatherds from the introduction;
the second one is a simple economic example.
As mentioned in the introduction, the moral dilemma of the Afghan Goatherds
features a scenario where individuals agree on the ranking of social outcomes, but
disagree on the likelihood of these. It showcases the effect of the introduction of
uncertainty, as its results are purely driven by the nature of different belief systems.
The economic example on the other hand essentially serves as a proof of concept.
It illustrates that our framework is able to accommodate not only pure philosophical
but also economic problems. As a bonus, the example allows us to demonstrate the
effect of the degree of fairness on the level of the impartial observer.
4.5.1. Afghan Goatherds. First, recall the moral dilemma of the Afghan Goat-
herds described in the introduction. As mentioned there, our claim is actually not
that the commander of the unit necessarily made the decision using anything related
to our approach (even though it could very well be the case). However, our approach
allows a normative analysis of this (and similar) situations. You could for example be
developing a moral guideline for the military in the vein of the United States Army
Field Manuals. Naturally, you would then be in the position of a neutral or impartial
observer and evaluate the situation using the point of view of each involved individual
including their perception of the situation’s uncertainty.
Let us define the formal structure of the decision problem now. It is deliberately
kept simplistic compared to the actual events. Hence, it might not be a perfect fit for
every aspect of the original story, but should still serve as a proper demonstration of
an application of our theory.
First, let X = {0, 1}2\{(0, 0)} be the set of outcomes. Each element x = (x1, x2)
corresponds to the survival of the soldiers, x1, and that of the afghan goatherds, x2.
Each entry then indicates either ‘alive’, 1, or ‘dead’, 0. Furthermore, let S = {t, u}
be the states of the world, where t and u correspond to talking to the Taliban about
the soldiers and keeping quiet about them, respectively. Finally, the two available
moral choices are killing or sparing the civilians, denoted by K and L, respectively.
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Thus, using the previous notation, they are given by:
K =
{
(1, 0) s = t, u
L =
(0, 1) s = t(1, 1) s = u
Note that these elements only contain subjective risk (with respect to the states).
Together with the remaining specifications, this is actually going to guarantee that
the example is purely driven by individual belief systems.
In addition, let I = {1, . . . , 3} be the set of individuals - corresponding to the
team of soldiers.11 Following the traditional setting, the identity lottery that is part
of the choice problem is going to be fixed to (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Note that in this setting,
i.e. with this set of individuals and this (fixed) identity lottery, the specifications of
the next part actually conflict with our initial assumption of absence of unanimity.
Appendix C.2 analyses and corrects this problem by introduction of a dummy variable
without any changes to the preferences. In the rest of this analysis therefore consider
the assumption of absence of unanimity to be fulfilled.
4.5.1.1. Specifying the Moral Dilemma. In order for us to conduct a detailed anal-
ysis, we need to specify more about the preferences of the individuals and in particular
about the the nature of their belief systems. First of all, to ensure that our results
are purely driven by the beliefs of the soldiers, we assume that their preferences are
otherwise completely identical, that is ui = u and vi = v for each i ∈ I. Similarly,
assume that the impartial observer treats the soldiers identical with respect to facing
similar mixtures. Consequently, φi = φ, i ∈ I, by Section 4.4.3.
Furthermore, let us specify the ranking of all of the possible survival outcomes.
Naturally, you would assume that the soldiers rank the survival of all the highest.
Additionally, our assumption is going to be that the soldiers, when confronted with
the exclusive survival outcomes, prefer their own survival over that of the civilians.
This essentially captures the idea of universal self-preservation instincts. Therefore,
after using a positive affine transformation (to specify the lower and upper bound):
0 = u(0, 1) < u(1, 0) < u(1, 1) = 1
Moreover, the individuals are assumed to be uncertainty-averse, which then implies
a concave function v. In particular, it is going to be of the form zq for q ∈ (0, 1).
Assume further a preference for life chances (of the impartial observer). Thus, Section
4.4.2 yields that φ is also a concave function. As before, take zr for r ∈ (0, 1).
11In the original story, the team consists of four soldiers including the commander of the unit.
Each of the three regular soldiers exhibited different individual preferences, i.e. K 1 L, L 2 K
and K ∼3 L, which is already enough to construct a simple (yet interesting) example. Therefore,
excluding the commander as an individual is of no (significant) consequence to our analysis.
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In general, the belief systems mi are probability distributions over ∆(S), which
in this specific scenario is equivalent to probability distributions over [0, 1] by simply
identifying µ ∈ ∆(S) with p ∈ [0, 1] via p = µ(u) (alternatively p = µ(t)). Now, the
actual belief systems are going to be truncated normal distributions on [0, 1].12 Let
(µi, σi) denote a pair of parameters of the initial normal distributions. Then, assume
that µi = µ = 0.5 for i ∈ I and furthermore 0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < +∞. Hence,
the individual belief systems are mean-preserving spreads of each other, which allows
us to showcase the effect of introducing uncertainty to the framework. Additionally,
the centered mean captures the idea of unbiased individuals. Finally, combining
everything together yields the following utility of the impartial observer for the two
moral choices:
V (z,K) =
3∑
i=1
1
3
φ(v(u(1, 0)))
= (u(1, 0)q)r
V (z, L) =
3∑
i=1
1
3
φ
(∫ 1
0
v(pu(1, 1) + (1− p)u(0, 1))dmi(p)
)
=
3∑
i=1
1
3
(∫ 1
0
pqdm(µ, σi)(p)
)r
4.5.1.2. Numerical Analysis. In addition to calculating the results for specific val-
ues, the aim is to demonstrate the effect of uncertainty in our framework. Therefore,
consider a modified version of the framework where each individual only uses a single
(subjective) probability distribution over states but on a societal level there is an
additional probability distribution over these subjective probability distributions.13
In other words, instead of uncertainty, the model features subjective risk. Denote by
V˜ (z, P ) the evaluation of (z, P ) corresponding to the modified model. Ideally, the
comparison between our model and this modified one produces a difference and thus
justifies to a certain degree the use of the concept of uncertainty in our model.
Finally, fix q = 0.75, r = 0.25, σ1 = 0.01, σ2 = 0.1, σ3 = 1, and u(1, 0) = 0.48.
Now, the parameter choices here (and also the previous functional choices) should
be understood as part of an example. Our (numerical) analysis uses reasonable but
still debatable choices to enable us to showcase interesting phenomena for one of
potentially many formal interpretations of the story within our framework. Anyhow,
using these parameters produces the following values when rounded to the fourth
decimal:
12Alternatively, take beta distributions Beta(α, β) with varying α = β.
13Formally, this corresponds to the use of indicator functions as belief systems, i.e. mi = 1µi for
µi ∈ ∆(S) and all i ∈ I, and an extended set of individuals that includes beliefs, i.e. I × ∆(S)
where the density function is given by fz(i, µ) = zi ·mi(µ) for (i, µ) ∈ I ×∆(S), instead of I and
the corresponding z ∈ ∆(I).
78 4. THE IMPARTIAL OBSERVER UNDER UNCERTAINTY
V1 V2 V3 V V˜
K 0.5767 0.5767 0.5767 0.8714 0.8714
L 0.5946 0.5923 0.5723 0.8751 0.8657
As a consequence, the values produce the following rankings:
V3(L) < V1/2/3(K) < V2(L) < V1(L)
V (z,K) < V (z, L)
V˜ (z, L) < V˜ (z,K)
Therefore, the higher the (perceived) uncertainty on the level of the individuals
the lower the evaluation of L compared to that of K, which stays constant. In fact,
the dynamic actually produces different individual rankings of the two alternatives.
Additionally, the comparison of our model and the modified one actually produces
a different ranking on the level of the impartial observer. Thus, the introduction of
uncertainty influences (and to a certain extent drives) the final ranking. Further, the
impartial observer actually agrees with the result of a simple majority vote in this
specific case (which in general is not guaranteed).
4.5.2. Exchange Economy. Consider a simple exchange economy with two
goods and two individuals, with each of them receiving endowments. In this setting,
compare two alternative re-distributions rules, namely the Walrasian auctioneer and
the Egalitarian rule.14 Uncertainty enters the model via a possible bias in the distri-
bution of the endowments. This specific example serves as a proof-of-concept in the
sense that it shows an interpretation of a traditional economic problem within our
framework. It is based on an example by Eichberger and Pethig (1994).
Let I = {1, 2} be the set of individuals and let x and y denote the two goods.
In order to keep it simple, let us assume that the total endowment for each good is
set to 3 and restricted to positive integers. Thus, the possible initial endowments are
given by the two by two matrix(
e1,1 e1,2
e2,1 e2,2
)
=
(
((1, 1) , (2, 2)) ((1, 2) , (2, 1))
((2, 1) , (1, 2)) ((2, 2) , (1, 1))
)
where ei,j in row i and column j corresponds to individual 1 receiving (i, j) and
individual 2 receiving (3− i, 3− j) of the pair of goods (ex,k, ey,k), k = 1, 2.
In the following, our analysis focuses on two possible re-distributions of these
initial endowments, namely the Walrasian auctioneer and the Egalitarian rule. Let
the utility function of an individual i for the (re-distributed) goods xi and yi be given
14In general there is also a combination of the two, namely the Walras rule from Equal Division.
However, in this scenario, it coincides with the Egalitarian rule. See Nagahisa and Suh (1995) for a
characterisation of the Walras rules.
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by the Cobb-Douglas form (xiyi)
αi , where αi ∈ R>0. Then, the individuals evaluate
the results of the re-distributions as follows (depending on endowments):
In case of the Egalitarian rule, any endowment vector ((ex,1, ey,1) , (ex,2, ey,2))
yields the consumption bundles ((3/2, 3/2) , (3/2, 3/2)). In consequence, the util-
ity for an individual i is always given by (9/4)αi , independent of initial endowments.
Now, in case of the Walrasian auctioneer rule, any fixed endowment vector induces
a corresponding unique Walrasian equilibrium. The resulting utility of individual i
is then given by ((ex,i + ey,i)2/4)αi , where ex,i and ey,i are the initial endowments.
Using our matrix notation, the following then characterises the re-distribution rules
with respect to the individual utilities for all possible initial endowments:
E˜ :
(
e1,1 e1,2
e2,1 e2,2
)
7→
(
((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2) ((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2)
((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2) ((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2)
)
W˜ :
(
e1,1 e1,2
e2,1 e2,2
)
7→
(
(1, 4α2) ((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2)
((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2) (4α1 , 1)
)
The notation with the tilde is deliberate in order to distinguish these descriptions
from their counterparts that take the uncertainty into consideration.
As mentioned earlier, the uncertainty is about the probability distribution over
the initial endowments. Assume that there are two states, i.e. S = {s1, s2} where
s1 corresponds to a bias towards individual 1 and analogously s2 towards 2. Thus,
these are described via the following probability distributions (pi1 for s1, pi2 for s2):
pi1(ei,j) =

1
2
i = j = 2
1
4
i = 1, j = 2 or i = 2, j = 1
0 i = j = 1
pi2(ei,j) =

1
2
i = j = 1
1
4
i = 1, j = 2 or i = 2, j = 1
0 i = j = 2
In a sense, our example exhibits uncertainty about (the state of) the economy instead
of a fixed (state of the) economy with inherent uncertainty. Consequently, society
chooses the re-distribution rule before knowing the initial distributions.
Finally, to formally state the two rules taking uncertainty into consideration, i.e.
to formulate the act lotteries corresponding to them, combine the aforementioned
functions and probability distributions as follows:
E : sk 7→
(
E˜(ei,j) with probability pik(ei,j)
)
W : sk 7→
(
W˜ (ei,j) with probability pik(ei,j)
)
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Furthermore, using the inherent symmetries and other similarities simplifies it to:
E : s 7→ ((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2)
W : s 7→

(
4α11{s1}(s), 4α21{s2}(s)
)
with probability 1/2
((9/4)α1 , (9/4)α2)) with probability 1/2
Following the traditional setting, take again the ‘fair’ uniform identity lottery, that
is z = (1/2, 1/2). As in the previous example assume moreover that the impartial
observer treats individuals identical with respect to similar mixtures, thus φi = φ,
i ∈ I. In addition, set αi = 1/2 for both i (assuming similar risk-aversion) and fix vi
to be the identity function for both i (assuming uncertainty-neutrality).15 Also, take
φ = zr again but with r ∈ (0,+∞) this time.
As individual belief systems mi take truncated normal distributions on [0, 1]
again16, where p ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the probability of state si realizing. Fur-
ther, let (µi, σi) denote a pair of parameters of the initial normal distributions. Then
assume that µ1 = 0.75, µ2 = 0.25, and σi = σ = 0.25, i.e. each of the individuals
suspects a bias towards individual 1 and the same level of volatility.
Note that due to the exclusive nature of the game, essentially a zero-sum game,
and the additional assumptions, absence of unanimity requires no modifications. Fi-
nally, combine everything together for the following evaluations:
V (z, E) =
2∑
i=1
1
2
φi
(
vi
((
9
4
)αi))
=
(
3
2
)r
V (z,W ) =
2∑
i=1
1
2
φi
(∫ 1
0
vi
(
1
2
(
9
4
)αi
+
1
2
(4αip+ 1 (1− p))
)
dmi(p)
)
=
2∑
i=1
1
2
(
5
4
+
1
2
∫ 1
0
pdm(µi, σ)(p)
)r
Consider different values for r ∈ (0,+∞) now, which captures different degrees of
fairness on the level of the impartial observer. It results in the following values when
rounded to the fourth decimal:
V1 V2 V|r=1.5 V|r=1 V|r=0.5
W 1.5897 1.4103 1.8396 1.5000 1.2242
E 1.5000 1.5000 1.8371 1.5000 1.2247
15It seems completely counter-intuitive to assume uncertainty-neutrality in our framework as the
introduction of uncertainty is our main contribution. However, in this example and specifically this
(numerical) analysis our focus is on the effect of different transformations φ.
16Alternatively, take beta distributions Beta(α, β) with varying α = β.
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Evidently, the ranking of the impartial observer depends on the exact value of r and
the rankings of the individuals are diametrically opposed:
V2(W ) < V2(E) = V1(E) < V1(W )
V (z, E)|r=1.5 < V (z,W )|r=1.5
V (z, E)|r=1 = V (z,W )|r=1
V (z, E)|r=0.5 > V (z,W )|r=0.5
In other words, a preference for life chances of the impartial observer actually leads to
a preference of the Egalitarian rule over that of the Walrasian auctioneer in a setting
with a clear bias towards one specific individual. It essentially provides another
example for the discussion on the issue of fairness.
4.6. Conclusion
The focus of this chapter is the normative decision-making of an individual when
considering all other individuals in society and under the influence of uncertainty.
Based on the works of Grant et al. (2010) and Seo (2009) we provide an axiomatic
foundation for an extension of Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem that includes
Knightian uncertainty while also accommodating certain common criticism of the
traditional result. The main result shows that the impartial observer’s preferences
admit a representation in form of a weighted average of the individual (transformed)
second-order subjective expected utilities. This representation allows for a tractable
analysis of the normative choice problems under consideration. Furthermore, the
framework re-establishes links between additional properties of the preferences of the
impartial observer on one hand (e.g. the issues of fairness and mixtures) and the
specific form of the individual transformations on the other.
The main appeal of our model is the extension to normative decision-making in
situations where a group of individuals faces subjective instead of objective risk. The
story of the Afghan Goatherds is an example for such moral value judgements. It is
also purely driven by individual belief systems and thus provides justification for the
introduction of uncertainty to the framework. Moreover, the example shows that our
model in fact extends beyond the limitations of absence of unanimity via the use of
a dummy individual. Finally, the economic example is an application of our theory
to a scenario that demonstrates the effect of a preference for life chances - compared
to accidents of birth - of the impartial observer. It also serves as a proof-of-concept
for the application of our theory to economic problems in general.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1. Derivations
A.1.1. Election winning probability. In equation (2.11) we denoted the right-hand
side of the inequality by δ.
δ = Φ
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p
w, Em)− vms (p,Ewm))−
1
2
Φ
Recall that δ̂ is distributed uniformly (δ̂ ∼ U [−Ψ,Ψ]). Then using equation (2.12)
Π[ δ̂ > δ ] = (Ψ− δ) 1
2Ψ
we have
Π[ δ̂ > δ ] =
1
2
− 1
2Ψ
[
1
Φ
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(vms (p
w, Ewm)− vms (p,Em))− η
∑
j∈L
Cj(p)− 1
2
Φ](A.1)
After the simple manipulation equation (A.1) results in equation (2.13).
A.1.2. Equilibrium Conditions. Recall that the following formulas give the effects
of a marginal trade policy change on a specific swing voter and an industry:
∂vms (p,E
m)
∂pk
= (
εmk
Nm
− 1
N
)yk(pk) +
1
N
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk)
where εmk is an indicator function, that equals 1 when m = k and 0, otherwise.
∂pij(pj)
∂pk
= θjkyk(pk)
where θjk is an indicator function as well and it equals 1 when j = k and 0, otherwise.
To exploit the equilibrium first-order conditions, we have to sum up the effects over all
swing voters and industries respectively. First let’s consider the swing voters:
M∑
m=1
∂vms (p,E
m)
∂pk
=
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
((
εmk
Nm
− 1
N
)yk(pk) +
1
N
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk))
=
1
N
1
Φ
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk) + yk(pk)
M∑
m=1
αm
Φm
(
εmk
Nm
− 1
N
)
=
1
N
1
Φ
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk) + yk(pk)(
1
Nk
αk
Φk
− 1
N
1
Φ
)
(A.2)
Now derive the effect of a marginal policy change on all organized industries:
∑
j∈L
∂pij(pj)
∂pk
=
∑
j∈L
θjkyk(pk)
= Ikyk(pk)
(A.3)
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where
Ik =
{
1 if industry k is organized;
0 if industry k is unorganized.
Based on equation (2.19) the first-order condition in equation (2.17) can be written as
follows:
M∑
m=1
5αm
Φm
(vms (p,Em)− vms (pw, Ewm)) +
η
Φ
∑
j∈L
5pij(pj) = 0(A.4)
Based on equation (A.4), considering only the change in one dimension, in the price pk,
the relevant first-order condition accordingly will be:
1
N
1
Φ
(pk − pwk )m
′
k (pk) + yk(pk)(
1
Nk
αk
Φk
− 1
N
1
Φ
) + Ikyk(pk) = 0(A.5)
After some simple manipulations, equation (2.22) follows directly.
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B.1. Pseudocode
Note, that a couple of functions and variables are directly baked into the program
without any further explanation in the pseudocode below - for example the matrix that
determines the general network structure (for each player and all coalitions). The ori-
gin and characterisation of these can be found in their respective parts in the main pa-
per. The network structure A and the preference relations B both enter as a collection
of |X| × |X|-matrices, {AS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ and {BS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ resp., where (AS)i,j = 1{i→Sj}(i, j)
and (BS)i,j = 1{i≺Sj}(i, j) for (i, j) ∈ X × X. The detailed code is available at: https:
//pub.uni-bielefeld.de/librecat/record/preview/2931412
Algorithm Largest Consistent Set
Input: Countries N , Outcomes X, Network Structure A, Preference Relations B
Output: Largest Consistent Set {Y }
1: procedure ParameterSpaceLCS(N,X,A,B)
2: E = eMaxArea . See Section 3.3.6
3: α = αMinV alue(E) . See Section 3.3.6
4: for e ∈ E do
5: Y = GeneralLCS(N,X,A,B)
6: return {Y }
7: function GeneralLCS(N,X,A,B)
8: for S ⊆ N do
9: CS = min{AS, BS}
10: D0 = maxS⊆N{CS} . : Direct Dominance
11: n = 0
12: repeat
13: n = n+ 1
14: for S ⊆ N do
15: AnS = (1{(AS ·Dn−1)i,j 6=0}(i, j))(i,j)∈X×X
16: DnS = min{AnS, BS}
17: Dn = maxS⊆N{DnS} . : Indirect Dominance
18: until Dn = Dn−1
19: D = 1X +Dn
20: Y 0 = (1)x∈X
21: m = 0
22: repeat
23: m = m+ 1
24: for x ∈ X do
25: if Y m−1x = 0 then
26: Y mx = 0
27: else
28: y = max
k∈X,S⊆N
{
(AS)x,k
(
1−max
z∈X
{Y m−1z (D)k,z (1− (BS)x,z)}
)}
29: Y mx = Y
m−1
x − y
30: until Y m = Y m−1
31: Y = Y m
32: return Y
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B.2. Model
B.2.1. Individual Welfare. The following table lists the individual welfare for each
(representative) trade agreement, depending on endowments and tariffs, multiplied with the
factor 18. Note that for MFN, CUGFT, FTAGFT, and MTAGFT the welfare Wi resembles
Wj and Wk. In case of CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), and MTA(i,j) the welfare Wi is similar to Wj . For
FTAHub(i) the welfare Wj resembles Wk.
Trade Individual
Agreement Welfare
MFN

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 8t2i + t2j + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek − tj − tk)
+2ej(ek + ti + tk) + 2ek(ti + tj)
CU(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 11t2ik + t2jk + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk − tk)
+2ej(ek − 4tik + tk) + 2ek(5tik − tjk)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2ik + 4t2jk − 8t2k + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + 2tik + tk) + 4ek(9α− 2tik − 2tjk)
CUGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
FTA(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 11t2ik + t2jk + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk − tk)
+2ej(ek − 4tik + tk) + 2ek(5tik − tjk)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2ik + 4t2jk − 8tk2 + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + 2tik + tk) + 4ek(9α− 2tik − 2tjk)
FTAHub(i)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + t2jk + t2kj + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk + tkj)
+2ej(ek − tkj)− 2ektjk

Wj 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2jk − 11t2kj + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk − 4tkj)
+ej(−4ek + 10tkj) + 4ek(9α− 2tjk)
FTAGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
MTA(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 8t2i + t2j + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek − tj − tk)
+2ej(ek + ti + tk) + 2ek(ti + tj)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + t2i + t2j − 8t2k + 2ei(ej − 2ek + tj + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + ti + tk) + 4ek(9α− ti − tj)
MTAGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
Table B.1. The individual welfare for each trade agreement depend-
ing on endowments and tariffs
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B.2.2. Tariffs. The following describes the tariffs that the countries choose for each
trade agreement. In addition to the specific restrictions mentioned in Section 3.3.3, all
tariffs are bounded both from below and above by zero and the MFN-tariff respectively. As
per WTO rule, the formation of any PTA does not allow additional tariffs towards others -
which results in the upper bound of the MFN-tariff. Also, any form of subsidies is excluded
here - which results in the lower bound of zero. Now, the following determines and describes
the optimal tariffs for each scenario and the cases where capping occurs:
B.2.2.1. MFN. In this case, the optimal tariff of country i, given by t∗i =
1
8(ej + ek), is
always greater than zero as the endowments themselves are greater than zero. Additionally,
t∗i is going to play the role of the maximal tariff for country i for all the other agreements,
then denoted tMFNi .
B.2.2.2. CU. Consider the scenario CU(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i towards
country k, given by t∗ik =
1
5(2ek − ej), is always greater than zero but not always less than
the MFN-tariff (and the one towards country j, t∗ij , is always zero):
i) Lower Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≥ 35ej and thus ek > 12ej , which
guarantees t∗ik > 0.
ii) Upper Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≤ 53ej however t∗ik ≤ tMFNi
requires ek ≤ 1311ej , which leaves the interval 1311ej < ek ≤ 53ej to require capping. For this
interval, the (maximal) MFN-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the joint welfare with
respect to tik is always greater than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂(Wi +Wj)
tik
=
1
9
(−10tik − 2ej + 4ek) ≥ 1
36
(−13ej + 11ek) > 0
B.2.2.3. FTA. Consider the scenario FTA(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i to-
wards country k, given by t∗ik =
1
11(5ek−4ej), is neither always greater than zero nor always
less than the MFN-tariff (but the one towards country j, t∗ij , is zero):
i) Lower Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≥ 35ej however t∗ik ≥ 0 requires
ek ≥ 45ej , which leaves the interval 35ej ≤ ek < 45ej to require capping. For this interval, the
(minmal) zero-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the welfare with respect to tik is always
lesser than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂Wi
∂tik
=
1
9
(−11tik − 4ej + 5ek) ≤ 1
9
(5ek − 4ej) < 0
ii) Upper Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≤ 53ej however t∗ik ≤ tMFNi
requires ek ≤ 4329ej , which leaves the interval 4329ej < ek ≤ 53ej to require capping. For this
interval, the (maximal) MFN-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the welfare with respect
to tik is always greater than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂Wi
∂tik
=
1
9
(−11tik − 4ej + 5ek) ≥ 1
72
(−43ej + 29ek) > 0
B.2.2.4. MTA. Consider the scenario MTA(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i,
given by t∗i =
1
7(2ek − ej), is greater than zero and less or equal to the MFN-tariff as per
assumption on the endowments 35ej ≤ ek ≤ 53ej .
B.2.2.5. Notes. The analysis considered country i and an agreement with country j, but
it naturally extends to all other combinations. Also, the perspective of the third country
needs no further analysis as it always chooses the MFN-tariff. Furthermore, the case of
FTAHub(i) is simply a combination of FTA(i,j) and FTA(i,k). Finally, the three variants
of GFT require no additional analysis as every country always chooses the zero-tariff. In-
formation on another form of GFT, Pseudo-GFT, that technically exists but turns out to
be negligible, can be found in Appendix B.2.5.1.
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B.2.3. Overall Welfare. The following table lists the overall welfare for each (repre-
sentative) trade agreement, depending purely on endowments, computed modulo 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
,
which is the common term associated with the factor α. Also, the notation lc and lc is used
to indicate that country l is capped in terms of tariffs from below or above respectively. Note
that one specific comparison of trade agreements is presented in more detail in Appendix
B.2.5.2.
Trade Overall
Agreement Welfare
MFN

no cap 1132 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
CU(i,j)

no cap 11600 (−563e2i − 550eiej − 448eiek − 563e2j − 448ejek − 704e2k)

ic 11600 (−563e2i − 550eiej − 448eiek − 550e2j − 550ejek − 627e2k)

ic, jc 1132 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
CUGFT

no cap 13 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
FTA(i,j)

no cap 17744 (−2963e2i − 2662eiej − 1728eiek − 2963e2j − 1728ejek − 3648e2k)

ic
1
23232 (−8889e2i − 7986eiej − 5184eiek − 7865e2j − 7744ejek − 9344e2k)

ic, ic
1
192 (−65e2i − 66eiej − 64eiek − 65e2j − 64ejek − 64e2k)

ic 17744 (−2963e2i − 2662eiej − 1728eiek − 2662e2j − 2662ejek − 3155e2k)

ic, jc 1132 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
FTAHub(i)

no cap 1363 (−153e2i − 81eiej − 81eiek − 146e2j − 121ejek − 146e2k)

jc
1
363 (−137e2i − 81eiej − 121eiek − 146e2j − 121ejek − 121e2k)

jc, kc
1
3 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)

jc 123232 (−8889e2i − 5184eiej − 7986eiek − 9344e2j − 7744ejek − 7865e2k)

jc, kc 1192 (−66e2i − 66eiej − 66eiek − 65e2j − 64ejek − 65e2k)
FTAGFT

no cap 13 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
MTA(i,j)

no cap 13136 (−1083e2i − 1078eiej − 960eiek − 1083e2j − 960ejek − 1216e2k)
MTAGFT

no cap 13 (−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
Table B.2. The overall welfare for each trade agreement depending
on endowments
B.2.4. Transition Tables. The following lists the network structure of Section 3.3.5,
specifically Figure 3.1 and 3.2, in the form of transition tables:
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x1 ∈ X x2 ∈ X \ {x1} with x1 →{i} x2
MFN -
CU(i,j) MFN
CU(j,k) -
CU(k,i) MFN
CUGFT CU(j,k)
FTA(i,j) MFN
FTA(j,k) -
FTA(k,i) MFN
FTAHub(i) MFN, FTA(i,j), FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(j) FTA(j,k)
FTAHub(k) FTA(j,k)
FTAGFT FTA(j,k), FTAHub(j), FTAHub(k)
MTA(i,j) MFN
MTA(j,k) -
MTA(k,i) MFN
MTAGFT MTA(j,k)
(a) The transition table for coalition {i}, i ∈ N .
x1 ∈ X x2 ∈ X \ {x1} with x1 →{i,j} x2
MFN CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(i,j) MFN, FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CUGFT MFN, CU(i,j), CU(j,k), CU(k,i), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(i,j) MFN, CU(i,j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTAHub(j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTAHub(i), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(k,i), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(j) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), FTA(k,i),
FTAGFT, MTA(i,j)
FTAGFT MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), FTA(k,i),
FTAHub(i), FTAHub(j), FTAHub(k), MTA(i,j)
MTA(i,j) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j)
MTA(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
MTA(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
MTAGFT MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j), MTA(j,k), MTA(k,i)
(b) The transition table for coalition {i, j}, i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
Table B.3. The network structure as transition tables
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B.2.5. Additional Remarks.
B.2.5.1. Pseudo-GFT. In Appendix B.2.2 a special case of ‘Pseudo-GFT’ is a possibility.
Namely, in the case of a hub structure with both non-hub nodes capping at zero the trade
agreement amounts to the same tariff structure (and welfare) of a GFT. If it were ever part
of the stable set, then it would necessarily need to be considered de facto GFT even though
it is not de jure GFT. However, in our analysis this case never occurred and it is therefore
a negligible oddity.
B.2.5.2. A Special Case. As can be seen in Table B.2 the overall welfare is equal in case of
MFN, CU(ic, jc), and FTA(ic, jc) even though the tariff structure is different. The following
explores this equivalence in order to provide an insight into the underlying mechanics. In
terms of tariff structure both CU(ic, jc) and FTA(ic, jc) are the same and therefore it is
sufficient to compare MFN with CU(ic, jc) when only interested in (effects on) welfare.
Now, Table B.4 shows us the differences in the welfare (components) both on the individual
as well as on the joint/overall level, which are computed from the expressions in Table B.5
and B.6.
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
TRi 1/24(ej + ek)(2ej − ek)
CSi (32e
2
i + 64eiek − 13e2j − 26ejek + 19e2k)/1152
PSi 1/12ei(−ei − ek)
Wi (−64e2i − 32eiek + 83e2j + 22ejek − 29e2k)/1152
TRj 1/24(ei + ek)(2ei − ek)
CSj (−13e2i − 26eiek + 32e2j + 64ejek + 19e2k)/1152
PSj 1/12ej(−ej − ek)
Wj (83e
2
i + 22eiek − 64e2j − 32ejek − 29e2k)/1152
TRk 0
CSk 19(−e2i − 2eiek − e2j − 2ejek − 2e2k)/1152
PSk 1/24ek(ei + ej + 2ek)
Wk (−19e2i + 10eiek − 19e2j + 10ejek + 58e2k)/1152
(a) The difference in the individual welfare (components) depending on endowments
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
TRi + TRj 1/24(2e
2
i + eiek + 2e
2
j + ejek − 2e2k)
CSi + CSj 19(e
2
i + 2eiek + e
2
j + 2ejek + 2e
2
k)/1152
PSi + PSj 1/12(−e2i − eiek − e2j − ejek)
Wi +Wj (19e
2
i − 10eiek + 19e2j − 10ejek − 58e2k)/1152∑
n∈N TRn 1/24(2e
2
i + eiek + 2e
2
j + ejek − 2e2k)∑
n∈N CSn 0∑
n∈N PSn 1/24(−2e2i − eiek − 2e2j − ejek + 2e2k)∑
n∈N Wn 0
(b) The difference in the joint/overall welfare (components) depending on endowments
Table B.4. The difference in the welfare (components) depending on
endowments
B.2. MODEL 91
Welfare Components
MFN
TRi (ej + ek)
2/32
CSi (18e
2
i + 13e
2
j + 13e
2
k + 8ejek + 18ei(ej + ek))/128
PSi −ei(−16α+ 6ei + 3ej + 3ek)/8
TRj (ei + ek)
2/32
CSj (13e
2
i + 18e
2
j + 13e
2
k + 8eiek + 18ej(ei + ek))/128
PSj −ej(−16α+ 3ei + 6ej + 3ek)/8
TRk (ei + ej)
2/32
CSk (13e
2
i + 13e
2
j + 18e
2
k + 8eiej + 18ek(ei + ej))/128
PSk −ek(−16α+ 3ei + 3ej + 6ek)/8
CU(ic, jc)
TRi −(5ej − 7ek)(ej + ek)/96
CSi (65e
2
i + 65e
2
j + 49e
2
k + 49ejek + ei(81ej + 49ek))/576
PSi −ei(−48α+ 16ei + 9ej + 7ek)/24
TRj −(5ei − 7ek)(ei + ek)/96
CSj (65e
2
i + 65e
2
j + 49e
2
k + 49eiek + ej(81ei + 49ek))/576
PSj −ej(−48α+ 9ei + 16ej + 7ek)/24
TRk (ei + ej)
2/32
CSk (17e
2
i + 17e
2
j + 25e
2
k + 25eiek + 25ejek + 9eiej)/144
PSk −ek(−24α+ 5ei + 5ej + 10ek)/12
(a) The individual welfare (components) depending on endowments
Welfare Components
MFN
TRi + TRj 1/32(e
2
i + 2eiek + e
2
j + 2ejek + 2e
2
k)
CSi + CSj 1/128(31e
2
i + 36eiej + 26eiek + 31e
2
j + 26ejek + 26e
2
k)
PSi + PSj 1/8(−6e2i − 6eiej − 3eiek − 6e2j − 3ejek) + 2α(ei + ej)∑
n∈N TRn 1/16(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N CSn 11/32(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N PSn 1/4(−3e2i − 3eiej − 3eiek − 3e2j − 3ejek − 3e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
CU(ic, jc)
TRi + TRj 1/96(−5e2i + 2eiek − 5e2j + 2ejek + 14e2k)
CSi + CSj 1/288(65e
2
i + 81eiej + 49eiek + 65e
2
j + 49ejek + 49e
2
k)
PSi + PSj 1/24(−16e2i − 18eiej − 7eiek − 16e2j − 7ejek) + 2α(ei + ej)∑
n∈N TRn 1/48(−e2i + 3eiej + eiek − e2j + ejek + 7e2k)∑
n∈N CSn 11/32(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N PSn 1/24(−16e2i − 18eiej − 17eiek − 16e2j − 17ejek − 20e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
(b) The joint/overall welfare (components) depending on endowments
Table B.5. The welfare (components) depending on endowments
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Trade Individual/Joint/Overall
Agreement Welfare
MFN

Wi 1/128(−78e2i + 256αei − 30eiej − 30eiek + 17e2j + 16ejek + 17e2k)

Wj 1/128(17e
2
i − 30eiej + 16eiek − 78e2j + 256αej − 30ejek + 17e2k)

Wk 1/128(17e
2
i + 16eiej − 30eiek + 17e2j − 30ejek − 78e2k + 256αek)

Wi +Wj 1/128(−61e2i − 60eiej − 14eiek − 61e2j − 14ejek + 34e2k) + 2α(ei + ej)

∑
n∈N Wn 1/32(−11e2i − 11eiej − 11eiek − 11e2j − 11ejek − 11e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
CU(ic, jc)

Wi 1/576(−319e2i + 1152αei − 135eiej − 119eiek + 35e2j + 61ejek + 91e2k)

Wj 1/576(35e
2
i − 135eiej + 61eiek − 319e2j + 1152αej − 119ejek + 91e2k)

Wk 1/288(43e
2
i + 36eiej − 70eiek + 43e2j − 70ejek − 190e2k + 576αek)

Wi +Wj 1/288(−142e2i − 135eiej − 29eiek − 142e2j − 29ejek + 91e2k) + 2α(ei + ej)

∑
n∈N Wn 1/32(−11e2i − 11eiej − 11eiek − 11e2j − 11ejek − 11e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
Table B.6. The welfare depending on endowments
Now, recall that capping at the MFN-tariff for both members of a customs union, in this
case CU(ic, jc), occurs when the endowment of the non-member is above a minimal value
determined by the endowments of the members, max{ei, ej} < 1113ek (Appendix B.2.2). Us-
ing this together with the general assumptions on the relation of endowments, the following
effects on welfare (components) take place.
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
Country i Country j Country k
TR
+τi +τj 0
+τij 0
+τ
CS
+γi +γj −γk
+γij −γk
0
PS
−ρi −ρj +ρk
−ρij +ρk
−ρ
W
±ωi ±ωj +ωk
−ωij +ωk
0
Table B.7. The effect on the welfare (components)
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B.3. Analysis
B.3.1. Additional Graphics. The following provides detailed figures:
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(a) Overall Stability with PTAs
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(b) Overall Stability without PTAs
Figure B.1. Overall Stability with and without PTAs
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(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure B.2. Stability of MFN
(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure B.3. Stability of MTA
(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure B.4. Stability of MTAGFT
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(a) CU (b) CUGFT
Figure B.5. Stability of CU
(a) FTA (b) FTAGFT
(c) FTAHub
Figure B.6. Stability of FTA
B.3.2. Exact Intervals. The table here lists the exact intervals where each specific
trade agreement is part of the stable set (for the border of the parameter space):
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Trade Exact
Agreement Interval(s)
eb = emin ≤ ec ≤ emax = ea
CU(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.3380093520374081]
CU(c,a) [1.3259853039412157,1.6666666666666667]
FTA(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.3807615230460921]
FTA(c,a) [1.3353373413493654,1.6305945223780896]
FTAHub(c) [1.2364729458917836,1.2698730794923179]
[1.3353373413493654,1.3647294589178356]
MTA(c,a) [1.379425517702071,1.635938543754175]
eb = ec = emin ≤ ea ≤ emax
CU(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.1108884435537743]
CU(b,c) [1.0240480961923848,1.6666666666666667]
CU(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.1108884435537743]
CUGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
FTA(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.2404809619238477]
FTA(b,c) [1.0240480961923848,1.29124916499666]
[1.483633934535738,1.6666666666666667]
FTA(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.2404809619238477]
FTAHub(b) [1.0013360053440215,1.29124916499666]
FTAHub(c) [1.0013360053440215,1.29124916499666]
FTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
MTA(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.1469605878423514]
MTA(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.1469605878423514]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
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eb = emin ≤ ea = ec ≤ emax
MFN [1.2044088176352705,1.2297929191716768]
[1.2752171008684035,1.276553106212425]
CU(a,b) [1.0454241816967267,1.2498329993319974]
CU(b,c) [1.0454241816967267,1.2498329993319974]
CU(c,a) [1.0494321977287908,1.6666666666666667]
CUGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
FTA(a,b) [1.0494321977287908,1.2925851703406814]
FTA(b,c) [1.0494321977287908,1.2925851703406814]
FTA(c,a) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
FTAHub(a) [1.0454241816967267,1.276553106212425]
FTAHub(b) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
FTAHub(c) [1.0454241816967267,1.276553106212425]
FTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
MTA(a,b) [1.0494321977287908,1.2244488977955912]
MTA(b,c) [1.0494321977287908,1.2244488977955912]
MTA(c,a) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
Table B.8. The exact intervals of stability with PTAs
Trade Exact
Agreement Interval(s)
eb = emin ≤ ec ≤ emax = ea
MFN [1.0000000000000000,1.3780895123580494]
MTA(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.0000000000000000]
MTA(c,a) [1.379425517702071,1.6666666666666667]
eb = ec = emin ≤ ea ≤ emax
MFN [1.6666666666666667,1.6666666666666667]
MTA(a,b) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
MTA(b,c) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
[1.3754175016700068,1.6666666666666667]
MTA(c,a) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.3740814963259853]
eb = emin ≤ ea = ec ≤ emax
MTA(a,b) [1.0160320641282565,1.1202404809619237]
MTA(b,c) [1.0160320641282565,1.1202404809619237]
MTA(c,a) [1.0160320641282565,1.6666666666666667]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.203072812291249]
Table B.9. The exact intervals of stability without PTAs
APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Let us start the proof with a general remark on the compactness of the involved
sets: For any compact topological space (X, τ) the set ∆(X) is always compact with the
weak convergence topology. Now, X is compact by assumption and thus ∆(X ) is compact.
Furthermore, H = ∆(X )S as a finite Cartesian product of compact spaces is compact and
thus ∆(H) is compact.1 In addition, I is compact and therefore ∆(I) is compact as well.
Consequently, ∆(I)×∆(H) is compact. Next, let absence of unanimity apply and split the
proof into its two directions.
Assume absence of unanimity from now on. If there exist functions V and Vi, i ∈ I, that
represent the corresponding preferences, then this representation of the impartial observer’s
preferences is affine in identity lotteries. Therefore, it satisfies the acceptance principle and
independence over identity lotteries.
Conversely, let the preferences of the impartial observer now satisfy both the acceptance
principle and independence over identity lotteries. Then, let us first prove that there exist
lotteries P and P in ∆(H) and lotteries z1, z1, z2, z2 in ∆(I) with
1) (z1, P )  (z2, P )
2) (z1, P )  (z, P )  (z2, P ) ∀(z, P ) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(H)
3) (z1, P )  (z, P )  (z1, P ) ∀z ∈ ∆(I)
4) (z2, P )  (z, P )  (z2, P ) ∀z ∈ ∆(I)
Note that these lotteries do not necessarily have to be distinct. The existence itself follows
from continuity of , non-emptiness of , and compactness of ∆(I)×∆(H):
First of all, consider the collection of weak upper (resp. lower) contour sets, i.e.
{(z′, P ′) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(H)|(z′, P ′)  (z, P )} (resp. ) for (z, P ) in ∆(I) × ∆(H). Each
of them is a closed set because of the continuity of . Also, this collection satisfies the finite
intersection property as the intersection of a finite collection of contour set is simply the
contour set of the ‘maximal’ or ‘minimal’ element. Together with the fact that ∆(I)×∆(H)
is compact, this yields that the infinite intersection over all elements is non-empty. In other
words, there exists a maximal and minimal element (or pair) satisfying the second relation(s)
and by using the non-emptiness of  also the first. In addition, the remaining relations of
three and four follow either directly or by using similar arguments for closed subsets of the
contour sets.
Moreover, by independence over identity lotteries, we can take z1, z1, z2, z2 to be
degenerate identity lotteries i1, i1, i2, i2. Namely, take the relation (z1, P )  (z, P ) and
assume (for contradiction) that there exists no i ∈ I such that (i, P )  (z, P ) for all
(z, P ) ∈ ∆(I) ×∆(H). In other words, for all i ∈ I there exists a corresponding element
(z, P ) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(H) such that (z, P )  (i, P ). However, (z1, P )  (z, P ) and thus
(z1, P )  (i, P ) for all i ∈ I. Take now one i ∈ I such that z1i 6= 0 and define α := (z1i)
and z′ := 1(1−α) (z11, . . . , z1i−1, 0, z1i+1, . . . , z1I). Then, using independence over identity
1A modified proof that requires no specific structure of H but compactness could replace the last
one and a half sentences with ‘The set H is compact by assumption.’.
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lotteries, (z1, P )  (i, P ) implies by mixing with (z′, P ) that (αz1 + (1 − α)z′, P )  (αi +
(1 − α)z′, P ) = (z1, P ) - a contradiction to the maximality of (z1, P ). Similarly, the same
chain of arguments work for z2 as well as z1 and z2.
Next, let us show the following two (related) statements for these lotteries:
A) At least one of the following three relations always holds:
A1) (i1, P ) ∼ (i2, P );
A2) (i2, P ) ∼ (i1, P );
A3) (i2, P )  (i1, P ).
B) Take (z, P ) ∈ ∆(I)×∆(H), then at least one of two holds:
B1) (i1, P )  (z, P )  (i1, P );
B2) (i2, P )  (z, P )  (i2, P ).
Note, that B) follows from A) with 2)-4). Thus, let us show A). First, if P = P , then clearly
both A1) and A2) hold by property of i1, i1, i2, i2. Second, if P 6= P , then assume that A1)
and A2) do not hold, i.e. (i1, P )  (i2, P ) and (i1, P )  (i2, P ). By definition of i1, it
holds that (i2, P )  (i1, P ) and hence (i2, P )  (i2, P ). Using absence of unanimity and the
acceptance principle, there must exist another individual iˆ 6= i2 such that (ˆi, P )  (ˆi, P ).
Again, by definition of i1 it follows that (ˆi, P )  (i1, P ) and hence (ˆi, P )  (i1, P ). On the
other hand, by definition of i2, it follows that (i2, P )  (ˆi, P ) and hence (i2, P )  (i1, P ) as
desired.2
Using B) together with continuity, it follows that for any pair of lotteries (z, P ) there
exists z′ with (z, P ) ∼ (z′, P ) or there exists z′′ with (z, P ) ∼ (z′′, P ). Moreover, z′ and z′′
can actually be chosen such that they are convex combinations of i1 and i1 (for z′) and i2
and i2 (for z′′).
Finally, let us construct the (claimed) representation of the impartial observer’s prefer-
ences. First, assume again that P = P . Then, as before (i1, P )  (i1, P ) and for all (z, P )
it holds that (i1, P )  (z, P )  (i1, P ). Define for each (z, P ) the expression V (z, P ) by
(z, P ) ∼ (V (z, P )i1 + (1− V (z, P ))i1, P )
whose existence and uniqueness follows by continuity of  (see previous paragraph) and
independence over identity lotteries. In addition, the function V is continuous and represents
 on ∆(I)×∆(H). In order to show that this representation is also affine in identity lotteries,
take (z, P ) and (z′, P ) with their representations given by
(z, P ) ∼ (V (z, P )i1 + (1− V (z, P ))i1, P )
(z′, P ) ∼ (V (z′, P )i1 + (1− V (z′, P ))i1, P )
and note that independence over identity lotteries implies that the following mixture(
[αV (z, P ) + (1− α)V (z′, P )]i1 + [1− αV (z, P )− (1− α)V (z′, P )]i1, P
)
is on the same indifference curve as (αz+ (1−α)z′, P ). Thus, by definition and uniqueness
of V (·, ·) it holds that V (αz + (1 − α)z′, P ) = αV (z, P ) + (1 − α)V (z′, P ). Now, any
identity lottery z in ∆(I) can be written as z = ∑i∈I zii. Therefore, affinity implies
V (z, P ) =
∑
i∈I ziV (i, P ). The acceptance principle then yields that Vi : ∆(H)→ R defined
by Vi(P ) := V (i, P ) corresponds to i on ∆(H).
Uniqueness follows by standard arguments: Assume that W , Wi is another such rep-
resentation of , i with W (z, P ) =
∑
i∈I ziWi(P ). Let (z, P ) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(H) and
assume that without loss of generality B1) holds, i.e. (i1, P )  (z, P )  (i1, P ), (the case
of B2), i.e. (i2, P )  (z, P )  (i2, P ), follows similarly). Next, define a := W (i1, P )
and b := W (i1, P ) − W (i1, P ) > 0. Now, by definition of V it holds that (z, P ) ∼
2Even though our approach only uses ¬A1), it also works with ¬A2) and similar arguments.
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(V (z, P )i1 + (1− V (z, P ))i1, P ) and therefore, using that W is affine,
W (z, P ) = V (z, P )W (i1, P ) + (1− V (z, P ))W (i1, P )
= bV (z, P ) + a
with the definitions of a and b. Also, Wi(P ) = W (i, P ) = bV (i, P ) + a = bVi(P ) + a.
Second, assume now that P 6= P . If (i1, P ) ∼ (i2, P ) or (i2, P ) ∼ (i1, P ), then for
all (z, P ) we have (i1, P )  (z, P )  (i1, P ) or (i2, P )  (z, P )  (i2, P ). Thus, in both
cases, the arguments from the previous part still hold. Otherwise, by A3), it follows that
(i1, P )  (i2, P )  (i1, P )  (i2, P ). In other words, two overlapping intervals span the
entire range of the impartial observer’s preferences. Construct for each of those intervals
V 1 and V 2 as before. In order to merge these into a single V on the whole range, define
α1 := V
1(i2, P ), α2 := V 2(i1, P ) and then the (affine) transformed
V˜ 1(z, P ) :=
1− α2
1− (1− α1)α2V
1(z, P ) +
α1α2
1− (1− α1)α2
V˜ 2(z, P ) :=
α1
1− (1− α1)α2V
2(z, P )
to get agreement on the overlap (i2, P )  (z, P )  (i1, P ). Define V to be the merged
representation on the whole range, which is affine as both V 1 and V 2 as well as V˜ 1 and V˜ 2
are affine. Then, with the same arguments as before we get that V (z, P ) =
∑
iI ziVi(P ),
where Vi represent i for i ∈ I and V represents , and the representation exhibits the
claimed uniqueness. 
C.2. Construction of a Dummy
As mentioned in chapter 4, in order to actually satisfy the assumption of absence of
unanimity, without distorting any preferences, the introduction of a dummy individual d is
necessary. The following explains this necessity:
Assuming sufficiently heterogeneous beliefs, it is certainly possible to imagine a ranking
of the form K 1 L, L 2 K and K ∼3 L - essentially mirroring reality. However, the
assumption of absence of unanimity also applies to all degenerate outcome lotteries, like the
one always yielding the outcome (1, 1) irrespective of the state of the world and also the
one always yielding (0, 1). Certainly, it is counter-intuitive to assume that in reality one of
the soldiers would prefer the second over the first one, i.e. preferring being dead over being
alive with everything else fixed. Now, the dummy individual takes care of this problem by
preferring (0, 1) over (1, 1) and therefore maintaining absence of unanimity. At the same
time, the probability of imagining yourself as the dummy individual is set to zero (for both
options) to prevent any distortion on the level of preferences of the impartial observer.
A dummy individual seems artificial, especially one that is necessary because of an
assumption that is imposed by us on the model. Yet, it is not an actual restriction or
invalidates the assumption. It is merely a technical solution to a technical problem. The
two presented (degenerate) lotteries that conflict with absence of unanimity otherwise are
(or were) not part of the set of feasible options in reality anyway. A dummy individual in
this example is necessary due to the homogeneity of the individuals (and their preferences),
which is the result of a simplistic structure. Thus, a dummy individual allows us to apply
our theory to examples where the size of the choice set collides with absence of unanim-
ity otherwise. Essentially, this weakens absence of unanimity while still remaining in the
framework of our theory.
Formally: Consider I ′ = I ∪ {d} with the (fixed) identity lottery (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0) and
set ud(x1, x2) = u(x1, x2) and vd(y) = 1 − v(y) with md = m1 (or md = m2/3). It results
in the following (ultimately irrelevant) utilities for the two moral choices: Vd(K) = 0.4233
and Vd(L) = 0.4054; Consequently: Vd(L) < Vd(K).
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